KASYANOV ON OPPOSITION PROSPECTS; PUTIN'S PLANS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 004609

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/19/2017
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PINR RS
SUBJECT: KASYANOV ON OPPOSITION PROSPECTS; PUTIN'S PLANS


Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reason: 1.4 (d).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) A relaxed, self confident ex-Prime Minister Mikhail
Kasyanov told Ambassador September 18 that:

-- the appointment of 66-year old Viktor Zubkov as Prime
Minister meant that President Putin was determined to leave
office in 2008, but remained undecided about the succession;

-- if Zubkov became President, the chances were greater that
Putin would return to power before 2012;

-- Putin had appointed "his personal friend," Zubkov, in part
in order to reduce the influence that Presidential
Administration Head Igor Sechin exercised through former
Prime Minister Fradkov;

-- if First Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Ivanov became
President, an early Putin return to the presidency was
excluded (at least through 2012);

-- four parties would be in the new Duma: United Russia,
Just Russia, the Communist Party, and LDPR;

-- Putin's succession master plan could become clear as early
as the President's October 7 55th birthday;

-- Kasyanov would be allowed to register and run for
President only if the Kremlin were confident it could control
the outcome. Allowing Kasyanov into the second round of the
elections was "dangerous," as it would energize an otherwise
dispirited electorate. End summary.

Succession Scenarios
--------------


2. (C) In their September 18 meeting, ex-Prime Minister
Mikhail Kasyanov told Ambassador that the appointment of
Viktor Zubkov as Prime Minister meant that President Putin
had decided firmly to leave office in 2008, but had not yet
decided on a succession scenario. The elevation of Zubkov to
President, if it occurred, would increase the chances that
Putin would return before 2012, when his successor's term
would expire. If First Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Ivanov
were tapped for the presidency, an early Putin return would
not take place (at least not before 2012).


3. (C) Kasyanov thought that Putin had decided to bring
Zubkov into play relatively recently. He claimed that Zubkov
had been planning to retire when he reached the mandatory age
of 66 for government employees (Zubkov's birthday was
September 15).


4. (C) Putin had appointed Zubkov, his "personal friend," in
party to reduce the influence Presidential Administration
Head Igor Sechin wielded in Kremlin politics via Prime
Minister Fradkov. It was not clear what the President's next
step would be, but he could show his hand as early as his
October 7 birthday, which would provide the perfect occasion
for a dramatic announcement. In Kasyanov's view, if Putin
were going to make Ivanov president, he would have to make it
known soon, in order to solidify support.

Kasyanov's Campaign
--------------


5. (C) Kasyanov thought that the continued fragmentation of
the opposition had increased the Kremlin's confidence so much
that it might allow him to be registered and run for
President. His Popular Democratic Union would meet after the
Duma elections to decide if he should throw his hat into the
ring. If it appeared at that time that Zubkov would be
tapped for the presidency then, Kasyanov calculated, his odds
of success, if allowed to compete, would improve. A one-year
Zubkov presidency, Kasyanov thought, was the most dangerous
for Putin.


6. (C) Kasyanov shrugged off Kremlin-directed efforts by the
youth group "Nashi" to disrupt his campaign. Thirty Nashi
members followed him everywhere, even in Moscow, but they did
not appear to be getting information from the FSB about his
movements, which handicapped their efforts.

The Fragmented Opposition
--------------


7. (C) It appeared likely to Kasyanov that the opposition
would remain fragmented. Yabloko party Chairman Grigoriy
Yavlinskiy seemed to have won the Kremlin's approval to run a

MOSCOW 00004609 002 OF 002


campaign, and was getting AIR time on central television.
Kasyanov guessed that Yabloko's presence on national
television was calibrated in part to create the appearance of
a hotly-contested election, but that Yabloko would encounter
more obstacles as it attempted to campaign in the regions.


8. (C) If a "miracle" occurred, Yabloko could win seven
percent. It was more likely, Kasyanov believed, that it
would win three percent, which would entitle it to Federal
financing, and allow Yabloko to survive into the next
election cycle.


9. (C) The Union of Right Forces (SPS),in Kasyanov's view,
was equally unlikely to win seats in the Duma. SPS patron
Anatoliy Chubais had good relations with the Kremlin, but he
would not get its permission to spend the USD 200 million
from RAO UES coffers that Kasyanov estimated was necessary
for SPS to win Duma representation.


10. (C) Kasyanov joined other political observers here in
predicting that independent Duma Deputy Vladimir Ryzhkov
would not be offered a slot on the SPS party list. Ryzhkov
"has been a Duma deputy since he was 26, and knows nothing
else; he is very depressed." Kasyanov planned to offer
Ryzhkov a place in his organization after the SPS conference
on September 21.


11. (C) Kasyanov had unsuccessfully urged SPS and Yabloko not
to legitimate the political process by participating in the
elections. He differed with Other Russia, as well. Other
Russia leader Garry Kasparov wanted to be his organization's
candidate for President. Kasparov, Kasyanov said tactfully,
was a "potential friend" and some of Other Russia's members,
especially from Eduard Limonov's National Bolshevik Party,
were helping him in the regions.

Comment
--------------


12. (C) Kasyanov --no stranger to "take no prisoner" Kremlin
politics-- appeared, if anything, energized by the obstacles
he faces as he pursues his long-shot run at the presidency.
It is clear that he sees the surprise selection of Zubkov as
keeping not only Putin's, but his own, options alive.
Kasyanov evidently hopes that the instability created by a
weak potential successor, or Kremlin complaisance fostered by
a fractured opposition, will somehow create the perfect storm
he needs to make a serious run at the presidency.
Burns