CHECHNYA REVISITED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 003495 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/02/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREF PHUM PINR EAID RS SUBJECT: CHECHNYA REVISITED REF: A. 05 MOSCOW 4108 ¶B. MOSCOW 2857 Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons 1.4 (b and d). ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: During a recent visit by REFCOORD to Grozny, the evidence of Chechnya's economic reconstruction was striking. Scaffolding, initially seen only around government buildings, has appeared everywhere, including private homes. Minutka Square, long a symbol of the city's destruction, has been cleared, while what is promised to be the largest mosque in the North Caucasus commands the center of Grozny. Traffic and pedestrians have returned to city streets. Interlocutors ascribe this progress to the leadership of Ramzan Kadyrov, while conceding the human rights costs. For Grozny's long-suffering population, the reconstruction and relative security has resurrected a once-forgotten sense of hope, although nervousness remains due to rumors of a resurgent insurgency. Ingushetiya is not faring as well, as increased abductions as well as attacks on police and military targets have raised tensions in the republic and prompted some Ingush to soften their opposition to reunification with Chechnya. For the international community, the transition from humanitarian aid to recovery and economic development in Chechnya looms large, but the GOR's signals on international involvement in the region remain mixed. U.S. assistance will continue to make a significant contribution to security in the North Caucasus as long as we work with other donors and avoid falling prey to GOR suspicions. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) On June 28, REFCOORD traveled to Chechnya as part of a UNHCR monitoring mission, his first visit in 15 months. He visited a temporary accommodation center for returning IDPs, met with local NGOs, and saw two U.S.-funded humanitarian aid projects. Because of UN and GOR security regulations, the mission stayed on a pre-determined route, accompanied by Russian MVD troops in two armored jeeps, two Chechen traffic police cars, and a third jeep with men who were probably Federal Security Service officers. Grozny's security has improved to the point that the mission was able to have lunch at a pizza restaurant in the city center and to make an impromptu stop for photographs. Our observations are anecdotal, however, and limited to what we could see along the route. RETURN TO CHECHNYA -------------- �00A; ¶3. (C) Crossing into Chechnya from Ingushetiya at the Kavkaz-1 checkpoint, cars must pass a Russian military blockpost, but other than our MVD escorts, this was the only Russian military presence that we saw along the route to Grozny. Kavkaz-1 continues to be a lucrative assignment for Russian forces. UN staff told us that soldiers pay up to USD 1,000 for their postings there, and recoup the cost by demanding money from motorists. Or as we observed, confiscating a bottle of soda as relief for the 90-degree heat. ¶4. (SBU) Passing through Achkoy Martan and Urus Martan, heading east to Grozny on a road recently paved, the armored vehicles we had seen on previous visits were gone, replaced by tractors and threshers working in the fields (ref A). We passed a work crew repairing a bridge, and a little farther, a boy cutting grass along the road with a scythe. We saw nothing out of the ordinary, and a ride that in the past went at high speed, continued at a leisurely pace, with time to take in the fields immediately before us and the shadows of the Caucasus in the distance. There was no suggestion of trouble other than the heavily armed men in the vehicles in front of and behind the UN vehicle. ¶5. (SBU) In the village of Assinovskaya, we saw a 15-foot-tall roadside poster of Ramzan Kadyrov, his late father Akhmed, and President Putin, a trinity that many have taken to calling, "The Father, Son, and Holy Ghost" given the younger Kadyrov's constant praise for Putin and his recent statements crediting Putin with saving the Chechen nation. There were other posters of Ramzan Kadyrov and his father along the way, nicely set in newly built brick enclosures, noting the gratitude and pride of the Chechen people. Approaching Grozny, they gave way to billboards for air conditioners, window replacements, and water delivery, literally signs of progress. IDPS -------------- ¶6. (SBU) At the outskirts of Grozny, the sign welcoming MOSCOW 00003495 002 OF 004 visitors had been repaired and painted. A Russian postal service truck passed in the opposite direction. Entering the city, workmen were finishing renovations on 10 low-rise apartment buildings, housing for some of the estimated 120,000 still displaced within Chechnya. About 12,000 IDPs still live in temporary accommodation centers (TACs),but Kadyrov has ordered all 26 closed by the end of the year. A contact working in Kadyrov's administration told us earlier, however that insufficient alternative shelter would make this order unfeasible. Chechen officials are making aggressive efforts to remove some families they claim are staying in government housing illegally after receiving compensation or having adequate housing elsewhere. At the TAC we visited, housing about 400 families, conditions were tolerable, but cramped. The TAC commandant asserted that no one was being forced to leave if they had no other shelter, and officials were reviewing each case individually. MAIN STREET, CHECHNYA -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Grozny's main streets were paved and many of the buildings were barely visible through scaffolding as workers plastered and painted facades. Victory Street, the first to undergo extensive reconstruction, bustled with pedestrians shopping or having lunch at one of several cafes and restaurants now open. Nearby Minutka Square, which had been called Grozny's Ground Zero and had been surrounded by piles of rubble and armed men from various security forces during our initial visit in 2005, has been cleared of rubble, as well as armed men, and prepared for reconstruction. Rising above Grozny's cityscape are the four minarets and domes of a Chechen-government-financed replica of a grand Turkish mosque, which Kadyrov has promised will be the largest in the Caucasus and is being built by a Turkish company. ¶8. (SBU) Even Kadyrov's critics have acknowledged Grozny's rapid transformation, although stressing that public sector employees have to contribute up to 30 percent of their salaries to the Kadyrov fund and that laborers have been press ganged into reconstruction projects for little or no pay. What is markedly different, however, is that throughout the city, Grozny's residents are beginning to rebuild their homes. Off Grozny's thoroughfares, on the unpaved, rutted streets that lead into many neighborhoods, destroyed or deserted homes that stood untouched were outshone by the bright red brick and sunlight reflected from the new tin roofs of houses being rebuilt. In one neighborhood, water lines, funded by the USG, were being laid to restore running, potable water to about 1,800 residents. THE ONCE AND FUTURE INSURGENCY -------------- ¶9. (C) The optimism suggested by reconstruction efforts is tempered by what remains a volatile security situation. The insurgency has been weakened considerably, but there are rumors that more young men and amnestied former rebels are joining the resistance, with rebels' appearance in Grozny, as well as more frequent attacks on federal and local security forces around the towns of Shali, Vedeno, and Shatoy. Chechen human rights activists, NGO workers, and UN officials told us access to areas south and east of Grozny is sporadic at best because of fighting there. Some of our contacts said they expected Chechen rebel leader Doku Umarov to attempt a large-scale raid this summer. ¶10. (C) Contacts were also quick to tell us that, despite the prospects for further clashes, security has improved and Chechnya is more stable than Ingushetiya and Dagestan. UN security officers said that there has been a sharp increase in attacks on security forces and law enforcement officers in Ingushetiya, with an average of one per day since mid-June. During our travels in the North Caucasus, insurgents attacked a border guards detachment in Nazran in the early morning on June 28, and we were advised to avoid passing through the middle of town by UN security. On June 29, gunmen fired on a police vehicle in the village of Karabulak in eastern Ingushetiya. Throughout the republic, including the capital Magas, we noticed a heavier military presence than in the past, with what appeared to be federal forces having set up new positions along the road leading to Magas and armored vehicles taking up positions at key intersections in Nazran in the early evening. As in Chechnya, there was speculation that a larger attack was being planned. The hit-and-run attacks could be intended to give newly recruited insurgents some experience, according to contacts. ¶11. (C) Shakman Akbulatov of Memorial's Ingushetiya office told us that abductions of Ingush by security forces were becoming more common. Memorial has documented 12 abductions MOSCOW 00003495 003 OF 004 in Ingushetiya since January, almost as many as in Chechnya (ref B). Other contacts, including an expatriate NGO director, said that frustration over these abductions and the recent forced closure of the Novi settlement for Ingush IDPs displaced during the 1992 conflict with North Ossetia were exacerbating tensions in the republic. The NGO director told us that previous Ingush public opposition to reunification with Chechnya was softening. Some Ingush were beginning to advocate for it in the hopes that Kadyrov could protect them from abuses by federal security forces and that he would support Ingush claims to have the disputed Prigorodniy District that is now part of North Ossetia returned to Ingushetiya. TRANSITION, BUT TO WHAT? -------------- ¶12. (C) As Chechnya improves and other republics start to fray, donors, UN agencies, and NGOs are discussing a transition strategy. Unemployment across the North Caucasus -- not the provision of basic necessities for victims of the Chechen conflict -- has become the most pressing issue for aid agencies as the number of displaced or other vulnerable victims of the conflict decrease. International assistance to the region is moving away from traditional humanitarian aid to small-scale economic development programs intended to give many aid recipients the means to support themselves and to begin full-scale recovery in Chechnya. ¶13. (C) Moreover, many traditional humanitarian donors, like the British and Canadians, have reduced substantially or ended humanitarian aid to the North Caucasus, while donors such as USAID and the EU's TACIS program have begun funding projects in conflict mitigation, health, and income generation. UN contacts tell us that the GOR has been unequivocal in calling for an end to direct humanitarian assistance. UN humanitarian agencies, like UNHCR and World Food Program, may leave the North Caucasus in 2008 because of declining numbers of beneficiaries and needs, reduced donor funding, and uncertainty over their access to Chechnya. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance will close in December of this year as a first step in a reduced UN humanitarian presence. HUMANITARIAN NEEDS AND THE FUTURE OF HUMANITARIAN AID -------------- -------------- ¶14. (C) According to UN estimates, there are about 120,000 displaced persons in Chechnya and slightly more than 15,000 in Ingushetiya. Although development programs can help many victims of the conflict, our contacts maintain there is still need for humanitarian assistance. Shelter, medical care, and access to potable water are lacking in many rural areas and the most vulnerable within Chechnya and Ingushetiya -- the elderly, single-mothers and their children, or the disabled -- cannot take advantage of job training or microfinancing. These populations will continue to rely on international aid. ¶15. (C) Privately, some contacts told us they were worried that the GOR may try to accelerate departure of international humanitarian aid agencies. Earlier this year, rocket-propelled grenades were fired at UN offices in Nazran. UN officials, after getting little information from security agencies on possible motives or suspects or concrete improvements in security around the offices, have decided to end the UN's full-time presence in Ingushetiya and close offices in Nazran. UN officials were told recently that the GOR would not allow the UN to open an office in Grozny in a surprising reversal of their long-running insistence that the UN and other international aid organizations should move their operations there. ¶16. (C) ICRC Chief of Mission Francois Bellon said recently that there had been a wave of increased scrutiny of aid activities, with GOR officials suggesting activities should be "constructive" and done in cooperation with the GOR. Other NGO contacts told us that following a flurry of questioning about "political activities" in May, FSB interest in their work has waned, at least temporarily. Earlier, an MFA official told UNHCR that as long as international agencies worked with the republic-level governments and did so in ways that supported GOR contentions that the situation was normalizing, they could stay in the North Caucasus. However, the GOR has never expressly laid out its priorities systematically and does not seem likely to do so, leaving donors and aid agencies to meet with GOR officials individually to discuss GOR preferences and to coordinate among themselves as best they can. TREATMENT OF NGOS MOSCOW 00003495 004 OF 004 -------------- ¶17. (C) Although much improved since 2003-2004, the relationship among aid agencies and the GOR and local officials continues to be uneasy, sometimes adversarial, but loosely cooperative. Local officials are more accepting of assistance, whereas federal officials, including Presidential Representative for the Southern Federal District Dmitriy Kozak, remain distant. Although all international NGOs working in the region were re-registered, some after nearly three months of suspended activities, they occasionally are harassed or have their work obstructed. There does not, however, seem to be any widespread effort to force them to shut down, despite what some had feared when new legislation governing NGOs was adopted. Most have learned to adapt quickly so that disruptions are minimal. World Vision, for example, has been suspended from working in Chechnya because a local employee was arrested on weapons charges. It has simply repositioned its resources in Ingushetiya, and Chechens seeking medical care visit its clinic in Sleptsovskaya, not far from the interrepublican border. ¶18. (C) Based on anecdotal evidence of treatment of NGOs and conversations with UN, Red Cross, and republic level officials, the GOR continues to be sensitive to activities by the international aid organizations that have political overtones or criticize Russia's human rights record. This is expected to increase as the 2008 presidential transition approaches. Suspected ties to separatists are almost certain to lead to trouble for NGOs, as was the case with World Vision. Local officials, meanwhile, complain that UN agencies and NGOs do not listen to them, but proceed with activities that they do not especially value such as tolerance building, rather than reconstruction or job training. But overall, international agencies and the GOR seem to co-exist, if not always cooperate, with aid agencies doing their best in Chechnya to fill gaps in the government's assistance. COMMENT -------------- ¶19. (C) Chechnya's reconstruction over the past year is dramatic, almost startling. The long-awaited arrival of federal funds and Kadyrov's central direction, even with his reprehensible methods of compelling contributions from his own citizens, have made Grozny more than the Potemkin village that government critics claimed it would be in the early days of the program. Normalcy, even optimism, is starting to return, judging by better security and reconstruction of individual homes. Grozny's residents remain nervous over the prospects of a re-invigorated insurgency, and prospects for trouble in other republics are serious. Aid agencies still see unmet needs and opportunities to assist in the region's recovery, despite the GOR's mixed messages about an international presence in the North Caucasus. From our perspective, U.S. assistance has made a meaningful contribution in Chechnya and can continue to do so throughout the broader region, as long as we work in concert with other donors and avoid falling prey to Russian suspicions. BURNS