KASPAROV REVIEWS OTHER RUSSIA MARCHES; KASYANOV

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 002651 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2017 TAGS: PGOV KDEM PHUM SOCI RS SUBJECT: KASPAROV REVIEWS OTHER RUSSIA MARCHES; KASYANOV ANNOUNCES CANDIDACY REF: MOSCOW 2202 Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells. Reason: 1.4 (d). -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) In a brief June 1 meeting United Civic Front leader Garry Kasparov reviewed recent Other Russia demonstrations and discussed the efforts of the fragmented, Western-leaning organizations and personalities to agree (to disagree) on a presidential nominee. Whatever the decision of his colleagues on Russia's western-leaning fringe, Other Russia would back ex-Central Banker Viktor Gerashchenko's recently-announced bid to replace President Putin. As expected, ex-Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov announced his own long-shot bid for the presidency at his movement's June 2 convention. Kasyanov aides suggested that Gerashchenko, who attended the convention, might withdraw his candidacy in favor of Kasyanov. End summary. -------------- Multiple Factors Combine to Sabotage Voronezh Other Russia Demonstration -------------- ¶2. (C) United Civic Front leader Garry Kasparov June 1 described Other Russia's efforts to stage a demonstration May 29 in Voronezh as sabotaged by a combination of overwhelming police presence, a Moscow-induced change of heart by the Voronezh mayor, and the inadequacies of OR's Voronezh organizers. Kasparov said that OR had selected Voronezh because it believed the city had benefited less than other provincial towns from economic progress in Russia. The city's mayor had initially backed the demonstration, Kasparov said, but as the demonstration date approached, he had what Kasparov described as a Kremlin-induced change-of-heart. Still, the city agreed that the demonstration could go forward, but not in the center of the city, as originally planned. The new venue, Kasparov said, was far from all public transportation. Lack of access, the 35 degree (centigrade) heat, and a large police presence, combined to keep participation to a minimum. Kasparov did not say how many had turned out. He alleged, that successful efforts by law enforcement had kept the numbers well below their potential. ¶3. (C) Kasparov was not prevented from traveling, as he had been when he attempted to attend his organization's Samara march (reftel). He believed that, with each successive march, police tactics were becoming more refined. On this occasion, Kasparov alleged that local law enforcement had pressured Voronezh OR organizers, who had economic equities that made them vulnerable, to effectively halt their efforts to organize the event. The intent, Kasparov thought, was to have him preside over a very sparsely-attended event. -------------- Problems Advertising St. Petersburg and Moscow Marches -------------- ¶4. (C) City authorities' confiscation of OR's special issue newspaper would hinder the demonstration planned for June 9 in St. Petersburg, but OR organizers planned to use their own, well-established grapevine to ensure a turnout. OR efforts to publicize its June 11 Moscow rally faced a similar impediment: nine publishers in Moscow had refused to print a special edition newspaper, although OR was offering prices well above market levels. Kasparov had received a letter from the Murmansk Administration, which said that OR's June 12 demonstration could not go forward, because regional special forces troops would not have returned by that date from St. Petersburg, where they would be used to patrol OR's June 9 meeting. ¶5. (U) On a brighter note, St. Petersburg authorities June 4 gave Other Russia permission to march in the city center June 9, concurrently with the GOR's International Economic Forum. Kasparov proclaimed the decision, which reversed an earlier city decision to confine Other Russia to the periphery, a victory. The city's agreement to a city center march comes with conditions attached; among them, that the number of participants be limited to five hundred. Some Other Russia participants were reported by the media to suspect that the authorities will indirectly impede the march, as they had in Samara. -------------- MOSCOW 00002651 002 OF 002 Gerashchenko: Age is Virtue -------------- ¶6. (C) Kasparov thought it likely that OR would back ex-Central Banker Viktor Gerashchenko's bid for the presidency. Arguing, paradoxically, in Gerashchenko's favor was his age (70),which would make him less threatening to the Kremlin than younger candidates, like ex-Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov. Kasparov waved away doubts that a banker would not play well with the Communist Party, pointing to Gerashchenko's Party background and alleging that he had discussed Gerashchenko's candidacy with some in the Party who are allegedly tired of perpetual presidential candidate, KPRF Chairman Gennadiy Zyuganov. There would be no need, said Kasparov, for Gerashchenko to undertake strenuous trips around Russia, as all of the presidential dealmakers were in Moscow. Kasparov seemed unfazed by the possibility of numerous western-leaning candidates contending for the presidency, or the long odds facing an agreed candidate. He thought that the initial free-for-all would end in an agreed candidate by the fall. He expected that OR would formally anoint Gerashchenko at its July 10 - 12 conference. -------------- The Berezovskiy (Non) Connection -------------- ¶7. (C) Kasparov, angry about Boris Berezovskiy's remarks, subsequently disavowed that he had provided funding for Other Russia. The Moscow daily Nezavisimaya Gazeta had gleefully devoted a front-page article to the alleged connection which, Kasparov noted, would only make the life of the already beleaguered Other Russia more difficult. Kasparov had no doubt that Berezovskiy had attempted to claim responsibility for OR, as the exiled oligarch "likes to be the center of attention." -------------- Kasyanov Announces Candidacy -------------- ¶8. (C) On June 5, Kasyanov Press Secretary Yelena Dikun described her boss as very satisfied with the rollout of his long-shot presidential bid at the Popular Democratic Union's (PDU) June 2 congress. Dikun estimated that about 650 delegates from the regions had attended the one-day affair. Although representatives of the Kremlin-sponsored youth groups Young Guard and Nashi had protested the conference, they had been prevented by PDU guards from disrupting the convention itself. The PDU event was not covered by central television, although it did receive national newspaper and radio coverage. Presidential candidate Gerashchenko, Other Russia's Eduard Limonov, PDU Presidium member Irina Khakamada, and Union of Right Forces Boris Nemtsov attended the event. According to Dikun, Gerashchenko told Kasyanov that he was prepared to withdraw his own, equally long-shot candidacy in Kasyanov's favor, although Kasparov's continued support for Gerashchenko appeared to remain firm after the event. ¶9. (C) Dikun insisted that Kasyanov supporters would succeed in collecting the two million signatures necessary to register his candidacy. It was less certain, but not impossible, that the signatures would pass muster with the authorities, she said. Handicapping the campaign would be lack of media access and the efforts of overzealous authorities in the regions to prevent Kasyanov from meeting would-be supporters. Dikun expected that further compromising materials on Kasyanov would emerge as the campaign progressed, but she described the expected dirt to have little shock value for an already cynical Russian public. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) Kasparov was tired and a little bit irritable on June 1, particularly in his discussion of what he expects will be OR's decision to back Gerashchenko's bid for the presidency. It did not appear that Kasparov had thought beyond OR's endorsement of Gerashchenko to the mechanics of the campaign necessary to, somehow, make his a semi-plausible candidate in an electoral process whose outcome is not in the first instance determined by the voter. Gerashchenko, Kasyanov, and any other candidate that may be tossed out by the disorganized opposition have little chance of registering with a public that seems prepared to accept a succession instead of competitive election, in exchange for continued political and economic stability. RUSSELL