ONCE-PLURALISTIC ALTAY KRAY STARTS TO

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 004119 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV KDEM SOCI RS SUBJECT: ONCE-PLURALISTIC ALTAY KRAY STARTS TO CONFORM REF: 06 MOSCOW 13168 MOSCOW 00004119 001.2 OF 003 -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (SBU) During an August 8-11 visit to Altay Kray, we found the region's traditional political diversity succumbing to the United Russia (YR) political machine fueled by the Governor's May 2007 YR party conversion. Reflecting the national line-up, YR, For a Just Russia (SR),the Communists (KPRF) and the LDPR are expected to secure places in the State Duma. The Communist Party and the Agrarian Party still enjoy considerable popularity but dwindling votes, while the liberal Republican Party of Russia (led by Altay's Vladimir Ryzhkov) and Yabloko verge on irrelevancy. Local party leaders complained about their lack of access to media outlets and United Russia's abuse of administrative resources for campaigning. End Summary. -------------- Election Outlook -------------- ¶2. (SBU) While local party leaders of all stripes expect that YR will get the majority vote in the Kray in December, most also expect that LDPR, the Communist Party (KPRF),and For A Just Russia (SR) will also win seats in the State Duma. Historically, YR has not been as strong in Altay Kray as it has been elsewhere, since Altay Kray belongs to the "Red Belt" region whose large rural population supported the KPRF and the nationally moribund Agrarian Party. The electorate had also supported a broad range of smaller parties such as Yabloko, Union of Right Forces (SPS), and the Republican Party of Russia (RPR) (reftel). ¶3. (SBU) Local party leaders emphasized that Altay Kray retained a pluralistic political atmosphere, yet the smaller parties now complain of an increasingly restrictive field for political action. Following Governor Aleksandr Karlin's move to United Russia in May, most of the other members of the Kray administration followed. As a result, in the upcoming elections, other parties must contend with a much stronger YR, which controls the Kray government and its significant administrative resources. -------------- Administrative Resources and Media Access -------------- ¶4. (SBU) The political benefits of incumbency are evident in the capital city Barnaul. YR posted several billboards promoting presidential "Priority ;Projects" that prominently featured the YR logo along with the name and picture of the Duma deputy from the Kray who supported the program. YR also flaunted its access to public events unavailable to the other parties, such as the Kray's upcoming 70th anniversary celebrations. According to local YR leaders, public works, beautification projects and televised celebrations presided over by YR candidates will be part of YR's election campaign. ¶5. (SBU) All parties with the exception of YR expressed difficulty in obtaining access to media. The smaller parties claimed that the media self- censors so as not to offend an increasingly YR- oriented regional government. At the same time, Yabloko, SPS and KPRF indicated that scarce campaign funds limit their access to an increasingly expensive media market. ¶6. (SBU) The local head of SPS, Vladimir Nebalzin, said that his party had turned to grass-roots efforts such as door-to-door canvassing and distribution of thousands of fliers and brochures. The other parties including KPRF and Yabloko indicated they would use similar strategies. Despite its vaunted status as the second "party of power", SR seemed to face the same hurdles in securing media coverage. They have used their stronger financial backing to produce slick, sophisticated campaign materials but do not command the resources to begin their campaigns as early as YR MOSCOW 00004119 002.2 OF 003 clearly has. -------------- United Russia Dismissive of Other Parties -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Nikolay Gerasimenko, a Duma deputy and leader of Altay Kray's YR branch since June, portrayed YR as a Western-style democratic party that was very much concerned with the problems of Russia. He described in party-apparatchik style how "Plan Putin" was both the core achievement and the basic platform of the party for the upcoming campaign. The plan covers such things as health care, education, and pensions. Gerasimenko said that YR expects 30-40 percent of the vote in the region, but that the remaining votes were up for grabs. ¶8. (SBU) Gerasimenko was visibly bored when discussing his opinions of other parties. "KPRF is a party of the past that offers only criticism," he said. "SPS is the party of big capital, but has turned left-wing. SR promises but YR delivers. And I don't even think about LDPR." -------------- For a Just Russia: The Official Opposition -------------- ¶9. (SBU) For A Just Russia's Aleksandr Shkraba acknowledged that his party began as a Kremlin project, but claimed that the party represented a coherent center-left alternative to United Russia. SR will campaign on this message to tap into Altay Kray's historic left-wing support. Shkraba emphasized his party's support of the president by saying that SR was the new brand of Putin, "the new opposition for the new political system." Shkraba acknowledged that they had accomplished little as a party besides criticizing United Russia, which he attributed to SR's need to build its party organization after its October 2006 creation. -------------- The Democratic Opposition is Depressed -------------- ¶10. (SBU) The fate of Barnaul's most famous political son, Republican Party of Russia leader Vladimir Ryzhkov, has cast a pall on the opposition. The recent Supreme Court decision, affirming the Central Election Commission's disqualification of the party, effectively killed RPR as a political entity. Local RPR leaders Valeriy Gachman, Andrey Olishevskiy and Gennadiy Sheyda said they were uncertain how to move forward. Some members wanted to reconstitute as a social movement or NGO and maintain the party's structure until it could be re-registered. Others feared losing momentum and activists to SR and SPS. Ryzhkov remains personally popular with interlocutors agreeing that he would bring considerable local advantage to any party list that he joined. While local journalist Svetlana Chistyakova told us that Ryzhkov's choice of his next party perch could significantly affect the region's voting results, the RPR leader has yet to secure alternative political party backing, with local SR leader Shkraba reinforcing that Ryzhkov would not necessarily be welcome on their list. ¶11. (SBU) The atmosphere at Yabloko was not much better. Local Yabloko chairman, Aleksandr Goncharenko, was pessimistic about Russia's future. He saw no independent media outlets to get his message out found the population politically lethargic and disconnected. Goncharenko said that Yabloko has not been able to draw crowds to recent rallies on local issues like it has in the past. Outside observers agree that Yabloko's chances of winning seats in the Duma are weak. -------------- Fading KPRF and Agrarians -------------- ¶12. (SBU) Both the Communists and the Agrarian Party enjoy a loyal but shrinking electoral base. The local MOSCOW 00004119 003.2 OF 003 KPRF secretary Petr Nonarin and Political Committee member Vladimir Zolotov argued that the KPRF was limited because of federal manipulation of and control over political parties, but they did not impress us with their political dynamism. Sitting under an oversized portrait of Lenin, Nonarin and Zolotov attempted to distance the party from the country's Communist past. The Agrarian Party will get some political mileage from the support of former Russian Minister of Agriculture and current chairman of the Altay Kray Soviet of People's Deputies, Aleksandr Nazarchuk. He will lead the party's national three- candidate list. Claiming that the Agrarian Party was the "true party of Russia, the party of the peasants," Nazarchuk attempted to put a modern spin on the party platform by promoting ethanol and bio-fuels programs. Both parties are counting on their traditional bases of support: the traditional left-wing electorate and rural, agricultural workers. -------------- Uncertainty on the Party Lists -------------- ¶13. (SBU) The local party machines were all developing their regional lists of 12-13 candidates for the upcoming elections. YR is using a system or "primaries" that Gerasimenko compared to Western political primaries even as he admitted that the national party leadership will maintain control over the final composition and order of all party lists, regardless of the primary results. Other parties will finalize their local lists at party conferences in August and September. ¶14. (SBU) Press reports have alleged that parties in Altay Kray have been selling slots on their party lists, with more sure-winner positions going for higher prices. Many party leaders confirmed that the practice was widespread, but pointed the finger at other parties. Altay Kray election commissioner Sergey Sytykh said that he did not believe that such commerce took place, while admitting that the practice would be impossible to detect and difficult to stop. KPRF leaders said that seat selling was a fact of regional and national politics, but only for other parties; the KPRF has "never" sold any of its slots. ¶15. (SBU) Comment: The once-diverse political scene in Altay Kray is being converted into yet another version of the national model, with United Russia on top and other parties scrambling for the remaining pieces. The losers in this process Q especially the KPRF and Agrarian party Q watch as their support bleeds away, but lack a plan to stop or reverse the trend. End Comment. MELVILLE