USE OF RUSSIAN HELOS IN DARFUR RAISED WITH MFA

S E C R E T MOSCOW 002985

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/20/2017
TAGS: MARR ETTC PREL PARM RS SU
SUBJECT: USE OF RUSSIAN HELOS IN DARFUR RAISED WITH MFA

REF: A. STATE 80838

B. MOSCOW 1026

C. STATE 26466

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Daniel A. Russell. Reasons 1.4 (
B/D).


1. (S) SUMMARY: The DCM and other Embassy officers have
raised new evidence of the reported use of Russian
helicopters in Darfur with mutliple MFA officials June 13-19.
MFA officials questioned the veracity of our information,
but they agreed to look into US concerns, including end-use
checks on military equipment previously transferred to Sudan.
The MFA acknowledged our previous demarches on Russian
helicopter use in Darfur but did not yet have an official
response to share with us. END SUMMARY.


2. (S) In a June 13 meeting with MFA North America
Department Director Igor Neverov, the DCM raised Ref A
concerns over the transfer of Russian military equipment to
Sudan and new evidence of the use by Sudanese authorities of
both the Mi-171sh HIP and Mi-24 attack helicopters in Darfur.
Noting the African Union report of the shooting down of a
Mi-24 helicopter near Um Rai, the DCM stressed mounting
evidence that Sudan was not adhering to Russian end-use
restrictions. Neverov recognized the seriousness of the
issue given UNSC sanctions, but agreed to look into US
concerns.


3. (S) On June 15, MFA Deputy Director of the Middle East
and North Africa Department Ambassador Aleksander Shein
questioned the sourcing of our information, reiterated that
strict restrictions had been negotiated with the Sudanese
over the use of Russian military equipment, and maintained
that Russia investigated all claims of sanctions violations
that are brought before the 1591 Experts Committee. Shein
noted that previous reports of Russian-made Kalashnikovs
being used in Darfur (both by the Government of Sudan and
Janjaweid forces) had proved false, since the markings did
not match Russian production lines. Russia would not close
its eyes to abuses, Shein maintained, but conceded that the
GOR does not physically check on the status of its equipment
in Sudan, but waits for information to be raised first in the
UN sanctions committee. Claiming not to be aware of the
reported shooting down of an Mi-24 in Um Rai, Shein
questioned where were the civilian casualties that would
correspond with the use of these attack helicopters.
However, Shein undertook to follow-up.


4. (S) Sergey Petlyakov, Director of the Arms Technology and
Transfer Policy Office in the MFA's Department for
Disarmament and Security Affairs, insisted June 19 that
Moscow had complied with all UNSC resolutions with respect to
arms transfers to Sudan. Russia relied both on Sudanese
government guarantees, as well as end-use checks, to ensure
that lethal military equipment (LME) would not be used in
sensitive areas like Darfur. He questioned the veracity of
the US information and asked whether we could confirm that
Russia had supplied the Mi-24 helicopter reportedly downed in
late April, noting that Sudan had acquired a variety of
weapons systems, some unlicensed copies, from a number of
countries. The Foreign Ministry had no information
suggesting that any Russian-supplied helicopter had been lost
in Darfur. Drawing from Ref A points, we asked Petlyakov to
follow up on promised end-use checks of previously
transferred LME, as well as to cease future LME transfers.


5. (S) Petlyakov replied that the Foreign Ministry had
raised our previous concerns (Refs B and C) about Mi-171
helicopters within the Russian interagency community,
including seeking verification that end-use checks would be
undertaken; however, the Ministry had not yet received a
response. He said he would circulate our current concerns
about the reported use of an Mi-171sh helicopter in Darfur in
April and follow up on reports that the Mi-24 downed was of
Russian origin. Petlyakov made no commitment that Russia
would cease further LME transfers to Sudan.
BURNS