FOR A JUST RUSSIA: KREMLIN BACKPEDALS ON SUPPORT

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 002471 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: KDEM PGOV PINR SOCI RS SUBJECT: FOR A JUST RUSSIA: KREMLIN BACKPEDALS ON SUPPORT REF: A. MOSCOW 01007 ¶B. MOSCOW 1023 ¶C. MOSCOW 01067 ¶D. ST. PETERSBURG 57 ¶E. YEKAT 00023 ¶F. VLAD 00026 MOSCOW 00002471 001.2 OF 002 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Since "For A Just Russia's" (SR) more or less successful debut in the March 11 regional elections (reftels),the Kremlin appears to have reconsidered its options and backed away from providing the administrative resources including access to national TV airtime that SR members expected to receive. SR critics and supporters alike recommend against pigeonholing SR as the "second" Kremlin party. SR's struggle with United Russia (YR) allows it to cast itself as an opposition party and possibly improve its election results. SR is focusing on building a larger party base, improving its image, developing its platform, and consolidating regional leadership. End summary. -------------- Russia's Political Map Redrawn -------------- ¶2. (SBU) As noted (ref b),"For A Just Russia's" solid performance in the March 11 regional elections, a mere four months after it was created, put it on Russia's political map. SR finished first in Stavropol, second in four other regions and third in yet seven others. Analysts credited SR's good fortune to a general drift to the left and President Putin's public support of the party. -------------- No Longer Second Kremlin Party -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Although the Kremlin gave SR the push it needed to get started, analysts and SR party members cautioned against labeling it the "second" Kremlin party. What might have started as a Kremlin effort to introduce managed competition has evolved considerably since. Yuriy Korgunyuk of the INDEM think tank told us that while it is true that SR is a "Putin party," SR is not and has never enjoyed full Kremlin support. Korgunyuk guessed that a strong SR coupled with a stronger-than-expected performance by the KPRF would threaten YR's majority, which in turn would upset the Kremlin's carefully constructed monopoly of power. Korgunyuk was convinced that Putin, Presidential Administration Deputy Vladislav Surkov, and others would not allow an SR victory to disrupt that fragile balance. Ekho Moskvy Editor Venediktov agrees that the Kremlin is unnerved by the fact that SR is developing as an opposition force, attracting disaffected elite in the regions. The Kremlin, he maintained, was focused on a smooth transition and the competition between the parties now threatened to complicate that process. -------------- Party Expansion and Makeover -------------- ¶4. (SBU) SR International Affairs Director Mikhail Demurin told us that in the lead up to the December Duma elections SR would focus on grassroots efforts, including door-to-door campaigning, to build a larger party base and to improve the party's image. The party seems off to a good start. Shortly after the March regional elections, SR Party Chairman Sergey Mironov claimed that SR was registering 40,000 new members a month. In April, Duma Deputy and head of SR's Duma faction Aleksandr Babakov described those new members as 45 years or older, former KPRF members or individuals who have never voted before. SR Duma Deputy Oksana Dmitrieva told us that SR's party membership comprised dissidents, small businessmen, and regional politicians unhappy with YR's monopoly of power. As predicted by Mironov and others, several smaller parties have announced their intent to merge with SR, including Duma Deputy Gennadiy Gudkov's People Party and Duma Deputy Vasiliy Shestakov's United Socialist Party. (Shestakov is Putin's former judo instructor.) ¶5. (SBU) Demurin, Dmitrieva, and others in SR expressed concern about the party's lack of access to the national media. Dmitrieva worried that without access to administrative resources and the national media SR would conduct an "average campaign with average results." Dmitrieva's husband, a former Duma Deputy member, predicted that national airtime could cost at least one million rubles per minute in the lead up to the December Duma elections; to expensive for even a party with deeper pockets, like SR. MOSCOW 00002471 002.2 OF 002 -------------- 21st Century Socialism -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Demurin told us that the portrayal of SR by media and others as "socialist" was inaccurate and that "progressive left" was a better fit. Mironov repeatedly refers to himself as a "social democrat" and the bulk of the amendments proposed by the party to date seem social democratic to socialist in tenor. In aligning itself on the left, SR is not alone. All parties with a chance to enter the Duma portray themselves as parties that will guarantee social justice for the Russian people on a range of issues from health care to education to housing and pensions. KPRF even appears to believe that SR's success has boosted KPRF's popularity. Oleg Kulikov, Secretary of KPRF's Central Committee has said, "'For A Just Russia' has been rehabilitating Soviet-type socialism." -------------- Seeking Popular Personalities -------------- ¶7. (SBU) The March 11 results demonstrated that SR can organize support, raise funds and create a viable political structure and party platform to contest YR's monopoly of power but (reftels e and f) the party continues to struggle with consolidation of its regional branches. One of the biggest challenges facing SR now, according to Dmitrieva, is recruiting "big" names to draw voters on election day. Babakov echoed her assessment, telling us that SR needed more well-known personalities and activists as candidates for mayors and governors in order to succeed. The party's growing pains in solidifying its power base and party leadership may not be limited to regional branches. During a recent meeting, Babakov took several swipes at SR Chairman Mironov suggesting that all is not well within the party, either. -------------- Opposition Strengthens SR's Chances -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Dmitrieva predicted that SR would come in second in the Duma elections, winning 15 percent of the vote. United Russia would win the largest number of seats, followed by SR, with KPRF a close third, followed by Zhirinovskiy's LDPR. SPS, Dmitrieva said, would not cross the seven percent barrier to Duma representation. (Note: Russia's three most well-known public opinion firms show support for SR hovering at 5-6 percent, more or less equal to LDPR's rating but not enough at this point to make it into the Duma.) -------------- Comment -------------- ¶9. (SBU) At his annual meeting with the press, President Putin welcomed competition between YR and SR, but the intensity of the jousting may be tempering enthusiasm. It remains to be seen if SR can maximize its opportunity and become a viable opposition party. With limited access to administrative resources and TV airtime, without the overt support of Putin, and with some Kremlin minions reportedly working to sabotage the party's chances, SR will not only have to devise a clever, comprehensive strategy for differentiating itself from YR, it will also have to discipline its regional factions. Conflicts between YR and SR may intensify as the regional elites jockey for position on the party lists. Those struggles could increase interest in this overdetermined election process. BURNS