RUSSIA-GEORGIA: IF THEY CAN JUST MAKE IT TO THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 002595 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2017 TAGS: PREL PBTS MARR OSCE UNSC GG RS SUBJECT: RUSSIA-GEORGIA: IF THEY CAN JUST MAKE IT TO THE NEXT MEETING... REF: TBILISI 1278 Classified By: PolMilCouns Alice G. Wells. Reason: 1.4 (b, d) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) MFA 4th CIS Department Director Kelin said May 31 that the upcoming Saakashvili-Putin meeting in St. Petersburg might serve one purpose: to overcome the legacy of bad blood left by last fall's confrontation. He warned that action on Kosovo between now and the meeting might ruin even that modest hope. Kelin sensed no wish on the part of the Abkhaz for direct contacts with Georgia. He thought Georgian troop movements, added to Georgian financing of Sanakoyev, are raising tensions in South Ossetia. Kelin appeared unaware that Ambassador Kovalenko's visit to South Ossetian coincided with the anniversary of the breakaway province's unilateral declaration of independence. He maintained that Russia's resumption of visa issuance to limited categories of Georgians was an international obligation, not a gesture to Georgia. End Summary. The Meeting... -------------- ¶2. (C) In a May 31 meeting, Kelin maintained that the upcoming meeting between Presidents Putin and Saakashvili at St. Petersburg offers "some potential" for substantive improvement. He refused to comment further on Russia's proposals. (The Georgian Ambassador told us the Russian proposed agenda contains "nothing exciting.") More importantly, the meeting might clear away some of the bad blood remaining from last fall's confrontation between Russia and Georgia after Georgia's arrest of four Russian officers on charges of espionage. ...And How to Get There -------------- ¶3. (C) Kelin worried about the potential effects on the Putin-Saakashvili meeting that UNSC movement on Kosovo might have, in view of its implications for Russian actions on Abkhazia. He noted the recent Bush-Putin telephone conversation and the confrontational May 30 meeting of foreign ministers in Potsdam. If the UNSCR moves forward in the next few days, "we will veto it, you will recognize Kosovo, and there will be an extremely bad situation by the time of the Putin-Saakashvili meeting." In response to our insistence that Kosovo could not serve as a precedent, Kelin demurred and noted strong domestic pressure from the North Caucasus and the Duma. (On June 1, MFA South Ossetia negotiator Yuriy Popov amplified on these concerns. Western recognition of Kosovo would lead natives of the North Caucasus to demand recognition for Abkhazia, threatening, should Russia refuse, the nightmare scenario of a conflagration in the North Caucasus in the run-up to the 2008 transition.) ¶4. (C) Kelin took the standard Russian line that it is up to Georgia to take steps in Russia's direction to improve relations. He denied that the resumption of visa issuance to Georgians with family members in Russia was a gesture of any sort to Georgia. Rather, Russia had determined that its visa policies are in breach of international laws on family reunification. It had revised its visa policies so as not to contravene Russia's international obligations. Separatist Borders -------------- ¶5. (C) Kelin noted that a team led by Russia's chief WTO negotiator Maksim Medvedkov had arrived in Tbilisi. Kelin refused to comment on Russia's proposals until after they had been presented to the Georgians, other than to say they are "realistic." Georgia's WTO objections are based on the Russian use of unauthorized border crossings into Georgia's separatist provinces. Kelin stated that the Georgian proposal -- placing Georgian border monitors at these borders -- is "unrealistic," since the monitors would be murdered "within 24 hours." The Georgians had rejected a Russian proposal to set up an "information center" in Tbilisi to relay data about border crossings as they took place; this would be similar to the system Russia has in place with Belarus. (Comment: Kelin must surely understand that Russia's relationship to Belarus is perhaps not the model Tbilisi would choose for its relationships to Abkhazia and South Ossetia. End Comment.) ¶6. (C) PolMinCouns noted that Ambassador Tefft had just been in Abkhazia urging the Abkhaz to talk with the Georgians MOSCOW 00002595 002 OF 002 without preconditions. Kelin noted that the Abkhaz are feeling "misled" after the prisoner exchange failed to produce one of the prisoners the Abkhaz believe Georgia is holding. He said he sees no desire on the part of the Abkhaz for direct talks with the Georgians, with or without preconditions, until Georgia takes undefined "reconciliation steps" towards Abkhazia. ¶7. (C) Kelin said tensions are rising in South Ossetia. The movement of a Georgian brigade from Senaki to Gori comes as Sanakoyev is gaining strength as a result of Georgian financing. Flush with cash, Sanakoyev is building 18 facilities -- shops, cinemas, and dance clubs -- to try to gain popularity within South Ossetia. There is talk that the Georgians will take Sanakoyev to the OSCE in Vienna, and will propose "free competition" between Sanakoyev and Kokoity -- which Kokoity will reject out of hand. Asked about Amb. Kovalenko's visit to Tskhinvali on the May 29 15th anniversary of South Ossetia's unilateral declaration of independence, Kelin seemed unaware that there was any significance in the dates. Kovalenko had refused so many previous invitations to Tskhinvali that he could not put his visit off any longer. As to the anniversary, "They celebrate something or other there every other day." ¶8. (C) On June 1 Popov added details of the water crisis in South Ossetia (reftel). Villagers tap into the pipes every year, he said, but in previous years the South Ossetians were allowed to repair the pipes. This year, however, the repair team that traveled to the site on May 30 was told that it would only be allowed to repair the pipes if it coordinated its activities with Sanakoyev, throwing the South Ossetians into a political dilemma. Popov showed us a letter sent May 31 by South Ossetian negotiator Chochiyev to Russian PKF commander Kulakhmetov, complaining bitterly of the Georgian move and claiming that PKF and OSCE monitors were turned away along with the repair team -- a violation of the cease-fire regime. Chochiyev claimed to Popov that he had been trying for a week to call Georgian conflict negotiator Merab Antadze, who refused to answer. Popov said he is trying to broker a meeting of the two in Tskhinvali next week. Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) The next ten days -- promising Kosovo action at the UN, the G-8 Summit in Germany and the informal economic summit in St. Petersburg, against the backdrop of heightened tensions in South Ossetia and Abkhazia -- will be a minefield for Russian-Georgian relations. Sadly, it appears that each side views navigating the minefield as the responsibility of the other side. BURNS