Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07MOSCOW2471
2007-05-25 14:46:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

FOR A JUST RUSSIA: KREMLIN BACKPEDALS ON SUPPORT

Tags:  KDEM PGOV PINR SOCI RS 
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VZCZCXRO6936
PP RUEHDBU RUEHLN RUEHPOD RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHMO #2471/01 1451446
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 251446Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0640
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHLN/AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG PRIORITY 4138
RUEHVK/AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK PRIORITY 2139
RUEHYG/AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG PRIORITY 2454
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 002471 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PINR SOCI RS
SUBJECT: FOR A JUST RUSSIA: KREMLIN BACKPEDALS ON SUPPORT

REF: A. MOSCOW 01007


B. MOSCOW 1023

C. MOSCOW 01067

D. ST. PETERSBURG 57

E. YEKAT 00023

F. VLAD 00026

MOSCOW 00002471 001.2 OF 002


UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 002471

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PINR SOCI RS
SUBJECT: FOR A JUST RUSSIA: KREMLIN BACKPEDALS ON SUPPORT

REF: A. MOSCOW 01007


B. MOSCOW 1023

C. MOSCOW 01067

D. ST. PETERSBURG 57

E. YEKAT 00023

F. VLAD 00026

MOSCOW 00002471 001.2 OF 002



1. (SBU) Summary: Since "For A Just Russia's" (SR) more or
less successful debut in the March 11 regional elections
(reftels),the Kremlin appears to have reconsidered its
options and backed away from providing the administrative
resources including access to national TV airtime that SR
members expected to receive. SR critics and supporters alike
recommend against pigeonholing SR as the "second" Kremlin
party. SR's struggle with United Russia (YR) allows it to
cast itself as an opposition party and possibly improve its
election results. SR is focusing on building a larger party
base, improving its image, developing its platform, and
consolidating regional leadership. End summary.

--------------
Russia's Political Map Redrawn
--------------


2. (SBU) As noted (ref b),"For A Just Russia's" solid
performance in the March 11 regional elections, a mere four
months after it was created, put it on Russia's political
map. SR finished first in Stavropol, second in four other
regions and third in yet seven others. Analysts credited
SR's good fortune to a general drift to the left and
President Putin's public support of the party.

--------------
No Longer Second Kremlin Party
--------------


3. (SBU) Although the Kremlin gave SR the push it needed to
get started, analysts and SR party members cautioned against
labeling it the "second" Kremlin party. What might have
started as a Kremlin effort to introduce managed competition
has evolved considerably since. Yuriy Korgunyuk of the INDEM
think tank told us that while it is true that SR is a "Putin
party," SR is not and has never enjoyed full Kremlin support.
Korgunyuk guessed that a strong SR coupled with a
stronger-than-expected performance by the KPRF would threaten
YR's majority, which in turn would upset the Kremlin's
carefully constructed monopoly of power. Korgunyuk was
convinced that Putin, Presidential Administration Deputy
Vladislav Surkov, and others would not allow an SR victory to

disrupt that fragile balance. Ekho Moskvy Editor Venediktov
agrees that the Kremlin is unnerved by the fact that SR is
developing as an opposition force, attracting disaffected
elite in the regions. The Kremlin, he maintained, was
focused on a smooth transition and the competition between
the parties now threatened to complicate that process.

--------------
Party Expansion and Makeover
--------------


4. (SBU) SR International Affairs Director Mikhail Demurin
told us that in the lead up to the December Duma elections SR
would focus on grassroots efforts, including door-to-door
campaigning, to build a larger party base and to improve the
party's image. The party seems off to a good start. Shortly
after the March regional elections, SR Party Chairman Sergey
Mironov claimed that SR was registering 40,000 new members a
month. In April, Duma Deputy and head of SR's Duma faction
Aleksandr Babakov described those new members as 45 years or
older, former KPRF members or individuals who have never
voted before. SR Duma Deputy Oksana Dmitrieva told us that
SR's party membership comprised dissidents, small
businessmen, and regional politicians unhappy with YR's
monopoly of power. As predicted by Mironov and others,
several smaller parties have announced their intent to merge
with SR, including Duma Deputy Gennadiy Gudkov's People Party
and Duma Deputy Vasiliy Shestakov's United Socialist Party.
(Shestakov is Putin's former judo instructor.)


5. (SBU) Demurin, Dmitrieva, and others in SR expressed
concern about the party's lack of access to the national
media. Dmitrieva worried that without access to
administrative resources and the national media SR would
conduct an "average campaign with average results."
Dmitrieva's husband, a former Duma Deputy member, predicted
that national airtime could cost at least one million rubles
per minute in the lead up to the December Duma elections; to
expensive for even a party with deeper pockets, like SR.

MOSCOW 00002471 002.2 OF 002



--------------
21st Century Socialism
--------------


6. (SBU) Demurin told us that the portrayal of SR by media
and others as "socialist" was inaccurate and that
"progressive left" was a better fit. Mironov repeatedly
refers to himself as a "social democrat" and the bulk of the
amendments proposed by the party to date seem social
democratic to socialist in tenor. In aligning itself on the
left, SR is not alone. All parties with a chance to enter
the Duma portray themselves as parties that will guarantee
social justice for the Russian people on a range of issues
from health care to education to housing and pensions. KPRF
even appears to believe that SR's success has boosted KPRF's
popularity. Oleg Kulikov, Secretary of KPRF's Central
Committee has said, "'For A Just Russia' has been
rehabilitating Soviet-type socialism."

--------------
Seeking Popular Personalities
--------------


7. (SBU) The March 11 results demonstrated that SR can
organize support, raise funds and create a viable political
structure and party platform to contest YR's monopoly of
power but (reftels e and f) the party continues to struggle
with consolidation of its regional branches. One of the
biggest challenges facing SR now, according to Dmitrieva, is
recruiting "big" names to draw voters on election day.
Babakov echoed her assessment, telling us that SR needed more
well-known personalities and activists as candidates for
mayors and governors in order to succeed. The party's
growing pains in solidifying its power base and party
leadership may not be limited to regional branches. During a
recent meeting, Babakov took several swipes at SR Chairman
Mironov suggesting that all is not well within the party,
either.

--------------
Opposition Strengthens SR's Chances
--------------


8. (SBU) Dmitrieva predicted that SR would come in second in
the Duma elections, winning 15 percent of the vote. United
Russia would win the largest number of seats, followed by SR,
with KPRF a close third, followed by Zhirinovskiy's LDPR.
SPS, Dmitrieva said, would not cross the seven percent
barrier to Duma representation. (Note: Russia's three most
well-known public opinion firms show support for SR hovering
at 5-6 percent, more or less equal to LDPR's rating but not
enough at this point to make it into the Duma.)

--------------
Comment
--------------


9. (SBU) At his annual meeting with the press, President
Putin welcomed competition between YR and SR, but the
intensity of the jousting may be tempering enthusiasm. It
remains to be seen if SR can maximize its opportunity and
become a viable opposition party. With limited access to
administrative resources and TV airtime, without the overt
support of Putin, and with some Kremlin minions reportedly
working to sabotage the party's chances, SR will not only
have to devise a clever, comprehensive strategy for
differentiating itself from YR, it will also have to
discipline its regional factions. Conflicts between YR and
SR may intensify as the regional elites jockey for position
on the party lists. Those struggles could increase interest
in this overdetermined election process.
BURNS