AFGHANISTAN: MOSCOW STIRS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 003567

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/20/2017
TAGS: PREL PTER MASS EAID SNAR AF RS
SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN: MOSCOW STIRS

REF: MOSCOW 381

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons: 1.4(B/D).


1. (C) Summary: Russia has sharply stepped up its
engagement with the Afghan government since FM Lavrov's
February visit to Kabul. Moscow intends to finalize its debt
relief agreement with Kabul by the end of the month and is
actively weighing increased arms supplies and initiating a
program of reconstruction assistance. Russian firms are more
aggressively seeking investment opportunities in Afghanistan.
According to the MFA and Russian Afghan hands, Russia is
motivated by concerns about a resurgent Taliban and drug
trafficking as well as hopes to gain from a recovering Afghan
economy. While Russia has agreed to expand training slots
for Afghan counternarcotics officials through a NATO-Russia
Council pilot project, Moscow's focus is on using the
Collective Security Treaty Organization to stem trafficking.
The upcoming meeting of the U.S.-Russian Counterterrorism
Working Group is an opportunity to gauge Russian willingness
to cooperate more actively across the board in support of
shared goals of Afghan stability. End Summary.

The Pace Quickens
--------------


2. (SBU) FM Lavrov's February 23 visit to Kabul marked the
start of a higher level of Russian engagement with
Afghanistan. Soon after Lavrov's return, MFA Second Asia
Department Director Aleksandr Maryasov announced that Moscow
was strengthening its ties with Kabul by finalizing a debt
relief agreement, seeking greater investment opportunities
for Russian firms and considering renewing arms supplies to
the Afghan National Army. In late-March, the MFA singled out
the appointment of a new Afghan ambassador to Russia after a
long gap as reflective of improved relations. May saw the
establishment of a joint Russian-Afghan Business Council and
the visit by a delegation led by Afghan Speaker Yunus Qanuni.
Moscow agreed to double the number of training slots for
Afghan and Central Asian counternarcotics officials at the
Domodedovo facility in June. On July 18, Deputy Finance
Minister Storchak told U/S Jeffrey that the long delayed
signing of the debt relief agreement would finally take place
at the end of the month when Afghan Finance Minister Ul-Haq
Ahady visited Moscow.
.
Mixed Motives
--------------


3. (C) Afghan experts have been direct about the reasons
behind the energized relationship. Moscow remains concerned
about what they view as a steadily deteriorating security
situation in Afghanistan and the effects this might have on
their Central Asian neighbors. One expert observed that the
appeal of a resurgent Taliban posed a much more concrete
challenge to Russian security interests than the proposed
U.S. missile defense system, that the GOR recognized this,
and that it was using the tools available to it to influence
and bolster the Afghan government. The threat posed by
narcotics trafficking also preoccupies GOR decision makers;
Northern Route drug trafficking is blamed for rising drug
abuse and HIV/AIDS problems in Russia as well as vastly
increasing the scale of corruption of law enforcement
personnel and border guards.


4. (C) At the same time, Moscow sees economic advantage for
Russian companies as the Afghan economy expands and
reconstruction funds are plentiful. An MFA official who
handles Afghan issues candidly acknowledged to us that the
debt deal with Afghanistan had been delayed as lower-level
officials in the Finance Ministry argued that Russian firms
were still not being given a fair shake. He told us this
might have once been true; Russian firms had long claimed
that they were being discriminated against. However, there
had been a shift in the past year. Technopromeksport, one of
Russia's leaders in power plant construction, won a USD 30
million contract to refurbish the 100 MW Naghlu hydroelectric
plant, beating out Chinese and Iranian firms. A Russian firm
with ties to Kremlin-connected metals oligarch Oleg Deripaska
was now bidding on the chance to develop the massive Anyak
copper deposit. Russian firms were also looking at oil and
gas prospects and road construction contracts. The Afghan
DCM noted to us that Kazan had just hosted a trade fair in
June that was aimed at reinvigorating ties between firms in
Muslim Tatarstan and Afghan contacts that dated back to the
Soviet occupation.
.
Loosening Purse Strings
--------------


5. (C) Private firms are not the only ones looking to
invest in Afghanistan. In the past, the GOR rarely made

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donations of humanitarian or reconstruction assistance, but
Moscow's now bulging coffers have persuaded the Finance
Ministry to provide some limited aid money to the MFA. The
Afghan desk has told us that Russia now plans to donate USD 3
million for additional humanitarian assistance (wheat,
cooking oil, tents and blankets) in northern Afghanistan.
Russia is also considering rehabilitating a hospital in Mazar
and allocating approximately USD 5 million for a university
in Kabul.


6. (C) Moscow's money is likely to be hedged with various
conditions and Russia is not aiming to be a major donor.
When approached about contributing to the Afghan
Reconstruction Trust Fund for justice projects, the MFA
argued that much of the aid money already given in
Afghanistan had been wasted and that the Afghans needed to
build their own self-sustaining institutions.
.
Political Support for Karzai
--------------


7. (C) Russia has never been particularly fond of Karzai,
but he is viewed by the MFA as the better than any of the
alternatives; MFA Second Asia Department Director Maryasov
stressed to us that the GOR was focused on strengthening the
Afghan President's authority. When UN Special Representative
for Afghanistan Tom Koenigs met in early June with DFM
Yakovenko, the Russians underlined their concerns about the
Taliban's strength and infighting among Afghan politicians.
MFA sources frequently express exasperation with the
political scene in Afghanistan, observing that everyone
imagined themselves as a leader, but few were devoted to
demonstrating leadership in building a unified Afghanistan.
The MFA tells us that when Qanuni visited Moscow in late-May,
he lobbied for Russian support, but, according to our
sources, he did not receive it. The absence of viable
alternatives to Karzai led the MFA to tell Koenigs that
Russia was willing to support combining the dates for
upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections in
Afghanistan, even if this meant Karzai stayed on an
additional year.

. . . but there are no moderate Taliban
--------------


8. (C) While the MFA views Karzai as the one Afghan
politician who can hold the nation together, the MFA and
Russian experts have been critical of the central
government's lack of control over outlying provinces and what
they viewed as the corrosive effect of pervasive corruption
in Karzai's government. The MFA has also slammed Karzai's
efforts at national reconciliation; during Koenig's visit,
the MFA rejected any suggestion that former Taliban leaders
should play a role in the national government, arguing that
it was a "fantasy" to believe there were "moderate Taliban."
The MFA stressed to us that they were adamant that Governor
Munib remain on the UNSCR 1267 sanctions list and argued that
the Taliban "should be outlawed from public life as were the
fascists in Germany."

Security and Counternarcotics Help
--------------


9. (C) Moscow's concerns about the threats posed by the
Taliban's resurgence and increased drug trafficking have
spurred more concrete offers of assistance, but progress has
been slow. Russia's willingness to resume arms supplies to
the ANA (USD 200 million in arms were donated from 2002-05)
is one of the more promising avenues for cooperation. After
both FM Spanta's October visit to Moscow and Lavrov's
February visit to Kabul, the sides agreed to consider
renewing the supply relationship, but not much has been done
since. The MFA complains that the Afghans are dragging their
heels in working on a comprehensive list of defense
equipment; we also understand that the Russians want to sell
arms to Afghanistan, albeit at a substantial discount, rather
than donate the materiel.


10. (C) On a more positive note, MFA European Cooperation
Department Director Ryabkov told us that there was no
political impediment to increasing Russian cooperation
through the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) and that the Russian
Ambassador is under instructions to continue contacts and
explore means of supporting NATO forces in Afghanistan, as
well as strengthening the Karzai government. The GOR is
examining a range of proposals, with President Putin
personally involved in the issue.


11. (C) On counternarcotics cooperation, Russia is going to
double the number of Afghan officials to be trained under the
NRC project, but still stresses its interests in pursuing
counternarcotics cooperation through the Collective Security

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Treaty Organization (CSTO). Ryabkov argued that the CSTO was
the "missing link" in counternarcotics cooperation between
the West and CIS states in Afghanistan. Acknowledging that
the Central Asia states were already members of the NATO's
EAPC, Ryabkov, said that the U.S. and its NATO Allies were
missing the point that real counternarcotics cooperation was
taking place within the CSTO, including interdiction,
information exchange and training. Russia was not seeking to
insert a "bloc" mentality in its approach to cooperation with
the U.S. on Afghanistan, but wanted to tap all mechanisms
that reinforced our common goals. Even symbolic cooperation
would be seen as a significant step by the GOR, according to
Ryabkov.
.
Comment: Marshaling Russian Support
--------------


12. (C) It is clear that Russia will be more assertive in
its engagement with Afghanistan. In some priority areas --
countering narcotics trafficking, spurring economic
development and equipping Afghan security forces -- Russian
efforts could dovetail with the U.S. comprehensive strategy
in Afghanistan. In particular, we need to build on Moscow's
new found willingness to aid reconstruction efforts in ways
that meet Afghan Compact goals. On other key issues,
particularly Afghanistan's political transition, we need to
sustain the international consensus while anticipating and
addressing differences before they become larger problems.
The early September meeting of the bilateral Counterterrorism
Working Group offers an opportunity to register support for
Russian initiatives that contribute to Afghan stability while
exploring whether further cooperation is possible.
BURNS