KOSOVO: RUSSIA TO BREAK WITH CONTACT GROUP

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000305 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM UNMIK SR YI RS SUBJECT: KOSOVO: RUSSIA TO BREAK WITH CONTACT GROUP REF: 06 MOSCOW 12819 Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns: Reasons: 1.4 (b/d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Welcoming a proposed visit by Special Envoy Wisner, the GOR's Special Envoy on Kosovo Botsan-Karchenko warned that Russia would break the Contact Group consensus on the Ahtisaari timeline at the January 26 Vienna meeting. The GOR will reject an "artificial" timeline, propose postponing negotiations until after the formation of a Serbian government, and insist on a solution acceptable to both Pristina and Belgrade. If pushed to an early UNSC vote, Karchenko warned of a possible GOR veto. He urged the West to force Serbia's hand on Euro-Atlantic integration, and encouraged the Serbian leadership to not reject the Ahtisaari report out of hand. He recommended postponement of the Group of Regionals meeting, in the face of Contact Group disunity. Lavrov's February 1-2 Washington visit and Wisner's proposed Moscow consultations are important opportunities to highlight the costs of Russia's isolation and work to back the Russians off from their threats of UNSC vetoes. End Summary Kosovo Timeline: Russia will beg to differ -------------- ¶2. (C) In a January 24 meeting, GOR MFA Special Envoy on Kosovo Botsan-Karchenko welcomed a proposed visit by Special Envoy Wisner to Moscow, in the aftermath of what he expected would be a difficult Contact Group meeting in Vienna, since Russia would break with the consensus on adhering to a strict timeline for the implementation of Ahtisaari's recommendations. During January 15 consultations, EU Kosovo Envoy Stefan Lene had reinforced to the GOR that while certain changes could be negotiated in the minority rights section of the report, the EU would not agree to modifying the general principles -- elements of which, Karchenko stressed, continued to imply that Kosovo independence was the objective. This approach was unacceptable to the GOR. ¶3. (C) The GOR will argue that the process needs to be slowed down in order to facilitate an acceptable solution to both Belgrade and Pristina Specifically: -- While Ahtisaari had been forthcoming in building in another negotiating opportunity, it was unrealistic to think that the parties could finish their deliberations in February; -- The GOR's "strong preference" was to await the formation of the new Serbian government, which had a "legal right" to defer responding to the Ahtisaari report until its leadership was confirmed; -- Russia will "insist" on a postponement of the negotiation for several weeks in order to demonstrate respect for this process. Only after the formation of the government should the Contact Group assess the behavior of Belgrade. -- As a rule, the GOR did not accept an "artificial" time frame whether a matter of weeks or years. Karchenko reiterated Putin's insistence on a negotiated solution, which the President reinforced during his January 21 meeting with Chancellor Merkel. -- In an aside, Karchenko suggested that the GOR also needed time to prepare for Kosovo independence. Pointing to the breakthrough visit by Kosovo Prime Minister Ceku in late November-early December 2006, Karchenko said the GOR made a significant effort with the Russian media to ensure that the visit was a success, but still had much to do "to open the path for better relations" with Kosovo. Karchenko continued to maintain that domestic pressure was a factor in GOR decision making. And may veto -------------- ¶4. (C) While stopping short of stating that a GOR decision was made, Karchenko signaled strongly that Russia was prepared to use its veto at the UNSC. If the Ahtisaari package moved forward in March, he commented carefully, Russia "would have no chance to achieve an endorsement in the Security Council;" the early delivery of the report, he reiterated, would "make us impose the veto." Serbia must choose -------------- ¶5. (C) Karchenko argued that Serbia had two contradictory ambitions: one was to integrate into Euro-Atlantic MOSCOW 00000305 002 OF 002 institutions, the other to retain Kosovo. Belgrade needed to face up to this contradiction -- a process that the West was best able to force. Russia's interest was in having Kosovo resolved within the "framework of international law" and would maintain pressure on the Serbs to constructively engage. Regardless of U.S. arguments, the GOR believed Kosovo would serve as a precedent, and it was not a precedent that the Russian government sought (with respect to the frozen conflicts). If Serbia was willing "to pay the admission price of Kosovo" for European integration, Russia would have no objection. Karchenko quoted Putin's recent comment to Kostunica that "Russia is not prepared to be more Serbian than Serbia." Group of Regionals: Postponement? -------------- ¶6. (C) Karchenko flagged an immediate concern stemming from the expected rupture in Contact Group consensus: whether to convene the Group of Regionals, as requested by Croatia. Technically, the proposed February 6-8 time frame may not work for Karchenko; substantively, Russia would be compelled to express its differences, undermining a common approach. In any event, Karchenko argued that a meeting of the Group of Regionals should come after Belgrade and Pristina have formally responded and suggested that the Croats be asked to postpone the session. When pushed as to whether Russia benefited from its isolation, Karchenko noted that many of the regionals tailor their reactions to the party inquiring, and questioned the degree of consensus that actually exists over Kosovo independence. Russia urges Serbia to Think before Responding -------------- - ¶7. (C) Serbian Charge Yelitsa Kuryak told us that Karchenko urged the Serbian leadership to not reject the Ahtisaari proposal out of hand, to recognize its many positive features -- including decentralization, Serbian Kosovar rights, and protection of church property -- and to propose additional negotiations on those elements of the plan unacceptable to Serbia. Kuryak, noting that FM Lavrov had repeated Putin's comment to Kostunica at a luncheon with the Slavic ambassadors, argued that the Russian leadership was trying to play the issue both ways: courting Russian public opinion and avoiding a precedent that it was afraid of, while making it more difficult for the Serbian leadership to define a future without Kosovo. In her view, the GOR benefited most by a continued stalemate, represented by inconclusive negotiations. No fan of the GOR or her incoming ambassador (by her account, a conservative Kosovar Serb),Kuryak adamantly believes that Russian public opinion is muted on Kosovo, although the Duma and Russian media continue to turn to Milosevic's relatives-in-exile in Russia for analysis of current political developments in Serbia. And tells the Slovaks to expect delays -------------- ¶8. (C) Slovak Charge d'Affaires Juraj Priputen told us January 24 that the MFA informed the Slovaks, who take up the Presidency of the UN Security Council in February, that they will adhere to the "Standards before Status" formulation as one argument for delaying a resolution of Kosovo's status. Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) Lavrov's February 1-2 consultations in Washington and Wisner's proposed early February visit to Moscow provide opportunities to engage bilaterally with the GOR before Russia irrevocably breaks with the Contact Group consensus. Demonstrating Russia's isolation on this issue, the EU's solidarity, and the American priority attached to a settlement will be important tools in shaping the Russian strategy at the UN. BURNS