PUTIN ASKS SERBS FOR AHTISAARI ALTERNATIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 002983

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/20/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV SR RS
SUBJECT: PUTIN ASKS SERBS FOR AHTISAARI ALTERNATIVE

REF: BELGRADE 00813

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons: 1.4 (b, d).


1. (C) Summary: During the June visits of Serbian Prime
Minister Kostunica and FM Jeremic, Putin apparently pushed
them to come up with a counterproposal on Kosovo that he can
carry to Kennebunkport. The GOR, however, remains committed
to a solution based on a "compromise" between the parties,
providing little grounds for optimism that Russia is crafting
a creative way forward. Meanwhile, Russian economic ties
with Serbia continue to expand, with more business
delegations heading to Belgrade shortly. End Summary

No Russian Promises, but Push for a Plan
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2. (C) In a June 19 meeting, Serbian DCM Yelica Kuryak told
us that the Russian leadership had stopped short of promising
a veto at the UN Security Council, while making their
opposition to the Ahtisaari plan clear. Kuryak, who attended
Jeremic's June 6 meeting with Lavrov, said the Russian
Foreign Minister delivered "nothing new," but briefed on the
visit of the Secretary and the outcome of the G8 Summit
discussions on Kosovo, and reiterated Russia's opposition to
a new resolution endorsing Ahtisaari in the absence of
Serbian buy-in. Lavrov commented that if the draft
resolution were put to a vote, "it will be bad for all of us."


3. (C) During the June 9 Kostunica-Putin meeting, there was
no promise of a Russian veto; however, Putin reportedly
pushed Kostunica for a "concrete proposal" that he could
share with the President at their July 2 meeting in
Kennebunkport. Putin complained that the GOR could no longer
deal in abstractions regarding the future of Kosovo, and
urged Kostunica to be specific. Putin and Kostunica
apparently concurred that extending the negotiating period
between Kosovars and Serbs, if combined with automaticity on
Kosovo's independence at the end of a new UNSCR timeframe,
would be "meaningless and insulting." The two leaders agreed
that the prospect of unilateral action by the West was not in
the interests of Serbia or Russia, with Putin reportedly
stressing that the GOR would not be able to resist taking
reciprocal steps on Abkhazia.


4. (C) Kuryak noted that the MFA has requested a bilateral
between Putin and President Tadic, on the margins of a June
24 energy forum in Croatia.

MFA: Compromise at Core of Resolution
--------------


5. (C) MFA Third European Deputy Director (Balkans) Andrey
Yermolenko confirmed that GOR officials reviewed broad
Russian concerns over the Ahtisaari plan with the visiting
Serbian officials and reiterated that the GOR's main problem
with the Sarkozy proposal was its "automaticity." The
six-month delay in resolving status would give the parties
"one last chance" to reach an accommodation, but Moscow could
not accept an imposed solution, regardless of the elapsed
time. Yermolenko would not be drawn out as to what factors
would lead the parties to an agreement when this had proved
impossible over the past 18 months. He urged the U.S. not to
take any precipitate steps before the presidents met at
Kennebunkport, stressing that there was a "chance for
progress" during the July 2 bilateral discussions.


6. (C) Observing that Russia could live with any settlement
Serbia accepted, Yermolenko pointed the finger at the EU for
the stalemate over status, because it had not offered Serbia
real prospects for integration. The Serbian leadership's
inability to offer its public a solid vision of a European
future limited its already restricted room for maneuver. In
his view, Serbia played the central role in the Balkans and
the EU could not realistically contemplate a Union "with a
hole in the middle of it." At the same time, there was no
figure in Europe who had an interest in pushing forward
Serbia's integration. Without this push, nothing would be
done because particular interests, such as the apprehension
of war criminals, would trump a more strategic view of
Serbia's role.

Russian Business and Orthodox Church Rush In
--------------


7. (C) Kuryak, a Tadic protg and a lonely figure among her
Milosevic-era Embassy staff, reiterated her concern that
Serbia's failure to move beyond the issue of Kosovo was being
deftly exploited by the GOR and Russian business. She noted
that Emergency Situations Minister Shoygu would travel to
Belgrade on June 21 to discuss investments, followed by a

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large Russian business delegation on June 25. Aeroflot, the
Sheremetevo Airport Authority, and Gazprom were among the
business interests represented. Aeroflot, in particular, had
adopted a more "aggressive" posture in seeking to purchase
the Serbian national airline. Yermolenko confirmed that
there was increasing Russian business interest in Serbia;
this extended beyond energy to include infrastructure
projects. Kuryak also described a higher profile among
Russian Orthodox Church leaders, who are using the
non-governmental Society for the Friendship of Nations to
promote cultural ties, language instruction, and exchange
programs.

New (Kosovo) Serb Ambassador Arrives
--------------


8. (C) After a long delay, Serbia's new Ambassador arrived
in Moscow on June 17. Kuryak describes Stanimir Vukicevic, a
Serbian native of Kosovo, as a classic nationalist, in the
Milosevic mold. Persuaded by Tadic to remain another year,
and with FM Jeremic instructing Vukicevic to maintain an even
keel with his liberal deputy, Kuryak appeared resigned to the
Embassy becoming a platform for advocating Serbian
grievances. According to Kuryak, Vukicevic has been hailed
by Russian conservative, Church leaders, and Duma members as
a "national hero," on the basis of his Kosovo roots, and the
MFA facilitated his quick presentation of papers.

Comment
--------------


9. (C) Whether or not Kostunica or Jeremic received
iron-clad guarantees on a Russian veto has little
significance, given the GOR's opposition to the Ahtisaari
plan in its current form. Kuryak's readout suggests that
Putin does not want to come to Kennebunkport empty-handed,
yet the MFA's continued insistence on a solution based on
compromise between the parties provides little grounds for
optimism that Russia is crafting a creative way forwards.
BURNS