DFM SALTANOV ON QUARTET, MIDDLE EAST CONFERENCE,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 004305 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/29/2017 TAGS: ECON IS IZ LE PREL RS SY SUBJECT: DFM SALTANOV ON QUARTET, MIDDLE EAST CONFERENCE, LEBANON, SYRIA, IRAQ, WESTERN SAHARA REF: A. MOSCOW 3803 ¶B. RIYADH 1691 ¶C. MOSCOW 4051 ¶D. MOSCOW 2985 Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells for reason 1.4 (b,d). ¶1. (C) Summary: In an August 30 meeting with the Ambassador, Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Saltanov expressed strong support for the upcoming Quartet meetings and the Middle East Peace Conference. Saltanov proposed bilateral consultations in Washington or New York following his planned September 8-15 trip to the Middle East and prior to the September 23 Quartet meetings. Saltanov urged the U.S. to review its proposals for the peace conference at the Quartet, stressed the importance of Syrian participation, and underscored the need for a "breakthrough" in the Israel-Palestinian talks. Saltanov confirmed Saudi NSA Prince Bandar's July trip to Moscow focused on SAG diplomatic efforts in Lebanon and Iran, but broke no new ground. The Ambassador welcomed GOR support for UNIFIL's extension, but pressed for follow-up on USG demarches on arms transfers to Syria, Iran, and Sudan. The Ambassador pushed for GOR's cancellation of Iraq's debt, which Saltanov said was still in progress and was connected to GOR efforts to revive its energy cooperation. Saltanov welcomed recent efforts by al-Maliki to build a consensus, pushed for a U.S. timetable for withdrawal to defuse Sunni radicalism, and praised U.S. efforts to increase the role of the international community. On Western Sahara, Saltanov was pessimistic about prospects for progress. End Summary. Quartet Meetings, Middle East Peace Conference -------------- - ¶2. (C) In his August 30 meeting with DFM Saltanov, the Ambassador previewed Secretary Rice's September trip to Israel and Palestine before the commencement of UNGA. Saltanov responded that, as early as September 8, he will travel to the UAE, Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon, mainly to focus on the political situation in Lebanon. He will return to Moscow for a few days and then travel to the U.S. for UNGA as early as September 19. Saltanov said he would then like to have bilateral consultations with the U.S. either in New York or Washington prior to the September 23 Middle East Quartet meetings. The Ambassador noted that NEA A/S David Welch might be unavailable during that window, as he would be traveling with the Secretary to the region, but undertook to convey the offer. ¶3. (C) Saltanov emphasized that the Quartet meetings should focus on two objectives: 1) listen to and engage on Quartet Special Envoy Tony Blair's report and 2) learn from the USG its proposals for the Middle East Peace Conference in November. Saltanov viewed the Quartet meetings and President Bush's conference as "closely connected," and added that the conference "has real significance." However, he underscored the need for the Israelis and Palestinians to be prepared to reach "substantive agreements" during the conference. ¶4. (C) Saltanov also stressed the importance of Syrian participation, noting that the SARG is interested in a successful conference and "would welcome an invitation." In response to Ambassador's question on PA President Abbas' comments to the Russians during his July 31 visit to Moscow, Saltanov responded that Abbas did not insist on Syria's participation in the conference (ref A). However, Abbas urged the international community not to "forget the Syrians and their role" in the peace process. The Ambassador stressed that irresponsible Syrian behavior is not exactly the best advertisement for their participation in the peace conference. ¶5. (C) Saltanov commented that a successful conference, which entailed a "breakthrough" in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, could solve problems in the entire region, "including in Iraq." Saltanov added that "many radicals" would take notice of such progress and their movements could be undermined. He underscored the importance of all parties taking full advantage of the two months prior to the conference to prepare the groundwork for successful talks in November. More On Abbas' Trip to Moscow -------------- ¶6. (C) Saltanov added that Abbas is in a particularly difficult situation regarding his struggle with Hamas, but agreed with Ambassador's assessment that Russia's public support of Abbas has helped him in his efforts. Saltanov stated that Russia does not hide "its unwavering support" for MOSCOW 00004305 002 OF 003 Abbas. However, he asserted that early elections could be beneficial to Abbas and the PA. Saltanov noted that FM Lavrov explained to Abbas that it would be a "serious mistake" to exclude Hamas and the Gaza sector from the election process, especially given Abbas' "significant popular support" in Gaza. Saltanov expressed concern that Abbas' prospects for remaining PA president would be thrown into serious jeopardy, if he failed to broker an agreement with Hamas by the end of the year. Lebanon -------------- ¶7. (C) The Ambassador thanked Saltanov for Russia's role in the unanimous passage of UNSC 1773 extending UNIFIL's mandate. Saltanov commented that the situation in Lebanon "has reached an impasse" and there is "serious risk of the country dividing into two parts." He added that one part of Lebanon could be "enveloped by radical ideas, which could destabilize the entire region." Noting that Russia maintains "good and objective relations" with all parties in Lebanon, Saltanov argued that the current political conflict could deteriorate into massive violence if a democratic solution to the problem is not agreed upon soon. Saltanov's personal view was that proposals for small changes to the constitution, including a provision that would allow the commander of the armed forces to become president, and the convening of elections could serve as positive steps forward. Saltanov stressed that Syria needed to play a role in the Lebanon problem, "not only because Syrians have their interests in Lebanon, but because a large part of the Lebanese political establishment seeks Syrian involvement." Bandar's Visit -------------- ¶8. (C) When asked about Saudi National Security Advisor Prince Bandar's July 31 visit to Moscow, Saltanov confirmed that Prince Bandar's trip focused on Saudi efforts to reach a political settlement in Lebanon and a way forward on Iran (ref B). Saltanov noted that the Saudis are working hard with all parties to prevent Lebanon "from collapsing." However, Saltanov noted Prince Bandar's lack of optimism on the prospects for political stability in Lebanon and added that the personal animosity between Saudi King Abdullah and Syrian President Asad limits Saudi Arabia's effectiveness. Arms Sales to Syria, Iran, Sudan -------------- ¶9. (C) Recalling previous U.S. demarches on Russian arms sales, the Ambassador reinforced U.S. concern over reports of Russia's arms sales to SyriQnd Iran and the potential transfer of weapons to Hezbollah (ref C). Citing as examples sales of the surface-to-air missiles and the Kornet anti-tank systems to Syria, the Ambassador stressed the USG regards these transactions a source of serious concern. After disputing the offensive nature of the mentioned weapons systems, Saltanov promised to check into the possible transfers. However, he reiterated Russia's position that the U.S. needed to provide specific evidence of "leaks" of these weapons systems from Syria to Hezbollah. Saltanov stated that Russia's formal arrangement with Syria allows for end-use inspections on Syrian territory, but only when presented with credible data. He added that countries besides Syria are supplying weapons to radical groups like Fatah Islam and the Taliban, emphasizing that "Syria cannot be blamed for everything." ¶10. (C) The Ambassador also conveyed USG concern over Sudan's use of Russian helicopters in Darfur and reminded Saltanov that the GOR was provided with additional evidence backing up our claims (ref D). Saltanov acknowledged that receipt Russia had received the additional information and assured the Ambassador that the GOR is "working on it." Iraq -------------- ¶11. (C) Noting Iraqi Oil Minister al-Sharastani's productive trip to Moscow, the Ambassador urged Saltanov to abide by its Paris Club commitments to cancel Iraq's debt. When asked about the possibility of the GOR preparing the paperwork for cancellation by September, Saltanov expressed doubt that the Joint Economic Commission would be sufficiently prepared to meet in September and thus the paperwork would not be ready in time. ¶12. (C) Saltanov acknowledged that Russia is focused on reactivating energy cooperation with Iraq and continues to MOSCOW 00004305 003 OF 003 pressure the Iraqi Government to fulfill its "contractual obligations" with Lukoil. The Ambassador emphasized that al-Sharastani had had a positive impression of his visit to Moscow and that the best the GOR could do now to strengthen the atmosphere for Lukoil and other Russian businesses would be to move ahead on debt cancellation. ¶13. (C) Commenting on Iraqi PM al-Maliki's "significant steps" to reach an agreement among key political factions in Iraq, Saltanov noted that without real progress in the political process, Iraq will remain unstable. He agreed that pressure needed to be maintained on the terrorists, but stressed there would be no settlement if "all those with guns in their hands" were excluded from the process. Saltanov asserted that the Sunni opposition would be willing to cease hostilities if the U.S. were to develop a timetable for troop withdrawal. Saltanov argued that a timetable could be either chronological or "pegged to political benchmarks." He added that a withdrawal timetable would also motivate the al-Maliki government to move more quickly on political and economic development. ¶14. (C) On widening the international community's role in Iraq, Saltanov noted that the most recent UNSC resolution on Iraq was certainly a step in the right direction and welcomed this "good initiative" from the U.S. The Ambassador and Saltanov agreed that all parties must follow through on their commitments made during the most recent Sharm el Sheikh Summit. Saltanov stressed that the planned September meeting of Iraq's neighbors serve as another opportunity to consolidate international support for Iraq. He noted the venue for the meeting had not been determined, but he identified Istanbul as the only viable Arab location, as Baghdad would be "problematic" for many participants. Western Sahara -------------- ¶15. (C) The Ambassador solicited Saltanov's views on ways to push forward the negotiations between Morocco and Polisario. Saltanov reported that he will accompany Russian PM Fradkov on a Fall trip to Algeria and Morocco and would provide the Ambassador with a readout of the trip upon his return. The DFM's initial impressions were that the August 10-11 negotiations in New York produced few concrete results. However, he understood that there was some "mutual interest" between Morocco and Algeria and Polisario in the development of confidence building measures, noting that such measures would positively influence discussions on the future of Western Sahara. Saltanov commented that the "costly and permanent position" of Algeria and Polisario of refusing to consider Morocco's proposal for expanded autonomy for Western Sahara only plays into Morocco's hands, as Morocco has already "won on a political level." Saltanov added that Morocco's claim to Western Sahara is a "matter of life or death" for the Moroccans, which he agreed was not the case for the Algerians. But Saltanov did not see any near-term chances for Algerian flexibility, or significant movement on Western Sahara. Burns