RUSSIA: NO FLEXIBILITY ON CFE REDLINES IN ADVANCE

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 002741 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2017 TAGS: PREL NATO PARM RS SUBJECT: RUSSIA: NO FLEXIBILITY ON CFE REDLINES IN ADVANCE OF JUNE 12 EXTRAORDINARY CONFERENCE REF: STATE 75293 Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Daniel Russell: 1.4 (b, d). ¶1. (C) Summary: The Russians plan to come to the June 12 CFE Extraordinary Conference (which they convened) with no new initiatives. Instead, they plan to restate their longstanding positions and to listen to what the U.S. and its Allies have to offer. Barring an unanticipated decision by NATO Allies to move ahead with A/CFE Treaty ratification and delink it from Russia's Istanbul commitments, we expect the Russians to suspend their observance of the CFE Treaty following the conference. Deputy Foreign Minister Grushko and the head of Russia's delegation to the upcoming conference, MFA Director for Disarmament and Security Affairs Antonov, separately told us to expect no flexibility in Russian redlines on CFE. MFA Director for European Cooperation Ryabkov commented to us that Russia was near the "point of no return" on CFE, but could work "cooperatively and productively" if engaged seriously at the beginning of the conference. Russia's firm position and tough talk, we believe, reflect Putin's personal opposition to CFE, leaving his government little room for maneuver. End Summary Russia Prepared to Walk Away from CFE -------------- ¶2. (C) On June 6, Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Grushko flatly told the DCM that the ball would be in the U.S. and European court on the Adapted Conventional Forces in Europe (A/CFE) Treaty at the June 12 CFE Extraordinary Conference. If the U.S. and its Allies were ready to move toward ratification now and forego their linkage to Russia's Istanbul commitments (which he, of course, rejected),then everything would be fine. If not, President Putin would likely decide to suspend Russia's observance of the CFE Treaty shortly thereafter. Grushko confirmed that the Russian delegation to the conference would not arrive with any new initiatives, but instead would simply reiterate longstanding concerns over the treaty and be in listening mode to see what the West was prepared to offer. Grushko was dismissive of the treaty's relevance, recounting Putin's comment to the President on flank deployment limitations inside Russia ("You must think we're idiots"). Grushko commented that the practical effect of a suspension meant little beyond cancellation of a few inspections. �A; ¶3. (C) In a lengthy exchange on June 7 with the DCM, MFA Director for Disarmament and Security Affairs Antonov brandished his 14-page draft speech for the Extraordinary Conference, noting that there would be no surprises in his recitation of the CFE Treaty's shortcomings and the developments that had led Russia to its current position (e.g., NATO enlargement, planned U.S. deployments to Bulgaria and Romania, and Missile Defense). Antonov said he would explain the reasons for convening the conference and would call for expedited ratification of the A/CFE Treaty. He said that Russia was prepared to listen to any new proposals on how to move forward from the U.S. and its Allies, but stressed that continued insistence on A/CFE linkage to Russia's Istanbul obligations would signal that there was "no real desire" for a conventional arms control regime in Europe. Ultimately, this would lead to the announcement of "other steps in accordance with Putin's statement." ¶4. (C) On June 6, Foreign Minister Lavrov told the press that Russia would not suspend its participation in CFE at the Extraordinary Conference; Antonov was fairly clear with us that this would occur only after Putin evaluated the conference's results. Antonov took the point that a sterile recitation of well-known positions at the conference would not advance European security, but underscored that he was operating within a narrow mandate, set by Putin, to determine whether rapid ratification of the A/CFE Treaty was possible and, if not, to take the "appropriate actions." Antonov said that none of this should be news to us. He had clearly stated Russia's disillusionment with CFE at last year's review conference. Despite his appeal for new thinking, no Western counterproposals had been forthcoming. "We told you that we could not live with this," Antonov reiterated. ¶5. (C) Antonov rejected the idea that CFE still served as a cornerstone of European security. In one of several calculated emotional outbursts, Antonov said it was "stupid" to live in an arms control world that posited the existence of the Warsaw Pact. Regardless of any commitments made in Istanbul or Berlin, CFE boiled down to a balance-of-power arrangement between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. "I am a Soviet man," Antonov blustered, "and I would like to live in CFE Disneyland where two superpowers balance one another." Drawing parallels with the Jackson-Vanik amendment and the INF Treaty, he termed the CFE regime "surreal"; the world of CFE is "just a dream." Istanbul Commitments: Non-starter -------------- ¶6. (C) Despite repeated attempts to draw him out on Russia's strategy for the CFE Extraordinary Conference that it had convened, Antonov said his delegation would be in listening mode and would not seek a negotiating session -- neither over the modalities of the Istanbul commitments nor flank limitations. The Russian draft declaration was a "roadmap" for the rapid implementation of the A/CFE Treaty and the Russian delegation would gauge the extent to which its Western partners were prepared to engage by their response. The Istanbul commitments, he stressed, could not be a starting point to any dialogue. Antonov rejected any linkage between A/CFE ratification and Russia's Istanbul commitments, and lashed out briefly on Georgia and Moldova: -- Georgia: Antonov charged that the U.S. and its Allies were biased in their approach and failure to hold Georgia accountable for its bilateral obligations to Russia. Antonov noted Georgia's lack of interest in agreeing to an inspection to show the withdrawal of Russian forces from Gudauta. Georgia does not want to close out this issue, Antonov charged, because it sought NATO leverage over Russia. The reality, he claimed, was that Russian forces had withdrawn and pensioners remained. -- Moldova: Antonov argued that Transnistria was solvable, but not within the context of CFE. The issue, Antonov maintained, boiled down to a "few hundred" soldiers in Transnistria securing stockpiles and whether the West thought they were more important than Europe's more pressing security issues. On Russia's Istanbul commitments, the DCM reiterated our position, emphasizing that at stake was the principle of host country agreement to the stationing of foreign forces, which was in no way outdated. ¶7. (C) MFA Director for European Cooperation Sergey Ryabkov told the DCM June 5 that he believed Russia was close to the point of no return on CFE. He expected the Russian agenda for the Extraordinary Conference to focus on flank limitations, the effects of NATO enlargement, and Treaty Limited Equipment concerns. Secondary issues would include defining "substantial combat deployments" and addressing the changed U.S. military posture in Europe. Ryabkov, suggested that, if a substantive conversation was launched at the beginning of the conference, Russia could work "cooperatively and productively" with its partners, but he expressed doubts about fresh thinking from any side. Ryabkov concurred that Russia was prepared to walk away from the CFE Treaty, commenting that to consider the treaty the "backbone" of European security at present would be a mistake. Think Tankers: CFE in the Dustbin of History -------------- ¶8. (C) The government's tough stance on CFE was echoed to us by think-tankers closely associated with Foreign and Defense Ministries. Chairman of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy Sergey Karaganov told us that the treaty had helped prolong the sense of "us versus them," despite the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact and the withdrawal of Russian troops from Central Europe and the Baltics. Since the core of the Treaty was rotten, he argued that it was time to throw it into the "dustbin of history." The Russian leadership was offended and "totally cynical" about the value of the CFE regime and the adapted treaty. The Extraordinary Conference, he concluded, would be a "very useful vehicle for Russia to impose its own agenda" about developments in Europe. Yevgeniy Kozhokin, Director of the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, agreed, emphasizing that Europe and Russia had moved beyond "Fulda Gap scenarios." Russian actions were about restoring its credibility and signaling unequivocally that the era of "unilateral Russian concessions" was over. ¶9. (C) Comment: The Russian position appears clear to us. The CFE Extraordinary Conference will be an effort to show that Russia made an attempt to engage the U.S. and its Allies before suspending its observation of the CFE regime. The Russians' lack of interest in exploring any new approaches before the conference suggests that they regard the gathering's outcome as preordained. Russia will attend, make its case and see if the West blinks and unexpectedly agrees to Moscow's terms to move forward on the adapted treaty; if not, suspension will follow shortly. Putin's personal view of CFE, in fact, leaves the Russian side little room for maneuver. BURNS