AFGHANISTAN: TIME TO REENGAGE WITH RUSSIA?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000381 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2017 TAGS: PREL PTER ETRD SNAR AF RS SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN: TIME TO REENGAGE WITH RUSSIA? REF: 06 MOSCOW 11373 Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons: 1.4(B/D) ¶1. (C) Summary: Foreign Minister Lavrov's February 2-3 Washington consultations provide an opportunity to seek support for the new U.S. strategy for Afghanistan's security and reconstruction. While Moscow has been critical of U.S. and Western efforts in Afghanistan, it has also expressed interest in moving forward on economic investments, renewing arms supplies to Kabul, and boosting counternarcotics cooperation with the Karzai government. We should press for specific progress in these areas, as well an expanded NATO-Russia Council counternarcotics program and a more substantial Russian contribution to Afghan reconstruction. End Summary. RUSSIA AND THE KARZAI GOVERNMENT -------------- ¶2. (C) Moscow's post-London Conference support for the Afghan government has been measured. Positive steps like the bilateral debt agreement have been accompanied by persistent criticism of counternarcotics efforts and growing concern about the upsurge in Taliban/Al-Qaeda activity. Russia has never been particularly supportive of Karzai, but he is still viewed as a better choice than any of the alternatives. Moscow's beefs are that Karzai has sidelined Russia's former Northern Alliance clients while not effectively reining in Pashtun warlords, and that Russia bears the brunt of efforts to stem narcotics trafficked to Europe through the Northern Route. . DEBT RELIEF OPENS DOORS -------------- ¶3. (C) Despite the complaints, we have seen the beginnings of a more positive Russian agenda for Afghanistan. Moscow's agreement to reconcile Afghanistan's outstanding debt of USD 11.2 billion and its reiteration of a commitment to forgive 100 percent of that debt will remove a significant obstacle to improved cooperation with Kabul. Deputy Foreign Minister Alekseyev told the Ambassador that Russia would propose specific development and investment projects once the agreements were finalized; some private Russian companies are already pursuing joint ventures in the energy field with U.S. companies and Afghan partners. Lavrov's planned January 24 visit to Kabul (scrubbed because of bad weather conditions) was to have been marked by an agreement in principle on the language of the formal debt agreement, to be followed by signatures in February. . ARMS SUPPLIES TO AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY -------------- ¶4. (C) Russia is also weighing whether to restart the arms supply relationship that saw Moscow donate USD 200 million to the Afghan Ministry of Defense over the past five years. Russia drew from stockpiles to provide Soviet-era transport aircraft, communications equipment, spare parts for tanks and APCs, artillery and jeeps, as well as repairs to helicopters and fixed wing aircraft. The MFA told us that new donations stopped after General Abdurrahim Wardak took over as Defense Minister in early 2005, replacing Russian ally General Fahim Khan. According to the Russians, Wardak said Afghanistan was no longer interested in Russian equipment and could count on the Americans for his supplies. After FM Spanta's October visit to Moscow, the GOR agreed to take another look at supplying arms, perhaps at a substantial discount. . COUNTER-NARCOTICS FOCUS -------------- ¶5. (C) Russia's mantra over the past several years is that more needs to be done to combat narcotics flows from Afghanistan -- which contribute to drug abuse and HIV/AIDS problems in Russia -- but Moscow has taken few initiatives itself. Russia has touted its cooperation with Central Asian states through Operation Channel, but this semi-annual event under CSTO auspices is more an interdiction blitz than a unified operation. Russia's long-standing pledge in the bilateral Counterterrorism Working Group to put a narcotics liaison in Kabul has yet to be realized. ¶6. (C) However, during the past year, Russia put substantial effort as G-8 President into hosting a ministerial conference on Afghan drug trafficking routes (Paris 2 - Moscow 1) that focused on concrete steps to prevent the diversion of precursor chemicals used to produce heroin. Also this year, Russia joined with Central Asian states and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime to establish a Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Center MOSCOW 00000381 002 OF 002 (CARICC) to foster information sharing on counternarcotics and transborder crime. October saw the kickoff of a pilot project under the auspices of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) under which Russia trains Afghan narcotics officials at the Interior Ministries' Domodedovo Training Center. . ENGAGING THE RUSSIANS -------------- ¶7. (C) Cooperation with Russia in support of the new U.S. comprehensive strategy in Afghanistan offers an opportunity to make progress in priority areas -- countering narcotics trafficking, spurring economic development and reconstruction, and equipping Afghan security forces -- while keeping Moscow on board regarding Afghanistan's political development. President Putin has made clear that Russian combat troops will not be deployed to Afghanistan, and the Afghan government would be unlikely to welcome such an offer, so Russia's contribution to stability in Afghanistan will need to come in other areas. FM Lavrov's February consultations in Washington offer an opportunity to assess Russian willingness to work with the U.S., NATO and its global partners to support security and reconstruction in Afghanistan. If early indications are positive, the dialogue begun during Assistant Secretary Boucher's October visit to Moscow could be resumed with more specific discussions. ¶8. (C) We offer the following recommendations for areas where Russia might be willing to cooperate: -- Counternarcotics: Russia is focused on increasing its direct contacts with the Afghan government to combat narcotics trafficking, but this is sometimes couched in terms of Afghan participation in the CSTO-sponsored Operation Channel. While there might be some benefit from this, we should encourage Moscow to act on its pledge to set up a narcotics liaison in Kabul. Russia should also be encouraged to consider scaling up the NRC pilot project. We could also explore with the Russians whether Afghan participation in the CARICC makes sense. -- Reconstruction and economic development: Russian participation in economic projects in Afghanistan should be encouraged to support development and improve security. Russian firms have significant Soviet-era experience with Afghanistan's mineral and energy resources. Efforts to develop joint ventures with Afghan and foreign firms could be productive. Russian firms are also interested in working as contractors or subcontractors on assistance projects -- including road building and power construction -- that support U.S. priorities. We should encourage Russia to build more commercial relations with Afghanistan by sending a trade delegation to Kabul. -- Military Assistance: To the extent consistent with U.S. plans to train and equip Afghan national security forces, we could encourage Russia to renew its donations to the Afghan National Army channeled through the Afghan Defense Ministry. -- Humanitarian Assistance: Immediately after the fall of the Taliban, Russia provided over USD 30 million in humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan. While this aid ended soon thereafter, we could approach the Emergencies Situation Ministry (MCHS),which delivers Russian assistance worldwide, to see whether Moscow would underwrite a project in the area of health. We could also encourage Russia to increase the scholarships it allocates to Afghan students. Russian firms interested in doing business in Afghanistan could also be encouraged to provide training slots for Afghans. . Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) It's time to see whether Russia's rhetoric about cooperation can be matched by efforts in collaboration with other Afghan Compact members to foster security and economic reconstruction. Lavrov's February 2-3 Washington consultations offer a preliminary opportunity to test whether Moscow is ready to step up its efforts. BURNS