KASPAROV, KASYANOV'S OPPOSITION: LARGELY

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 004418

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2017
TAGS: PGOV KDEM SOCI RS
SUBJECT: KASPAROV, KASYANOV'S OPPOSITION: LARGELY
IRRELEVANT


Classified By: Pol M/C Alice G. Wells. Reason: 1.4 (b).

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Summary
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1. (C) The movements led by Other Russia's Garry Kasparov and
ex-Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov seem to have fallen prey
to an inability to forge coalitions with colleagues similarly
inclined to reject the limited opportunities offered by the
current electoral cycle. Kasparov's Other Russia appears to
have foundered on a lack of unanimity among the movement's
heterogeneous coalition members, fostered by the lack of a
consensus candidate for president. In spite of the publicity
they generated abroad, the spring's "marches of dissent"
failed to snowball into a genuine movement here. Lack of
central media access and continued apathy across a broad
swath of the population seem also to have taken a toll.
Kasyanov's one-man campaign for the presidency faces many of
the same obstacles --lack of central media access, constant
harassment from a pro-Kremlin youth movement, and no support
from potential confederates. The two movements' prospects,
never better than bad, look, if anything, worse as the
official campaign season begins. End summary.

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Subdued Kasparov Ratchets
Down Already Low Expectations
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2. (C) A subdued United Civic Front and Other Russia leader
Garry Kasparov sketched for us September 5 a picture of his
movement that suggested it was largely adrift, following
Kasparov's controversial decision to back ex-central banker
Viktor Gerashchenko's stillborn bid for the presidency.
Kasparov acknowledged that his effort to promote Gerashchenko
had met resistance from Other Russia allies Eduard Limonov
and Sergey Udaltsov, and had provoked astonishment among
those who had flirted with Other Russia, like Duma Deputy
Vladimir Ryzhkov. In Kasparov's view, Gerashchenko's
prospects had ended with Communist Party Chairman Gennadiy
Zyuganov's success in winning Kremlin approval for his party,
and in "selling enough seats" on the party list to quell all
opposition to his continued leadership in the party's ranks.


3. (C) With Gerashchenko's eclipse, Kasparov acknowledged
that he had become Other Russia's default presidential
candidate, although earlier in the summer, Limonov and he had
insisted that they would never run for office. Kasparov
pegged his involuntary candidacy to "the will of the people"
in Other Russia. The organization's regional "primaries" had
identified him as the consensus candidate, although his
formal nomination would have to await the movement's early
September congress.


4. (C) Kasparov took some counterintuitive heart in the fact
that plans to have the Russian translation of his book, "How
Life Imitates Chess," unveiled at the September 5 - 9 Moscow
Book Fair had allegedly been scuppered by pressure from the
authorities. "It means they still consider me a threat," he
said hopefully. He guessed that there had been resistance to
his photograph being displayed around the grounds of one of
Moscow's largest exhibition centers. Still, Kasparov thought
that, in the end, the publisher would go forward with the
book, if only because the profits it would realize through
sales in Israel and the United States were too large to
refuse.


5. (C) Kasparov had traveled to Chelyabinsk on September 4,
where he had been met by a picket from the pro-Kremlin youth
group "Young Guard." The picket had not disrupted his
planned meetings with Other Russia adherents, but he worried
that such harassment would become a permanent feature of the
fall campaign season.


6. (C) Other Russia caucuses in the regions were to be
followed by larger meetings in some of the more prominent
regional capitals, such as St. Petersburg and Yekaterinburg.
Kasparov thought it unlikely that ex-Prime Minister Mikhail
Kasyanov's organization would ally itself with Other Russia.
Kasyanov's plans to stage a "March of Dissent" on October 7,
the date of journalist Anna Politkovskaya's assassination and
President Putin's birthday, struck Kasparov as "suicidal,"
and Other Russia would not sign on. There were no Other
Russia plans to continue the marches that had caused so much
controversy in the spring. Instead, Kasparov hoped to
quietly augment his organization with defectors from, for
example, St. Petersburg's Yabloko organization, and perhaps
some of those who had been ousted in the Union of Right
Forces' (SPS) purge of its Moscow organization. His earlier
hopes that members of the Communist Party's social-democratic

wing might work with Other Russia had ended.


7. (C) Kasparov held out some hope that Other Russia could
attract political allies, such as Republican Party Chairman
Vladimir Ryzhkov. Ryzhkov had told Kasparov September 3 that
he had failed in his bid to be included on SPS's party list.
(Ekho Moskvy Editor Aleksey Venediktov told us that SPS
Chairman Nikita Belykh sought and failed to secure
Presidential Administration Deputy Vladislav Surkov's
approval to include Ryzhkov -- a move that was previewed in a
press interview with the SPS's Boris Nemtsov. Surkov
allegedly reacted to the proposal by telling Belykh that the
media would be "closed" to SPS if Ryzhkov, a "traitor," was
welcomed to the SPS fold.) That might make it more likely
that Ryzhkov, and Duma Deputy Dmitriy Rogozin, who had
similarly failed with his Velikaya Rossiya project, and would
--in Kasparov's view-- not succeed in finding a place with
his confederates on the "Patriots of Russia" list, would
eventually join Other Russia.

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Kasyanov Flounders
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8. (C) Kasyanov's Press Secretary Yelena Dikun was similarly
subdued September 4, as she recounted continued harassment
from the Young Guards. Kasyanov's crew had been met upon
arrival at the Yekaterinburg airport September 3 by two cars
of YGs who had strewn rakes in the path of their motorcade as
they left the terminal. As has happened on previous
occasions, the director of the hotel whose conference room
they had booked canceled when they arrived, alleging that he
had not known that the Kasyanov was involved in politics.
Still, Dikun said, they had succeeded in finding a second
venue, and held meeting, which was covered by the regional
REN-TV and by a second regional television station.


9. (C) New to the Young Guard's tactics, Dikun said, was
harassment in Moscow. Upon returning to the capital after
their trip to Yekaterinburg, Kasyanov's crew had met with a
similar reception at their Moscow airport. They elected not
to publicize the harassment to the press in an attempt not to
encourage the Young Guards.


10. (C) Dikun saw "zero" chance that Kasyanov would join
forces with Other Russia. Their attempts to stage a "march
of dissent" were part of an effort to give their campaign
some street credibility. Dikun would not predict how many
marchers might take part.


11. (C) With the onset of the campaign, the key task, said
Dikun, was collecting enough signatures to get Kasyanov on
the ballot. The sheer numbers, and cost involved, made
success unlikely, she said. Further complicating their
efforts would be close scrutiny of the signatures submitted
for registration. Kasyanov's fall strategy was to "continue
to travel" the regions and, evidently hope that the
inevitability of presidential succession might prompt a
dissatisfied electorate to look elsewhere. That, she
admitted, was not likely, but "(Kasyanov's) campaign will not
stop with this (presidential) election.

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Comment
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12. (C) Kasparov as well made it clear that current
unpromising circumstances were forcing him to take the long
view of the struggle he believes he is waging. He made
frequent reference during the conversation to the period
following the inauguration of the new president when, he
hoped, current levels of satisfaction would decline. In the
meantime, it appears that the official political playing
field, uneven as it is, is still attractive and acceptable
enough to the majority of politicians interested in governing
Russia.
Burns