COMMUNIST PARTY TAKES TO DUMA ELECTION TRAIL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 004347

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2017
TAGS: PGOV RS
SUBJECT: COMMUNIST PARTY TAKES TO DUMA ELECTION TRAIL


Classified By: PolCouns Alice G. Wells for reason 1.4(b and d).


1. 1. (C) SUMMARY. Gennadiy Zyuganov, the Chairman of the
Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF),headlined a
press conference on August 29 to launch the 2007 Duma
campaign. He and other party leaders took an often defiant
tone for what may be the strongest political organization in
opposition, taking the government to task for manipulating
the electoral process and criticizing the Kremlin-backed
leftist party, "Just Russia" (SR). Later that day, KPRF
First Deputy Secretary Ivan Melnikov shared with Embassy his
concerns about the lack of transparency in the democratic
process, the lack of access to the media, anQworries about
the Kremlin's misuse of administrative resources to benefit
the "parties of power" -- United Russia and Just Russia.
Given the KPRF's surprising gains in the March regional
elections; unanticipated increases in the Party's financial
resources; and the shifting political landscape, the stage
may be set for a stronger than expected showing for the KPRF
in the coming election.
END SUMMARY

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Off and Running
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2) The KPRF leadership used the press conference to announce
the date of their party conference -- September 22 -- and the
list of candidates for the top three slots on the national
slate. The latter offered no surprises, with Zyuganov
heading the list with unanimous support from all regional
parties, followed by Nobel Prize Winner Zhores Alferov;
Melnikov; former cosmonaut and Duma deputy Svetlana
Savitskaya; and party deputy chairman Vladimir Kashin. Two
other contenders, Duma deputies Viktor Ilyusin and Nikolay
Kharitonov, also made the list but have little chance of
being included in the top three. Melnikov publicly
underscored the democratic process that brought these
candidates to the fore, noting that the list resulted from
the work of regional conferences over the summer and
represented the desires of the party membership.


3. (U) Zyuganov at the press conference came out swinging,
referring to Just Russia as a party of "turncoats, traitors,
and cast-offs" and downplayed concerns about losing members
to the KPRF's leftist competitors. Melnikov accused SR of
stealing the KPRF platform and even its symbols, showing an
image of a SR political placard featuring an icebreaker that
bears close resemblance to a propaganda poster used by the
Communists in last year's campaign.

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KPRF Promoting Transparency, Open Access to Media
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4. (U) At the press conference, Central Committee Secretary
Vadim Solovyev gave an impassioned critique of the electoral
process, harkening back to international condemnation of the
2003 elections as "unfair and not in conjunction with
international norms" and then argued that current conditions
were far worse. He despaired of the new election laws which,
in his opinion, violate the main democratic principle -- "all
candidates and parties should compete on a level playing
field." Three issues were particularly vexing to the KPRF:
the inclusion of governors and ministers on United Russia
(UR) party lists, which then turn the levers of influence of
those offices to benefit the candidates; UR's "monopoly"
control of the regional electoral commissions; and unequal
access to the media. For the latter, he asserted that 70
percent of television political programming was reserved for
United Russia, while any reporting on the KPRF was generally
negative.


5. (C) Behind closed doors, Melnikov continued along those
lines. His defense of electoral transparency, the need for
clear democratic procedures, and promotion of a traditional
"social democratic" agenda may have been tuned to Qe ear of
his interlocutors, but sounded closer to the policies of
European mainstream leftist politicians than the inheritors
of Lenin's legacy. He underscored the KPRF's opposition to
the changes in the electoral law and the emergence of a new
system that appears tilted to benefit United Russia. In
particular he condemned the new bar of 7% for a party's
accession to the Duma as contrary to the interest of
developing a diverse political structure.


6. (C) Melnikov despaired of not being able to reach a
broader audience through the mass media. On the most
important medium, television, he said that REN TV "tried" to
provide more objective coverage, but that all other channels
were solidly in the UR camp. He predicted -- correctly --
that none of the main stations would publicize the morning's

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press conference. He also claimed that the KPRF also had
difficulty with the print media, in part because Mironov was
using SR's comparatively stronger war chest to "buy up"
articles.


7. (U) Despite its problems with media access, analysis by
the independent Politcom.ru and PR company Medialogiya shows
that total press coverage (print, radio, and television) for
the KPRF does not lag all that far behind UR. Indeed, during
the last week of August, the survey found 766 citations about
the KPRF vice 825 for United Russia. Moreover, when
assessing the tone and significance of the material covered,
Politcom.ru gave the KPRF top billing for the week -- in part
because of Zyuganov's strong showing at the press conference.

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Reaching the Under-30 Crowd
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8. (C) When looking at the electoral landscape, Melnikov saw
the core of KPRF support coming primarily from "middle aged"
Russians, aged 40-50, whose childhood experiences during the
late Brezhnev/Gorbachev period continue to draw them to the
party. He noted that this generation is looking to the
future when they too will have to live on their pensions and
see the KPRF as perhaps the best defender of those interests.
Melnikov also took particular pride that, as he claimed, the
party has allegedly attracted the most educated part of the
population and he pointed to the academic accreditations of
the party's elite. (His staff assistant modestly pointed out
that Melnikov himself has a doctorate.) When questioned
about the youth vote, Melnikov admitted that his party has a
challenge in reaching out to that segment of the electorate.
He expressed his belief that most of the under-30 electorate
was apolitical and thus largely irrelevant in the coming Duma
elections.


9. (U) The KPRF campaign kick-off followed on the heels of
two incidents that seem to strike at the party's ability to
attract and retain younger voters: the reported defection at
their late August conference of more than half of the Union
of Communist Youth to the rival Just Russia party and a
well-publicized street fight between young KPRF members and
the SR's "Young Guard" in Moscow on 20 August. The challenge
of explaining the KPRF's take on those incidents at the press
conference fell to Yuriy Afonin, the First Secretary of the
Union of Communist Youth. For the former, Afonin underscored
that the break within the youth group reflected an earlier
split in 2004, when the then head of the organization
Konstantin Zhukov announced his defection to Patriotic
Russia. Thus, as Afonin argued, the more recent schism does
not really represent any change in the expected voting
support from the Union's membership. The latter incident he
dismissed as merely provocation, but promised that the
Communist youth would be ready to rebuff future pressure.

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Signs of Growing Strength?
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10. (U) Data released by the Central Election Commission on
political financing during the second quarter of 2007 showed
an unexpected increase in KPRF revenues, moving the party to
third place: behind the Kremlin-backed parties, but ahead of
the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) and the other
smaller competitors. KPRF officials have long pleaded
poverty as one of the weaknesses of the party, preferring to
characterize their political successes as a "David vs.
Goliath"-type victory against the Kremlin-backed parties.
Indeed Zyuganov publicly extolled the contribution of
membership dues as the primary source of funding for the
party, even as Melnikov admitted privately that they provide
only six percent of party revenues.


11. (U) While the KPRF continues to lag far behind the
front-runners in its ability to attract political revenues,
the increase in financial support suggests that some members
of the elite who are unable to find a place in the parties of
power may be looking at the KPRF as the best bet in the
coming election. We cannot rule out that some of the
financing came indirectly from government sources, as some in
the Kremlin see the benefit of the KPRF as a largely harmless
outlet for opposition.


12. (C) COMMENT: Whereas a year ago, there were doubts that
the KPRF would make the 7% electoral threshold for the Duma,
it appears that the party stands in a good position for the
coming elections. The unanticipated increases in the Party's
financial resources and the shifting political landscape
before the elections provide an opportunity for the KPRF to
consolidate its position in the Duma and, perhaps, as the
strongest opposition organization in the country.

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(Indpendent pollster Levada in late August shoed the KPRF as
drawing 18% of the population that intends to vote in the
Duma election; a distant second place behind UR, but with
twice the support of SR.) END COMMENT.
Burns