KOSOVO: RUSSIAN ENVOY PESSIMISTIC, PUSHING UNION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 004182

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/24/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL SR PBTS KV RS
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: RUSSIAN ENVOY PESSIMISTIC, PUSHING UNION
STATE

REF: A. BELGRADE 01181

B. PRISTINA 622

MOSCOW 00004182 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Political Affairs Alice G. Wells
for reasons 1.4 (b/d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: In an August 24th meeting, Russian Envoy
Botsan-Kharchenko characterized the first round of Troika
talks as satisfactory, but was pessimistic about prospects
for the August 30 Vienna session, given entrenched positions
over the Ahtisaari plan, which were exacerbated by Serbian
and Kosovar Albanian electoral dynamics. Botsan-Kharchenko
reiterated Russian opposition to the Ahtisaari plan,
underscored that December 10 was the deadline for the Troika
report and not an end-date for the negotiations, and pushed
for Western support of a Serbia-Kosovo confederation, as a
means for obtaining an "amicable disintegration" of Serbia.
Botsan-Kharchenko said partition remained an option, but
dismissed its prospect and desirability. He noted GOR and
Russian elite satisfaction with the Troika mechanism and
praised US Envoy Wisner, arguing that good personal relations
would be helpful in managing another possible showdown in
December. As the election season commences, the GOR remains
focused on stretching out the Kosovo process. End Summary.

No Expectations: Vienna Troika Round
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2. (C) In an August 24 meeting, Russia's Troika Envoy
Botsan-Kharchenko characterized the first round of Troika
discussions in neutral terms, but predicted a difficult
August 30 session in Vienna, expressing despair over how to
occupy the allotted two and half hour negotiating sessions.
While stressing that the Troika's function was not to
originate new ideas, but to provide a forum for the Serbs and
Albanians to negotiate, Botsan-Kharchenko implied that there
was little prospect of movement on those terms, given Kosovar
insistence on and Serbian rejection of the Ahtisaari plan.
While Russia had encouraged Serbian leaders to think
creatively in advance of the Troika meetings,
Botsan-Kharchenko noted that election dynamics brought out
obduracy on both sides. The fact that President Tadic and
Prime Minister Kostunica insisted on meeting with the Troika
together indicated that the Serbian government was unified on
Kosovo. Any vestigial Western expectations that Tadic could
champion a European future for Serbia, without Kosovo, was
not realistic given his political aspirations.
Botsan-Kharchenko said the GOR continued to encourage the
Serbian leadership to proactively advance a new proposal; in
part, to keep the wind out of the nationalists' sails.

Consensus, not Deadlines, Drive Process
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3. (C) Botsan-Kharchenko reiterated Russia's view that
December 10 was a deadline for the Troika's report to the
SYG, not the culmination of Kosovar Albanian-Serb
negotiations. Acknowledging the sharp differences with EU
Ischinger and US Envoy Wisner on this point,
Botsan-Kharchenko characterized the Fall period as a lull
between another -- virtually inevitable -- Winter showdown in
the Security Council. Botsan-Kharchenko reviewed, in
familiar terms, Russian objections to establishing an
artificial deadline for resolving the conflict, and argued
that the Troika engagement over the long run could push the
Serbs to significantly evolve their "supervised autonomy"
position. Botsan-Kharchenko sidestepped whether Belgrade
felt any pressure to move diplomacy forward by December 10,
or continued to pocket Russian support as a guarantee of
their position.

Examining Options; Pushing Confederation
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4. (C) Botsan-Kharchenko gave his assessment of the three
possible outcomes mooted by the parties, media, or Troika
envoys:

-- Adoption of Ahtisaari: Botsan-Kharchenko termed the
Kosovar Albanian bottom line -- adoption of the Ahtisaari
plan -- a non-starter for both Russia and Serbia. He
welcomed the compromise that allowed the Ahtisaari plan to
remain on the Troika table, but underscored that this should
not be mistaken for Russian willingness to revisit its
objections to the process overseen by Ahtisaari and its
results.

-- Partition of Kosovo: Botsan-Kharchenko argued that
partition was not the desired outcome of these negotiations,
although the Troika would have to support this result if both
parties agreed to it. Since neither Belgrade nor Pristina
had raised partition during the first round of talks,

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Botsan-Kharchenko thought it was unlikely to be resurrected
in Vienna. Botsan-Kharchenko was critical of partition, but
obliquely acknowledged former Prime Minister Primakov's role
in fanning rumors that it was under contemplation by Serbia
and the GOR. Botsan-Kharchenko attributed Primakov's
interest to an academic article that captured his attention,
but rejected any GOR support for the concept.

-- Creation of a Confederation: Botsan-Kharchenko returned
several times to the concept, first floated by EU Envoy
Ischinger, of a confederation of Serbia and Kosovo, modeled
loosely on Serbia-Montenegro. A confederation could be a
realistic outgrowth of Troika-brokered negotiations over
Serbia's autonomy proposal. Botsan-Kharchenko argued that
its virtue was to provide time for the "amicable
disintegration" of Serbia, while creating facts on the ground
of Kosovo's ultimate independence. When this idea was raised
by Ischinger in Belgrade, Serbian Minister for Kosovo Affairs
Samardzic objected strenuously, while Tadic was less forceful
-- a difference that Botsan-Kharchenko interpreted to mean
that the proposal had become more attractive to the Serbian
President.

Russian Domestic Audience Pleased with Troika Talks
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5. (C) Pointing to increased media and Duma interest in the
Troika process, Botsan-Kharchenko noted that domestic
reaction to the negotiating mechanism has been positive, with
the Russian elite and popular opinion gratified to see Russia
represented on an equal footing. The fact that the Troika
process encouraged new thinking on Kosovo was interpreted as
a Russian "win" over an Albanian-friendly plan driven by
Ahtisaari. Botsan-Kharchenko repeatedly praised US Envoy
Wisner's good personal relations with the Troika members,
which he stressed would be essential in navigating a
difficult December period.

Comment
--------------


6. (C) Time was very much on Botsan-Kharchenko's mind. Left
unspoken by the Russian Envoy was the fact that the Troika
negotiations will span the Russian parliamentary campaign
with the December 10 deadline coinciding with the December 2
Duma elections. With the March 2008 presidential contest
looming, the GOR will continue to seek a postponement of a
resolution on Kosovo's status. Putin's ability to manage a
smooth succession depends upon quiet in the "frozen
conflicts." In addition to the threat from direct conflict,
the Kremlin remains obsessed with restiveness in the North
Caucasus, which overwhelmingly favors independence for
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and which could flare up if
Kosovo's aspirations are granted while those of the
separatist entities in Georgia are denied.
Burns