EAP PDAS STEPHENS JULY 27 DISCUSSIONS ON THE NORTH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 003804

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM MNUC KNNP KN KS JA RS
SUBJECT: EAP PDAS STEPHENS JULY 27 DISCUSSIONS ON THE NORTH
EAST ASIA PEACE AND SECURITY MECHANISM

Classified By: CDA Daniel A. Russell. Reasons 1.4 (B/D).


1. (C) Summary. During a July 27 meeting, EAP Principal
Deputy Assistant Secretary Kathleen Stephens and a GOR
representative for the Six-Party Working Group on Northeast
Asia Peace and Security, Vladimir Rakhmanin, exchanged views
on the expectations and goals for the group, including plans
up to and beyond the expected September Six-Party
Ministerial. Rakhmanin relayed the GOR's more cautious
approach and the need to find common ground among the
conflicting views of the parties regarding the work of the
Working Group. PDAS Stephens emphasized the importance of
looking to the future while not distracting from the
immediate work at hand. Rakhmanin said that the GOR is
likely to convene the Working Group in Moscow August 20 - 21,
and indicated that FM Lavrov's full schedule might make a
September Ministerial difficult. In a separate meeting, a
group of Moscow's Asia experts expressed a wide spectrum of
opinions, ranging from a preference for the status-quo to
support for full engagement with North Korea. End summary.

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Confidence Building First
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2. (C) After thanking Ambassador Rakhmanin for Russia's role
in the Banco Delta Asia issue, PDAS Stephens emphasized the
importance of Working Group (WG) on a Northeast Asia Peace
and Security Working Mechanism (NEAPSM),noting its potential
role in contributing to security in North East Asia as part
of the Six-Party process. Rakhmanin agreed, saying that
Russia is pleased to chair the WG, which he described as "an
umbrella for the whole process." Initially, the WG should
start with the easy tasks and then move on to the more
difficult ones by focusing on common ground among all
parties, and nurturing a sense of trust rather than setting
non-realistic deadlines. The GOR will seek simple
confidence-building exercises and welcome the participation
of both military and civil experts. One possibility is to
consider holding a NEACD (Northeast Asia Community Dialogue,
and established Track II forum) workshop on the sidelines of
the NEAPSM WG.


3. (C) The GOR has proposed August 20-21 in Moscow for the
next meeting of the WG, and North Korea has already confirmed
its willingness to participate. Rakhmanin views lack of
confidence and trust among the participating countries as the
first obstacle to overcome, and as such the initial meeting
of the WG should "not be too ambitious." Rakhmanin suggested
that the GOR incorporate the concept of addressing "threat
perception" as part of the WG's agenda. The first issue for
NEAPSM is to work out what can be accomplished in the foreign
ministers' meeting.

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Different Priorities
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4. (C) Rakhmanin perceives each party as having different
views on the role of NEAPSM. Some want this WG to provide a
supportive environment for denuclearization of the Korean
peninsula which they believe should be the immediate goal,
while others want to build towards something broader in the
short term. He supports a "middle ground" in which the WG
should aim for broader goals while concentrating on concrete
measures now.


5. (C) Regarding the interaction of the WG with a Korean
peninsula peace process, Rakhmanin stated that the "directly
related" parties should inform the WG of both the
commencement and progress of the Peace Process. He believes
the Peace Process is an integral part of security in the
region and that if there were difficulties in the Peace
Process, NEAPSM could play a contributing role. He noted
that even the Russian media is interested in the peace
process possibility of Armistice replacement.


6. (C) PDAS Stephens underlined the importance of balance
among the five WGs, and the need to think how the longer
range task of NEAPSM fits with the work of the other four,
without distracting from the immediate goal of
denuclearization. The U.S. views the Korean Peace Process
and NEAPSM as two parallel processes.

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Core Principles
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7. (C) PDAS Stephens reiterated that the initial focus of
NEAPSM should be peace and security on the Korean peninsula.
As such, the initial task at the WG should be to formulate
core principles supporting denuclearization but also

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providing a vision for the future. PDAS Stephens noted eight
principles to be developed:

1) denuclearization and peace on the Korean peninsula
(reinforcing the September 2005 and February 13 2007
documents);
2) non-proliferation (with reference to the NPT and possibly
other agreements);
3) existing relationships and recognition of the stabilizing
role of defensive alliances;
4) normal bilateral relations (which is the primary focus of
the other WGs to achieve);
5) transparency (military and other);
6) peaceful settlement of disputes and confidence building
and maybe measures to prevent escalating tensions;
7) measures to counter common threats (piracy, trafficking
etc.); and
8) terms of participation: initially an enterprise of the six
parties to reinforce denuclearization and peace on the Korean
peninsula but looking to the day where other parties could
adhere to the same principles.


8. (C) Rakhmanin thought that the GOR's principles "would
not be so contradictory" to those of the U.S.; it was too
ambitious for now to talk of a "charter"; it is more
important to "prepare everybody to think about common
principles.".

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Details for the Ministerial?
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9. (C) Rakhmanin stated that there is no GOR position on
what to propose to the ministers. He believes the GOR needs
to listen to other parties and work out something that is
acceptable to everybody, seeking balance between the timing
and the content of the Ministerial. For the GOR, it is time
to move beyond the hype surrounding the Yongbyon closure and
deliver something meaningful. PDAS Stephens said that
although it would be too ambitious to try to reach agreement
on core principles in time for the ministerial, it would be
good to agree that the ministers could direct the WG to come
up with some principles to guide the future work of the WG.
Perhaps the deputies or ministers could thereafter endorse
them. She emphasized that the Ministerial needs to be
substantive and provide tangible impetus to the Talks.
Rakhmanin warned that, despite an agreement in Beijing in
July, FM Lavrov's full schedule may make his participation in
a September Ministerial difficult.

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Views from Non-Official Circles
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10. (C) PDAS Stephens also discussed regional security
concepts with a group of Moscow Asia experts during a working
luncheon hosted by the Charge. The experts agreed that
Russia's desire to demonstrate its influence as a key
international player and its own vital strategic interests in
the region have coalesced around North Korea. North Korea,
like Iran, Kosovo, and the Middle East, is another
"opportunity" for Russia to demonstrate that no significant
international dispute can be solved without its
participation. The North Korean nuclear issue influences
other international nuclear disputes and Russia wants its
voice heard. The Russian leadership is concerned with the
absence of a vision for the future of the Korean peninsula
that is acceptable both to China and Russia. Thus, for the
time being, Russia prefers the geopolitical status quo.
Aleksandr Zhebin, Director of Korean Studies, Far Eastern
Studies Institute, suggested that none of the parties
involved, including Japan and the U.S. wanted a change in the
status quo of a divided Korea, adding that a unified Korea a
U.S. troop presence, in particular, would not be acceptable
to either China or Russia. Senior Advisor Balbina Hwang
suggested a distinction between "preferring" the status-quo
and strategies to actually prevent changes in the status quo.
She also pointed out Korean (both North and South)
hyper-sensitivity to perceived "interference" by great powers
and that the future destiny of Korea would have to be
determined by the Korean people, with the support of regional
powers.


11. (C) Most experts welcomed the recent U.S. engagement
with North Korea, although some thought the complete
denuclearization of North Korea unlikely. Anton Khlopkov,
Deputy Director, PIR Center, believed that North Korea
already possessed four to six nuclear devices and did not
"need any more."


12. (C) Aleksandr Vorontsov, Director of Korean Studies at
the Institute of Oriental Studies, maintained that all future

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progress hinged on U.S flexibility. North Korea would
endeavor to make its nuclear capability as expensive as
possible for the U.S., but would be willing in exchange to
allow the U.S. to be its chief security guarantor.


13. (C) Zhebin argued that the U.S. presidential election
could produce a change in U.S. policy as was the case with
the Clinton and Bush administrations, and believed that North
Korea's strategy was to wait for the U.S. election outcome.
Senior Advisor Hwang observed that imminent elections in
Japan, and in the ROK at year's end were also critical to
Pyongyang's calculations and had the potential to
dramatically alter the regional political landscape.
Fedor Lukyanov, Editor-in-Chief of the journal "Russia in
Global Affairs," observed that succession in North Korea is
perhaps the single most important factor in the outcome of
regional dynamics. All agreed that even with a clear-cut
roadmap and U.S.-North Korean diplomatic normalization as the
end point, the process would be complicated and there would
be many disappointments along the way.


14. (U) PDAS Stephens cleared this cable.
RUSSELL