Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07MOSCOW4328
2007-09-04 15:36:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

DFM KARASIN ON GEORGIA AND OTHER NEIGHBORS

Tags:  PREL MARR MOPS OSCE UNGA MD GG RS 
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VZCZCXRO7669
OO RUEHDBU
DE RUEHMO #4328/01 2471536
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O 041536Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3512
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 004328 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2017
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS OSCE UNGA MD GG RS
SUBJECT: DFM KARASIN ON GEORGIA AND OTHER NEIGHBORS

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reason: 1.4 (b, d)

SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 004328

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2017
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS OSCE UNGA MD GG RS
SUBJECT: DFM KARASIN ON GEORGIA AND OTHER NEIGHBORS

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reason: 1.4 (b, d)

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Two contentious issues -- Georgia and the Russian
charges against the American HOM of OSCE Moldova -- dominated
the Ambassador's September 4 meeting with DFM Karasin (the
latter exchange reported separately). On Georgia, Karasin
said State Minister Bakradze started off on the wrong foot
with Russia by adopting tough tones of outrage. Karasin gave
a lengthy exposition of the August 6 missile incident along
familiar lines. He tied that incident, the August 22 air
incursion over Kodori, and the detention of peacekeepers in
both South Ossetia and Abkhazia together as an alleged
Georgian preparation for military action. Karasin and the
Ambassador briefly discussed Karasin's weekend visit to Baku,
Ukrainian politics, GUAM and controversial remarks by the
Russian ambassador in Belarus. END SUMMARY.

Azerbaijan
--------------


2. (C) Karasin led off with Baku, from which he had just
returned. He found the Azeris in a "good mood," eager under
their "multi-vectored" foreign policy to develop relations
with Russia. Use of the Qabala radar station figured in
discussions, and Karasin said he noted to the Azeris the
difference in principle between the U.S. and Russian
approaches, with the U.S. viewing Qabala as a complement to
its other plans, while Russia viewed it as an alternative.


3. (C) Karasin was not optimistic about progress on
Nagorno-Karabakh peace talks; he found the Azeri mood
"grimmer." The last possible venue for progress before the
Armenian electoral cycle kicks in will be the October 5-6 CIS
meeting in Dushanbe. The Azeris had complained to Karasin
about OSCE special representative Andrzej Kasprczyk, who had
angered them by accepting a diplomatic note from the Karabakh
authorities. Karasin said he had agreed this was a mistake,
but Kasprczyk had ten years' experience on the thorny issue;
replacing him would mean a hiatus of at least a year before
his successor knew enough to work effectively.

Ukraine
--------------


4. (C) Karasin said Russia is "calm" about the upcoming
Ukrainian elections. Russia is not taking sides. There are
some "permanent" irritants, such as the Ukrainian harping on
the Holodomor (1930's collectivization famine) and
compensation for relatives of victims of Stalin's repression
-- legal cases Americans are helping Ukrainians prepare.
Ambassador said the U.S. is also calm about the Ukrainian
elections.

GUAM
--------------


5. (C) Karasin raised the GUAM proposal to discuss Frozen

Conflicts at the UN. He believed no good could come out of
such a discussion. He thought the U.S. and Russia should
agree to the solution adopted last year, and defer discussion
to the 62nd General Assembly. Ambassador said Washington was
considering the issue at present.

Belarus
--------------


6. (C) The Ambassador thanked FM Lavrov for denying
statements by Russian Ambassador to Belarus Surikov to the
effect that Russia could consider deploying nuclear weapons
in that country. Karasin said that Surikov was expressing
personal thoughts. They had been taken out of context and
blown up by the Belarusan media. "It is a minor diplomatic
incident," he said. "Nothing more."

Georgia
--------------


7. (C) The Ambassador said he had just spoken with A/S Fried
on the August 6 missile incident in Georgia. We are not
trying to politicize the incident. It is in everyone's
interest to move back to a process of normalization between
Russia and Georgia. Ambassador asked about the August 30
visit of Georgian State Minister for Conflict Resolution
Bakradze and DFM Manjgaladze.


8. (C) Karasin replied that it was good that the Georgians
came, but he "personally didn't like" their tone of outrage.
Karasin had met Bakradze several times before, and found him
thoughtful and intelligent. But last week he was "emotional"

MOSCOW 00004328 002 OF 002


and "stressed," and not very diplomatic. Karasin railed --
along familiar lines -- against the charges of aggression
laid at Russia's door by the Georgians after the August 6
missile incident. He was "disappointed" that most western
countries accepted the Georgian version. He reiterated the
standard Russian analysis of the incident, concluding that it
was a Georgian fabrication. He said that with former DefMin
Okruashvili returning to politics in opposition to
Saakashvili from the right, Saakashvili is being forced to
move right to cover his flank; Karasin implied this was the
motive behind the alleged fabrication. Ambassador replied
that the U.S., despite its opposite view of the incident, is
not seeking to politicize it. Rather, our aim is to prevent
a recurrence of such incidents and to get the normalization
of Russian-Georgian relations back on track. Karasin had
related the incident to Georgia's political climate; the
Ambassador noted that Russia, too, is gearing up for
elections.


9. (C) Karasin said he believes Georgia is preparing for
military action in South Ossetia. He based this conclusion
on Georgia's defense budget, its military acquisitions, the
missile incident, another air incident over Kodori at the end
of August, the arrest of members of the North Ossetian
peacekeeping contingent, and the detention of members of the
CIS peacekeeping force in Abkhazia. He noted that these were
forced to lie face-down on the ground. "Some of these
peacekeepers come from various ethnic groups," Karasin said;
"and they may decide to take matters into their own hands."
Karasin continued that the Georgians refuse to sign
agreements on the non-use of force, and are starting to
assert that the South Ossetians are not a party to the
conflict.


10. (C) All of these actions frighten the South Ossetians as
well as the Abkhaz, Karasin asserted. Russia is working to
calm the situation. It wants the scheduled Joint
Coordinating Commission plenary on South Ossetia to go ahead
in Tbilisi this month as scheduled. Karasin will receive a
South Ossetian representative on September 5 or 6. Karasin
said the U.S. should know that Russia will not change its
position on the Sanakoyev "alternative government" in South
Ossetia, and will not meet with him or his organization. The
Ambassador replied that Russia must use its influence in
South Ossetia to tell Tskhinvali in the strongest terms that
resort to military force is unacceptable. That is the
message we are delivering in Tbilisi, and we will continue to
do so. The escalation of tensions must stop and
normalization of relations must be put back on track.

COMMENT
--------------


11. (C) Russian emotion on Georgia has not abated. Rather,
the embarrassing August 6 incident has only convinced people
like Karasin -- who have to defend Russian actions and clean
up after the armed forces and security services -- that
anything but the hardest of lines will result in Russian loss
of face and charges that they themselves are "soft on
Georgia."

Burns

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