POSITIVE REACTION TO "LOBSTER SUMMIT"

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 003338

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/09/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MASS MNUC RS
SUBJECT: POSITIVE REACTION TO "LOBSTER SUMMIT"

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons: 1.4 (B/D).


1. (C) Summary. While extensive media coverage of the
so-called "Lobster Summit" quickly gave way to euphoria over
Russia's winning the right to host the 2014 Winter Olympics
in Sochi, Moscow experts agreed that Putin demonstrated in
Kennebunkport a desire to tone down the rhetoric and find
ways to cooperate. Most attention focused on Putin's missile
defense proposals and First Deputy PM Sergey Ivanov's
subsequent threat to place new missiles in Kaliningrad if the
GOR proposals were not accepted. Experts we talked to viewed
Putin's missile defense initiative as serious and popular
domestically, but contingent upon Washington at the very
least slowing down negotiations with Poland and the Czech
Republic. The fact that Kosovo did not feature prominently
in the presidents' exchange has been pocketed as a Russian
success in kicking the Ahtisaari plan further down the road.
End Summary.
.
GOOD VIBRATIONS
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2. (SBU) Public reaction to the Summit was generally
positive, with most Russian media highlighting the
constructive atmosphere surrounding the meetings and
stressing that Putin was received with extraordinary
hospitality at the Bush family residence. Putin was
portrayed as open to discussions on difficult issues like
missile defense. Pre-meeting coverage had pitched the get
together as a primarily an attempt to restore a level of
civility to bilateral ties, so there were few expectations
here that agreements would be reached on contentious issues.
Kommersant was typical in observing that the presidents did
not come to "any real agreement" on any pressing issue but
had demonstrated that the relationship "had not deteriorated
to the level of a new Cold War."
.
GOR OFFICIALS ON MISSILE DEFENSE
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3. (SBU) Publicly, GOR opinion makers concentrated on
Putin's new offers on missile defense cooperation. First
Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Ivanov received extensive
coverage by stressing that U.S. acceptance of Russia's MD
proposals would create a true "strategic partnership" between
the U.S. and Russia. At the same time he cautioned that
failure to reach agreement would lead Russia to "take
adequate measures to ensure security" that involve an
"asymmetrical and effective answer" involving in part the
placement of missiles in Kaliningrad. Duma Foreign Affairs
Committee Chair Konstantin Kosachev also flagged Putin's MD
offer, characterizing the proposal as a "historic chance"
that could lead to a breakthrough in U.S.-Russian relations.
He was seconded by Federation Council International Affairs
Committee Chair Mikhail Margelov, who said that Russia was
demonstrating its readiness for a strategic partnership and
that the MD offer was a "moment of truth" for bilateral ties.
.
EXPERTS ON MEETING RESULTS
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4. (C) Our defense contacts characterized Putin's expanded
offer to cooperate on missile defense as sincere, and not
merely tactical. Editor of "Russia in Global Affairs" Feodor
Lukyanov urged the U.S. to explore Putin's initiative, and
argued that the medium-term nature of the Iranian threat
should allow the U.S. to slow down decision making on the
Czech and Polish sites. A "full steam ahead" approach on the
European sites, he warned, would preemptively end strategic
discussions with the GOR. Ivan Safranchuk, Chief Defense
Analyst at the World Security Institute, agreed that Putin
aimed to overcome Washington's perceived cool response to the
Gabala radar station by inviting the EU and NATO to
participate in his missile defense initiative. Like
Lukyanov, Safranchuk stressed that Russia was eager to
cooperate on MD, but remained adamantly opposed to the sites
in Poland and the Czech Republic. Konstantin Eggert,
Moscow's BBC correspondent, dismissed Sergey Ivanov's
"threat" to deploy new missiles in Kaliningrad, as rhetoric
driven by succession politics. At this point, Eggert
maintained, Moscow was not interested in increasing
international tensions or jacking up the anti-U.S.
sloganeering.


5. (C) Both Eggert and Alexey Malashenko, a scholar at the
Moscow Carnegie Center, told us that Putin scored points with
the Russian public by portraying himself as a world leader
who was trying to bring Europe, Russia and the U.S. under one
cooperative defense system. Putin delivered a clear message
that Russia will cooperate but made clear that the U.S.
"should leave us alone domestically." In doing so, Eggert
maintained that that Putin had gained the upper hand and

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placed the burden on Washington to prove that the U.S. was
taking Russia seriously. Eggert argued that Washington
needed to provide a thoughtful, considered response in order
to convince the GOR and Russian public that it was serious
about credible cooperation with Russia.


6. (C) Russian observers told us that the issue of Kosovo
was striking by its presumed absence from any substantive
exchange at the summit, with many such as Lukyanov arguing
that it represented a victory for Russian efforts to kick the
Ahtisaari plan further down the road. The GOR, Lukyanov told
us, remains confident that the European Union is not ready to
recognize a unilateral declaration by Kosovo of its
independence. Having pocketed French President Sarkozy's
suggestion of a six-month delay (while ignoring his condition
of "automaticity" of the Ahtisaari plan),the GOR would
continue to push for a delay beyond Russia's March 2008
presidential elections.
BURNS