KOSOVO: RUSSIAN ENVOY PESSIMISTIC, PUSHING UNION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 004182 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/24/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL SR PBTS KV RS SUBJECT: KOSOVO: RUSSIAN ENVOY PESSIMISTIC, PUSHING UNION STATE REF: A. BELGRADE 01181 ¶B. PRISTINA 622 MOSCOW 00004182 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Political Affairs Alice G. Wells for reasons 1.4 (b/d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In an August 24th meeting, Russian Envoy Botsan-Kharchenko characterized the first round of Troika talks as satisfactory, but was pessimistic about prospects for the August 30 Vienna session, given entrenched positions over the Ahtisaari plan, which were exacerbated by Serbian and Kosovar Albanian electoral dynamics. Botsan-Kharchenko reiterated Russian opposition to the Ahtisaari plan, underscored that December 10 was the deadline for the Troika report and not an end-date for the negotiations, and pushed for Western support of a Serbia-Kosovo confederation, as a means for obtaining an "amicable disintegration" of Serbia. Botsan-Kharchenko said partition remained an option, but dismissed its prospect and desirability. He noted GOR and Russian elite satisfaction with the Troika mechanism and praised US Envoy Wisner, arguing that good personal relations would be helpful in managing another possible showdown in December. As the election season commences, the GOR remains focused on stretching out the Kosovo process. End Summary. No Expectations: Vienna Troika Round -------------- ¶2. (C) In an August 24 meeting, Russia's Troika Envoy Botsan-Kharchenko characterized the first round of Troika discussions in neutral terms, but predicted a difficult August 30 session in Vienna, expressing despair over how to occupy the allotted two and half hour negotiating sessions. While stressing that the Troika's function was not to originate new ideas, but to provide a forum for the Serbs and Albanians to negotiate, Botsan-Kharchenko implied that there was little prospect of movement on those terms, given Kosovar insistence on and Serbian rejection of the Ahtisaari plan. While Russia had encouraged Serbian leaders to think creatively in advance of the Troika meetings, Botsan-Kharchenko noted that election dynamics brought out obduracy on both sides. The fact that President Tadic and Prime Minister Kostunica insisted on meeting with the Troika together indicated that the Serbian government was unified on Kosovo. Any vestigial Western expectations that Tadic could champion a European future for Serbia, without Kosovo, was not realistic given his political aspirations. Botsan-Kharchenko said the GOR continued to encourage the Serbian leadership to proactively advance a new proposal; in part, to keep the wind out of the nationalists' sails. Consensus, not Deadlines, Drive Process -------------- ¶3. (C) Botsan-Kharchenko reiterated Russia's view that December 10 was a deadline for the Troika's report to the SYG, not the culmination of Kosovar Albanian-Serb negotiations. Acknowledging the sharp differences with EU Ischinger and US Envoy Wisner on this point, Botsan-Kharchenko characterized the Fall period as a lull between another -- virtually inevitable -- Winter showdown in the Security Council. Botsan-Kharchenko reviewed, in familiar terms, Russian objections to establishing an artificial deadline for resolving the conflict, and argued that the Troika engagement over the long run could push the Serbs to significantly evolve their "supervised autonomy" position. Botsan-Kharchenko sidestepped whether Belgrade felt any pressure to move diplomacy forward by December 10, or continued to pocket Russian support as a guarantee of their position. Examining Options; Pushing Confederation -------------- ¶4. (C) Botsan-Kharchenko gave his assessment of the three possible outcomes mooted by the parties, media, or Troika envoys: -- Adoption of Ahtisaari: Botsan-Kharchenko termed the Kosovar Albanian bottom line -- adoption of the Ahtisaari plan -- a non-starter for both Russia and Serbia. He welcomed the compromise that allowed the Ahtisaari plan to remain on the Troika table, but underscored that this should not be mistaken for Russian willingness to revisit its objections to the process overseen by Ahtisaari and its results. -- Partition of Kosovo: Botsan-Kharchenko argued that partition was not the desired outcome of these negotiations, although the Troika would have to support this result if both parties agreed to it. Since neither Belgrade nor Pristina had raised partition during the first round of talks, MOSCOW 00004182 002.2 OF 002 Botsan-Kharchenko thought it was unlikely to be resurrected in Vienna. Botsan-Kharchenko was critical of partition, but obliquely acknowledged former Prime Minister Primakov's role in fanning rumors that it was under contemplation by Serbia and the GOR. Botsan-Kharchenko attributed Primakov's interest to an academic article that captured his attention, but rejected any GOR support for the concept. -- Creation of a Confederation: Botsan-Kharchenko returned several times to the concept, first floated by EU Envoy Ischinger, of a confederation of Serbia and Kosovo, modeled loosely on Serbia-Montenegro. A confederation could be a realistic outgrowth of Troika-brokered negotiations over Serbia's autonomy proposal. Botsan-Kharchenko argued that its virtue was to provide time for the "amicable disintegration" of Serbia, while creating facts on the ground of Kosovo's ultimate independence. When this idea was raised by Ischinger in Belgrade, Serbian Minister for Kosovo Affairs Samardzic objected strenuously, while Tadic was less forceful -- a difference that Botsan-Kharchenko interpreted to mean that the proposal had become more attractive to the Serbian President. Russian Domestic Audience Pleased with Troika Talks -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) Pointing to increased media and Duma interest in the Troika process, Botsan-Kharchenko noted that domestic reaction to the negotiating mechanism has been positive, with the Russian elite and popular opinion gratified to see Russia represented on an equal footing. The fact that the Troika process encouraged new thinking on Kosovo was interpreted as a Russian "win" over an Albanian-friendly plan driven by Ahtisaari. Botsan-Kharchenko repeatedly praised US Envoy Wisner's good personal relations with the Troika members, which he stressed would be essential in navigating a difficult December period. Comment -------------- ¶6. (C) Time was very much on Botsan-Kharchenko's mind. Left unspoken by the Russian Envoy was the fact that the Troika negotiations will span the Russian parliamentary campaign with the December 10 deadline coinciding with the December 2 Duma elections. With the March 2008 presidential contest looming, the GOR will continue to seek a postponement of a resolution on Kosovo's status. Putin's ability to manage a smooth succession depends upon quiet in the "frozen conflicts." In addition to the threat from direct conflict, the Kremlin remains obsessed with restiveness in the North Caucasus, which overwhelmingly favors independence for Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and which could flare up if Kosovo's aspirations are granted while those of the separatist entities in Georgia are denied. Burns