RUSSIA-GEORGIA: IF THEY CAN JUST MAKE IT TO THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 002595

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2017
TAGS: PREL PBTS MARR OSCE UNSC GG RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA-GEORGIA: IF THEY CAN JUST MAKE IT TO THE
NEXT MEETING...

REF: TBILISI 1278

Classified By: PolMilCouns Alice G. Wells. Reason: 1.4 (b, d)

Summary
--------------


1. (C) MFA 4th CIS Department Director Kelin said May 31
that the upcoming Saakashvili-Putin meeting in St. Petersburg
might serve one purpose: to overcome the legacy of bad blood
left by last fall's confrontation. He warned that action on
Kosovo between now and the meeting might ruin even that
modest hope. Kelin sensed no wish on the part of the Abkhaz
for direct contacts with Georgia. He thought Georgian troop
movements, added to Georgian financing of Sanakoyev, are
raising tensions in South Ossetia. Kelin appeared unaware
that Ambassador Kovalenko's visit to South Ossetian coincided
with the anniversary of the breakaway province's unilateral
declaration of independence. He maintained that Russia's
resumption of visa issuance to limited categories of
Georgians was an international obligation, not a gesture to
Georgia. End Summary.

The Meeting...
--------------


2. (C) In a May 31 meeting, Kelin maintained that the
upcoming meeting between Presidents Putin and Saakashvili at
St. Petersburg offers "some potential" for substantive
improvement. He refused to comment further on Russia's
proposals. (The Georgian Ambassador told us the Russian
proposed agenda contains "nothing exciting.") More
importantly, the meeting might clear away some of the bad
blood remaining from last fall's confrontation between Russia
and Georgia after Georgia's arrest of four Russian officers
on charges of espionage.

...And How to Get There
--------------


3. (C) Kelin worried about the potential effects on the
Putin-Saakashvili meeting that UNSC movement on Kosovo might
have, in view of its implications for Russian actions on
Abkhazia. He noted the recent Bush-Putin telephone
conversation and the confrontational May 30 meeting of
foreign ministers in Potsdam. If the UNSCR moves forward in
the next few days, "we will veto it, you will recognize
Kosovo, and there will be an extremely bad situation by the
time of the Putin-Saakashvili meeting." In response to our
insistence that Kosovo could not serve as a precedent, Kelin
demurred and noted strong domestic pressure from the North
Caucasus and the Duma. (On June 1, MFA South Ossetia
negotiator Yuriy Popov amplified on these concerns. Western
recognition of Kosovo would lead natives of the North
Caucasus to demand recognition for Abkhazia, threatening,
should Russia refuse, the nightmare scenario of a
conflagration in the North Caucasus in the run-up to the 2008
transition.)


4. (C) Kelin took the standard Russian line that it is up to
Georgia to take steps in Russia's direction to improve
relations. He denied that the resumption of visa issuance to
Georgians with family members in Russia was a gesture of any
sort to Georgia. Rather, Russia had determined that its visa
policies are in breach of international laws on family
reunification. It had revised its visa policies so as not to
contravene Russia's international obligations.

Separatist Borders
--------------


5. (C) Kelin noted that a team led by Russia's chief WTO
negotiator Maksim Medvedkov had arrived in Tbilisi. Kelin
refused to comment on Russia's proposals until after they had
been presented to the Georgians, other than to say they are
"realistic." Georgia's WTO objections are based on the
Russian use of unauthorized border crossings into Georgia's
separatist provinces. Kelin stated that the Georgian
proposal -- placing Georgian border monitors at these borders
-- is "unrealistic," since the monitors would be murdered
"within 24 hours." The Georgians had rejected a Russian
proposal to set up an "information center" in Tbilisi to
relay data about border crossings as they took place; this
would be similar to the system Russia has in place with
Belarus. (Comment: Kelin must surely understand that
Russia's relationship to Belarus is perhaps not the model
Tbilisi would choose for its relationships to Abkhazia and
South Ossetia. End Comment.)


6. (C) PolMinCouns noted that Ambassador Tefft had just been
in Abkhazia urging the Abkhaz to talk with the Georgians

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without preconditions. Kelin noted that the Abkhaz are
feeling "misled" after the prisoner exchange failed to
produce one of the prisoners the Abkhaz believe Georgia is
holding. He said he sees no desire on the part of the Abkhaz
for direct talks with the Georgians, with or without
preconditions, until Georgia takes undefined "reconciliation
steps" towards Abkhazia.


7. (C) Kelin said tensions are rising in South Ossetia. The
movement of a Georgian brigade from Senaki to Gori comes as
Sanakoyev is gaining strength as a result of Georgian
financing. Flush with cash, Sanakoyev is building 18
facilities -- shops, cinemas, and dance clubs -- to try to
gain popularity within South Ossetia. There is talk that the
Georgians will take Sanakoyev to the OSCE in Vienna, and will
propose "free competition" between Sanakoyev and Kokoity --
which Kokoity will reject out of hand. Asked about Amb.
Kovalenko's visit to Tskhinvali on the May 29 15th
anniversary of South Ossetia's unilateral declaration of
independence, Kelin seemed unaware that there was any
significance in the dates. Kovalenko had refused so many
previous invitations to Tskhinvali that he could not put his
visit off any longer. As to the anniversary, "They celebrate
something or other there every other day."


8. (C) On June 1 Popov added details of the water crisis in
South Ossetia (reftel). Villagers tap into the pipes every
year, he said, but in previous years the South Ossetians were
allowed to repair the pipes. This year, however, the repair
team that traveled to the site on May 30 was told that it
would only be allowed to repair the pipes if it coordinated
its activities with Sanakoyev, throwing the South Ossetians
into a political dilemma. Popov showed us a letter sent May
31 by South Ossetian negotiator Chochiyev to Russian PKF
commander Kulakhmetov, complaining bitterly of the Georgian
move and claiming that PKF and OSCE monitors were turned away
along with the repair team -- a violation of the cease-fire
regime. Chochiyev claimed to Popov that he had been trying
for a week to call Georgian conflict negotiator Merab
Antadze, who refused to answer. Popov said he is trying to
broker a meeting of the two in Tskhinvali next week.

Comment
--------------


9. (C) The next ten days -- promising Kosovo action at the
UN, the G-8 Summit in Germany and the informal economic
summit in St. Petersburg, against the backdrop of heightened
tensions in South Ossetia and Abkhazia -- will be a minefield
for Russian-Georgian relations. Sadly, it appears that each
side views navigating the minefield as the responsibility of
the other side.
BURNS