DFM KISLYAK ON PRE-KENNEBUNKPORT PREPARATIONS,

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 003023 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/21/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM RS SUBJECT: DFM KISLYAK ON PRE-KENNEBUNKPORT PREPARATIONS, IRAN, DPRK, MD, CHAVEZ Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons: 1.4(B/D). ¶1. (C) Summary: In an hour-long meeting on June 20, the Ambassador and Deputy Foreign Minister Kislyak reviewed preparations for the Kennebunkport meeting between the presidents. Kislyak said he was ready during his late-June Washington visit to work through outstanding issues on documents and the presidential checklist. He asked for a quick reaction to the Russian draft joint statement on strategic arms. Kislyak said he would be prepared to clarify President Putin's offer on the Qabala radar site. He noted that FM Lavrov was in Tehran for a Caspian Sea ministerial, but did not expect significant bilateral exchanges with the Iranians, and would in any case emphasize to the Iranians that they should focus on meeting their obligations to the IAEA and UNSC, and engage seriously with Solana. The Ambassador thanked Kislyak for Russia's role in facilitating the transfer of DPRK funds from Banco Delta Asia and stressed that Washington would pay careful attention to next week's Moscow visit by Venezuelan President Chavez. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Kislyak's Washington Visit: Kislyak said he looked forward to his meetings with A/S Rood and other officials in Washington. Kislyak noted that he would be coming directly from his meetings with Special Envoy Joseph in Vienna and would be available the afternoon of June 28 and all of June ¶29. Kislyak hoped to work through the documents being prepared on nuclear cooperation. He said he would be accompanied by General Buzhinskiy, MOD Director for International Military Cooperation, who would be in Washington for consultations on the Joint Data Exchange Center. ¶3. (C) Post-START arrangements: Kislyak reiterated Russia's impatience with the lack of a response from the U.S. on a joint statement on post-START arrangements. Kislyak said the Russian draft joint statement on strategic arms was designed to spur the process. Kislyak stressed that Russia's interagency process was complicated too, and the time for finalizing drafts was growing short. Kislyak would not be in the office after June 22 to work the process directly. On format, he noted the GOR's continuing strong preference for one document to be issued around the time of the presidential meeting to address nuclear issues. ¶4. (C) Presidential Checklist/200th Anniversary document: Kislyak said he intended to share draft language on presidential libraries by June 22. He was prepared to engage on any other outstanding checklist items when he was in Washington. Kislyak also offered to provide a "simple" draft statement on June 22 regarding commemorating the 200th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Russia and the U.S. ¶5. (C) Missile Defense: Kislyak noted that he and General Buzhinskiy would be willing to provide clarifications on Russia's offer on the Qabala radar site during their Washington visit. Formal talks between experts would depend on a clear mandate from the presidents at Kennebunkport that spelled out what the experts were to do. Otherwise, Kislyak noted, the experts could waste time arguing over the mandate rather than focusing on the task at hand. ¶6. (C) Iran: The Ambassador noted that FM Lavrov was in Tehran for a Caspian Sea ministerial. Kislyak said he did not expect significant bilateral exchanges with the Iranians, and Lavrov would in any case emphasize to the Iranians that they should focus on meeting their obligations to the IAEA and UNSC, and engage seriously with Solana. Turning to Iran's nuclear strategy, he noted European speculation that Tehran might be pursuing a level of enrichment capability that would be sufficient to demonstrate that Iran's program was "irreversible." Tehran would then stop adding centrifuges and be willing to negotiate a cap on its program. Kislyak stressed that the GOR had no "special clue" on this issue. ¶7. (C) Chavez: Kislyak confirmed that Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez would visit Moscow in advance of the Kennebunkport meeting. He acknowledged the Ambassador's point that the content and atmospherics of Chavez's visit would be watched carefully in Washington. ¶8. (C) DPRK Funds Transfer: The Ambassador thanked the GOR for its assistance in facilitating the transfer of DPRK funds from Banco Delta Asia. Kislyak said that the transfer from the Russian Central Bank to a bank in the Russian Far East may have occurred earlier in the day, but in any case would be completed on June 21. BURNS