WHAT ZUBKOV'S APPOINTMENT MIGHT MEAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 004511

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/13/2017
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL PINR RS
SUBJECT: WHAT ZUBKOV'S APPOINTMENT MIGHT MEAN

REF: MOSCOW 4483

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).

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Summary
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1. (C) President Putin's surprise decision to replace Prime
Minister Fradkov with First Deputy Finance Minister Viktor
Zubkov seems to have been the product of Kremlin clan
rivalries, a wish to keep all options open, a need to ride
herd over avaricious elites and a desire to at least
temporarily cut high-flying First Deputy Prime Minster Sergey
Ivanov down to size. The media and commentators have
suggested that the appointment of First Deputy Finance
Minister Zubkov brings back into play the long dormant
possibility of Putin's return to power; something that at
this juncture we find unlikely. Zubkov's September 14
confirmation may presage a cabinet re-shuffle of unknown
magnitude. In the end, Fradkov's long-expected departure did
little to answer the succession question, and in failing to
do so, was vintage Putin. End summary.

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Clan Politics
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2. (C) Since his February 14 promotion to First Deputy Prime
Minister, Sergey Ivanov's ascent to the presidency, possibly
via the prime minister's job, seemed increasingly inevitable.
Zubkov's appointment appears to have been a setback for
Ivanov, and a success for the efforts of Presidential
Administration Chief Sechin and his camp to remind the elites
of their continued influence. Putin, ever mindful of the
Kremlin's competing interests, may have acceded to the
attempt to restore the balance in order to puncture the
balloon of the high-flying Ivanov. The September 12 article
in Vedomosti (reftel),which forecast an Ivanov presidency
can be interpreted in that light as a last-ditch effort by
Ivanov supporters to avoid that setback. Alternatively, some
here speculate that the Zubkov appointment could have been a
sop to Sechin in order to win his acquiescence to an Ivanov
presidency.

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Zubkov as President
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3. (C) Although Zubkov during his meetings with Duma
political party factions September 13 did not exclude the
possibility that he could become president, the emerging
consensus in the media (that must rely on rumor and
speculation in the absence of authoritative information about
what is being planned) was that he was "too old" at 66, for
the job. (Putin may share that view. He reportedly told
editors at an August 24 meeting that Zubkov was very capable
"for a man of his age.") At a minimum, Zubkov's age and his
unexpected appointment have revived long-dormant speculation
that a Zubkov presidency, if it occurred, could be short and
might be followed by a Putin third term.


4. (C) A Zubkov prime ministership does not exclude an
Ivanov, Medvedev, or "other" presidency, however. Putin may
have pegged Zubkov for the job because his reputation for
probity, personal loyalty, and knowledge of where the
skeletons are buried made him better able to ride herd over
the financial competition among elites. That competition
will only further intensify as the President's term of office
nears its end. (In his September 13 Duma meetings, Zubkov
described corruption as the "key problem facing Russia.")
Certainly, it is much too early in the presidential marathon
to assume that Zubkov's surprise appointment has changed the
fundamentals of the contest. It instead may be a sign only
that Putin has not yet definitively settled on a successor.
(In the eyes of the political elite --the only group that
counts for Putin-- the selection of Ivanov for the job would
have sealed his claim to the presidency.)

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Putin in Charge
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5. (C) As noted reftel, the September 12 appointment was
vintage Putin. It was unexpected, it left no doubt that the
President remains firmly in control of the succession
process, it postponed his lame duck status, and it kept
afloat the largest possible number of succession options. It
also provided Putin with a plausible occasion for engineering
a Cabinet re-shuffle should he choose to do so. (Rumors here
suggest that Minister of the Economy Gref could be one of the
casualties. His departure, if it occurred, would have more to

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do with clan politics than with the GOR's economic policies.)
Some here speculate that Fradkov's departure could be the
leading edge of a more thorough re-structuring that could see
key potential contenders --Ivanov, Medvedev, Naryshkin,
Yakunin-- moved to positions that would inconclusively
highlight their candidacies.

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Comment
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6. (C) An inkling of Zubkov's intentions, or Putin's
intentions for Zubkov, may become apparent on September 14
when he addresses the Duma before his confirmation as Prime
Minister, but it appears at this juncture that the endgame
will emerge only slowly, and at a pace of Putin's choosing.
That will be disappointing to observers who had hoped that
Putin would show his hand early in order to compensate for
the absence of the institutions that normally inject
predictability into the political process. Such
expectations, however, ignore the far more compelling need,
from Putin's point of view, to ensure that he emerges from
this, the most delicate part of his presidency, unscathed and
with a successor of his choosing well positioned to continue
his agenda for Russia.
Burns