RUSSIA WANTS A STABLE PAKISTAN BUT AVOIDS DIRECT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 004420 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/31/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL IN PK RS XD SUBJECT: RUSSIA WANTS A STABLE PAKISTAN BUT AVOIDS DIRECT BACKING OF MUSHARRAF Classified By: Political M/C Alice D. Wells for reasons 1.4 (b/d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Russia seeks a stable Pakistan, preferably under the leadership of President Musharraf, but is reluctant to weigh in on the country's volatile political situation. The MFA told us that the GOR considers Musharraf capable of maintaining government control of the nation's nuclear weapons -- the top Russian priority in Pakistan -- and does not want him replaced by a less competent leader. Russia would like Musharraf to take stronger action against terrorist training camps but understands that he is hampered by domestic politics. Diplomats and analysts tell us that although Russian-Pakistani relations are slowly improving, the relationship remains constrained by Russia's strong ties with India and Russian inability to move past Pakistan's anti-Soviet role during the Cold War. End summary. Russia Favors the Predictable Musharraf -------------- ¶2. (C) Russia's primary concern is that the Pakistani government maintains control of its nuclear weapons, according to Andrey Starkov, the MFA's Head of Department for Pakistan. The GOR would like to see Musharraf eliminate the terrorist training camps in Pakistan's tribal regions but understands that the he is hamstrung by political realities. The Pakistani President is viewed by the GOR as a "predictable and pragmatic" leader who deals effectively with these issues, considering the country's turbulent domestic situation. Starkov stressed that Russia would be concerned if he were replaced by a less capable leader, but, "unlike the U.S.," his government is not prepared to intervene or take a public position on the upcoming Pakistani elections. Little Russian Activity or Influence in Pakistan -------------- --- ¶3. (C) Starkov explained that Russia is not particularly active in Pakistan. The most dynamic elements of the bilateral relationship are the Regional Stability Working Group that annually brings together interagency representatives to discuss South Asian issues and the Anti-Terrorism Working Group that fosters cooperation and intelligence sharing. Starkov noted that real counter-terrorism cooperation is limited to the GOR periodically providing information on Chechen and Central Asian extremists believed to be in Pakistan. Few Results from the Relationship -------------- ¶4. (C) Pakistani DCM Syed Sail Abbas commented that Russia is slowly improving its relationship with Pakistan, but there does not appear to be any urgency on the part of the GOR nor is there an apparent goal other than for Russia to expand its diplomatic role in Asia. The working groups meet annually, as do the foreign ministers, but there are no concrete results. The DCM confirmed that the GOR does not comment on Pakistani internal matters and has not weighed in on the possibility of Musharraf sharing power with former PM Bhutto or other aspects of the upcoming Pakistani elections. Soviet Thinking and India Impact Russian Policy -------------- -- ¶5. (C) Experts see both the Soviet experience in Afghanistan and Russia's current relationship with India as affecting the GOR's dealings with Pakistan. Yevgeniy Satanovskiy of the Institute of Middle East Studies asserted that Pakistan's active support of anti-Soviet forces in Afghanistan still colors Russian thinking about Pakistan. That said, the GOR has adopted a "realistic" approach and prefers that a military strongman like Musharraf maintain stability in a country rife with tribal warfare and engaged in a battle against terrorists and extremists. Satanovskiy understands that some Russian policy makers fear that without a military leader like Musharraf, Pakistan could face an Islamic revolution and become another Iran, but with an already developed nuclear arsenal. ¶6. (C) Both Satanovskiy and Yakolevich Belokrinitsky of the Oriental Studies Institute agreed that the GOR would not risk damaging its relationship with India by way of Pakistan. India remains Russia's "traditional" ally in the region. Gennady Chufrin of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations told us that improving economic ties with India is the GOR's key interest in South Asia (septel), which has led Russia to steer clear of embroiling itself in contentious issues that could land Russia between India and Pakistan. Pakistani DCM Abbas cited as an example Pakistan's MOSCOW 00004420 002 OF 002 efforts to purchase Russian military equipment for counter-terrorism purposes. The GOR responded simply that it would "consider" the request. Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) Although MFA officials did not speculate about the political prospects of either of Pakistan's former Prime Ministers, they clearly signaled their preference for the status quo, while conceding it may not be sustainable. Burns