AMBASSADOR'S ROUNDTABLE WITH HUMAN RIGHTS NGOS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 003168 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/28/2017 TAGS: PHUM KDEM PGOV SOCI RS SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S ROUNDTABLE WITH HUMAN RIGHTS NGOS Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reason: 1.4 (d). -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) In a June 27 discussion, five human rights NGO activists offered the Ambassador their advice for coping with an increasingly assertive President Putin. They suggested that like-minded countries speak with one voice, that the "tools" of international organizations and agreements be used as appropriate, and that the West treat Putin's expressions of concern about developments in other countries with the same seriousness that they expect for their concerns about unsettling developments in Russia. The participants also suggested that efforts be made to demonstrate the link between an increasingly prosperous Russia and respect for human rights; as, for example, in the fight against corruption. End summary. -------------- Participants -------------- ¶2. (SBU) The Ambassador on June 27 discussed with representatives of five of Russia's leading human rights organizations the current state of human rights in Russia, projected developments during the 2007 - 08 election cycle, and the role of the opposition in Russia's political calculus. Attending the discussion were: -- Lyudmila Alekseyeva, Chairwoman, Moscow Helsinki Group -- Tatyana Lokshina, International Programs Coordinator, Demos Center -- Yuriy Dzhibladze, President, Center for Development of Democracy and Human Rights -- Tatyana Kasatkina, Executive Director, Memorial -- Aleksandr Petrov, Deputy Chairman, Human Rights Watch -------------- Putin's Assertiveness -------------- ¶3. (C) All of the participants endorsed Dzhibladze's description of Russia as increasingly centralized and less democratic than it was when President Putin took office. Economic improvements and increased stability since the tumultuous Yeltsin years had not stimulated greater GOR self-confidence. Instead, restrictions on the freedom of the media had increased, and an "external enemy," the United States, had been created to unify Russians and rationalize some of the steps taken. ¶4. (C) Putin's increasing self-assertiveness presented a challenge both to the West, Dzhibladze said, and to human rights advocates in Russia. It had strained U.S.-Russian relations, although Dzhibladze doubted that Putin wanted to revive the Cold War. Domestically, Putin's assertive defense of Russian "sovereign democracy" had placed GOR critics in a difficult position, as democracy had not been rejected out of hand. Dzhibladze and the other participants agreed that the President's assertiveness required a carefully considered response. Like-minded countries should express their concerns about Russia with one voice, in order to avoid charges of partisanship, and the "tools of international organizations" should be used, where possible. Putin's concerns about the human rights performance of other countries should receive a serious hearing, in order to legitimate expressions of concern about human rights developments in Russia. ¶5. (C) The participants thought that human rights presented special difficulties for Putin, because he and many of his advisors believed that Russia could be modernized without undue concern for them. Putin's belief was belied by the continuing inability of the GOR to address problems like corruption in the absence of an impartial judiciary, and the continuing erosion of the legitimacy of the electoral system. Putin, the participants thought, did not understand that genuine democracy was as important to Russia's future as security and a booming economy. -------------- Worrisome Developments in the Caucasus -------------- ¶6. (C) Alekseyeva and Lokshina worried about developments in Chechnya and the North Caucasus. While kidnappings may have decreased in Chechnya, they were increasing in the North Caucasus and Dagestan, they alleged. The new-found MOSCOW 00003168 002 OF 002 "stability" in Chechnya was a by-product of Chechen President Kadyrov's willingness to terrorize whole families in order to blunt resistance to his rule. It had resulted, Alekseyeva maintained, in the flight of younger males into the mountains in order to avoid being caught up in one of the government's frequent sweeps. -------------- Changes to NGO Law Under Discussion -------------- ¶7. (C) President Putin's increasingly frequent comments about the allegedly negative role of foreign-funded NGOs worried the participants. They thought it important that the USG assure the GOR that it had no intention to subvert the regime, and to note that cross-border aid to NGOs was widely practiced, including by Russia, whose Ministry of Foreign Affairs had aid programs in the Baltic States. ¶8. (C) The participants noted they had taken up Putin's invitation to offer amendments to the 2006 NGO law. Their proposals were currently under discussion. There were signs that some of them were meeting resistance in the Ministry of Justice, but the proposals had found support elsewhere in the Russian bureaucracy. It was difficult for the participants to predict when they would received a final verdict. Alekseyeva thought that an increasingly active Public Chamber was usurping the NGOs traditional territory. Her concern did not seem to be shared by the others present. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) The participants were clearly worried about negative human rights trend lines. However, the advice they offered for dealing with Putin, and their own discussions with the GOR on the NGO law, indicated that they still believed it possible to modify the behavior of the government, even as the GOR enters a period when it will be preoccupied above all by its own survival through the Duma and presidential elections. BURNS