EAP PDAS STEPHENS JULY 27 DISCUSSIONS ON THE NORTH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 003804 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM MNUC KNNP KN KS JA RS SUBJECT: EAP PDAS STEPHENS JULY 27 DISCUSSIONS ON THE NORTH EAST ASIA PEACE AND SECURITY MECHANISM Classified By: CDA Daniel A. Russell. Reasons 1.4 (B/D). ¶1. (C) Summary. During a July 27 meeting, EAP Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Kathleen Stephens and a GOR representative for the Six-Party Working Group on Northeast Asia Peace and Security, Vladimir Rakhmanin, exchanged views on the expectations and goals for the group, including plans up to and beyond the expected September Six-Party Ministerial. Rakhmanin relayed the GOR's more cautious approach and the need to find common ground among the conflicting views of the parties regarding the work of the Working Group. PDAS Stephens emphasized the importance of looking to the future while not distracting from the immediate work at hand. Rakhmanin said that the GOR is likely to convene the Working Group in Moscow August 20 - 21, and indicated that FM Lavrov's full schedule might make a September Ministerial difficult. In a separate meeting, a group of Moscow's Asia experts expressed a wide spectrum of opinions, ranging from a preference for the status-quo to support for full engagement with North Korea. End summary. -------------- Confidence Building First -------------- ¶2. (C) After thanking Ambassador Rakhmanin for Russia's role in the Banco Delta Asia issue, PDAS Stephens emphasized the importance of Working Group (WG) on a Northeast Asia Peace and Security Working Mechanism (NEAPSM),noting its potential role in contributing to security in North East Asia as part of the Six-Party process. Rakhmanin agreed, saying that Russia is pleased to chair the WG, which he described as "an umbrella for the whole process." Initially, the WG should start with the easy tasks and then move on to the more difficult ones by focusing on common ground among all parties, and nurturing a sense of trust rather than setting non-realistic deadlines. The GOR will seek simple confidence-building exercises and welcome the participation of both military and civil experts. One possibility is to consider holding a NEACD (Northeast Asia Community Dialogue, and established Track II forum) workshop on the sidelines of the NEAPSM WG. ¶3. (C) The GOR has proposed August 20-21 in Moscow for the next meeting of the WG, and North Korea has already confirmed its willingness to participate. Rakhmanin views lack of 
confidence and trust among the participating countries as the first obstacle to overcome, and as such the initial meeting of the WG should "not be too ambitious." Rakhmanin suggested that the GOR incorporate the concept of addressing "threat perception" as part of the WG's agenda. The first issue for NEAPSM is to work out what can be accomplished in the foreign ministers' meeting. -------------- Different Priorities -------------- ¶4. (C) Rakhmanin perceives each party as having different views on the role of NEAPSM. Some want this WG to provide a supportive environment for denuclearization of the Korean peninsula which they believe should be the immediate goal, while others want to build towards something broader in the short term. He supports a "middle ground" in which the WG should aim for broader goals while concentrating on concrete measures now. ¶5. (C) Regarding the interaction of the WG with a Korean peninsula peace process, Rakhmanin stated that the "directly related" parties should inform the WG of both the commencement and progress of the Peace Process. He believes the Peace Process is an integral part of security in the region and that if there were difficulties in the Peace Process, NEAPSM could play a contributing role. He noted that even the Russian media is interested in the peace process possibility of Armistice replacement. ¶6. (C) PDAS Stephens underlined the importance of balance among the five WGs, and the need to think how the longer range task of NEAPSM fits with the work of the other four, without distracting from the immediate goal of denuclearization. The U.S. views the Korean Peace Process and NEAPSM as two parallel processes. -------------- Core Principles -------------- ¶7. (C) PDAS Stephens reiterated that the initial focus of NEAPSM should be peace and security on the Korean peninsula. As such, the initial task at the WG should be to formulate core principles supporting denuclearization but also MOSCOW 00003804 002 OF 003 providing a vision for the future. PDAS Stephens noted eight principles to be developed: 1) denuclearization and peace on the Korean peninsula (reinforcing the September 2005 and February 13 2007 documents); 2) non-proliferation (with reference to the NPT and possibly other agreements); 3) existing relationships and recognition of the stabilizing role of defensive alliances; 4) normal bilateral relations (which is the primary focus of the other WGs to achieve); 5) transparency (military and other); 6) peaceful settlement of disputes and confidence building and maybe measures to prevent escalating tensions; 7) measures to counter common threats (piracy, trafficking etc.); and 8) terms of participation: initially an enterprise of the six parties to reinforce denuclearization and peace on the Korean peninsula but looking to the day where other parties could adhere to the same principles. ¶8. (C) Rakhmanin thought that the GOR's principles "would not be so contradictory" to those of the U.S.; it was too ambitious for now to talk of a "charter"; it is more important to "prepare everybody to think about common principles.". -------------- Details for the Ministerial? -------------- ¶9. (C) Rakhmanin stated that there is no GOR position on what to propose to the ministers. He believes the GOR needs to listen to other parties and work out something that is acceptable to everybody, seeking balance between the timing and the content of the Ministerial. For the GOR, it is time to move beyond the hype surrounding the Yongbyon closure and deliver something meaningful. PDAS Stephens said that although it would be too ambitious to try to reach agreement on core principles in time for the ministerial, it would be good to agree that the ministers could direct the WG to come up with some principles to guide the future work of the WG. Perhaps the deputies or ministers could thereafter endorse them. She emphasized that the Ministerial needs to be substantive and provide tangible impetus to the Talks. Rakhmanin warned that, despite an agreement in Beijing in July, FM Lavrov's full schedule may make his participation in a September Ministerial difficult. -------------- Views from Non-Official Circles -------------- ¶10. (C) PDAS Stephens also discussed regional security concepts with a group of Moscow Asia experts during a working luncheon hosted by the Charge. The experts agreed that Russia's desire to demonstrate its influence as a key international player and its own vital strategic interests in the region have coalesced around North Korea. North Korea, like Iran, Kosovo, and the Middle East, is another "opportunity" for Russia to demonstrate that no significant international dispute can be solved without its participation. The North Korean nuclear issue influences other international nuclear disputes and Russia wants its voice heard. The Russian leadership is concerned with the absence of a vision for the future of the Korean peninsula that is acceptable both to China and Russia. Thus, for the time being, Russia prefers the geopolitical status quo. Aleksandr Zhebin, Director of Korean Studies, Far Eastern Studies Institute, suggested that none of the parties involved, including Japan and the U.S. wanted a change in the status quo of a divided Korea, adding that a unified Korea a U.S. troop presence, in particular, would not be acceptable to either China or Russia. Senior Advisor Balbina Hwang suggested a distinction between "preferring" the status-quo and strategies to actually prevent changes in the status quo. She also pointed out Korean (both North and South) hyper-sensitivity to perceived "interference" by great powers and that the future destiny of Korea would have to be determined by the Korean people, with the support of regional powers. ¶11. (C) Most experts welcomed the recent U.S. engagement with North Korea, although some thought the complete denuclearization of North Korea unlikely. Anton Khlopkov, Deputy Director, PIR Center, believed that North Korea already possessed four to six nuclear devices and did not "need any more." ¶12. (C) Aleksandr Vorontsov, Director of Korean Studies at the Institute of Oriental Studies, maintained that all future MOSCOW 00003804 003 OF 003 progress hinged on U.S flexibility. North Korea would endeavor to make its nuclear capability as expensive as possible for the U.S., but would be willing in exchange to allow the U.S. to be its chief security guarantor. ¶13. (C) Zhebin argued that the U.S. presidential election could produce a change in U.S. policy as was the case with the Clinton and Bush administrations, and believed that North Korea's strategy was to wait for the U.S. election outcome. Senior Advisor Hwang observed that imminent elections in Japan, and in the ROK at year's end were also critical to Pyongyang's calculations and had the potential to dramatically alter the regional political landscape. Fedor Lukyanov, Editor-in-Chief of the journal "Russia in Global Affairs," observed that succession in North Korea is perhaps the single most important factor in the outcome of regional dynamics. All agreed that even with a clear-cut roadmap and U.S.-North Korean diplomatic normalization as the end point, the process would be complicated and there would be many disappointments along the way. ¶14. (U) PDAS Stephens cleared this cable. RUSSELL