THE 2ND ASIAN ENERGY OFFICERS CONFERENCE --

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 MOSCOW 002393

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/RUS WARLICK, HOLMAN, AND GUHA
DEPT FOR EB/ESC/IEC GALLOGLY AND GARVERICK
DOE FOR HARBERT/EKIMOFF
DOC FOR 4231/IEP/EUR/JBROUGHER
NSC FOR KLECHESKI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/18/2017
TAGS: EPET ENRG ECON PREL RS
SUBJECT: THE 2ND ASIAN ENERGY OFFICERS CONFERENCE --
RUSSIAN SUPPLY MEETS ASIAN DEMAND

Classified By: Econ M/C Pamela G. Quanrud. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) Summary. On April 19-20, Embassy Moscow hosted energy
officers from regional Embassies and Washington DC-based USG
officials at the 2nd Asia Energy Officers Conference. The
conference focused on the still nascent oil and gas linkages
between energy-rich Russia and energy-hungry Asia. Russian
and foreign energy companies and leading think-tankers
briefed attendees on the complex issue of putting together
Russian supply and Asian demand. The key themes were a
growing Chinese-Russian rivalry for energy dominance in
Central Asia; the rising importance of gas decision-making
(relative to oil); Russian foot-dragging holding back
consummation of regional ties; uncertainty over some
resources and infrastructure (particularly pipeline routes);
and the ubiquitous and lumbering Russian energy giant Gazprom
as the linchpin to solving (or blocking) key projects. End
Summary.
.
TNK-BP
--------------
.

2. (C) Alistair Ferguson and Shawn McCormick provided an
overview of Russia's looming gas imbalance and a harsh
assessment of Gazprom's ability to deal with what could
become a crisis. Gazprom's modus operandi is to "lie, cheat,
and steal" about gas numbers and Gazprom "manages demand out"
of the equation rather than finding new supply. TNK-BP
estimates that Russia operated at a 4-5 bcm/y deficit in
2006, and that will grow to about 10-12 bcm this coming
winter. Russia will do all it can to meet export
commitments, and there is a definite recognition of
interdependence with Europe.


3. (C) One significant thing that has changed since the last
Asian Energy Officers conference in December 2005 is that it
is apparent now that Russia is unable to follow through on
strategic decisions. Promising 30-40 billion cubic meters of
natural gas to China by 2020, for example, means that
geotechnical work must be underway now, yet Gazprom stands in
the way of projects in the east. To move West Siberian gas
to China through the so-called Altai route would drain gas
from Europe, as production has reached a plateau and is
insufficient to supply both markets. Since it is unlikely
that Gazprom will walk away from its base European markets,
the company will look elsewhere for new reserves. Developing
the big fields on Yamal, in TNK-BP's estimation, is much more
difficult and expensive than estimated, and at the earliest a
2015-2020 proposition.


4. (C) As a result, Central Asian gas, as well as gas
produced by independents (non-Gazprom companies),is
absolutely critical to Russia's gas balance. At the same
time, China's growing inroads to its west present the Central
Asian countries with a chance to play the two superpowers off
each other. The gas balance problem is "not a crisis yet,"
but Gazprom's growing needs present companies like TNK-BP
with opportunities and TNK-BP will not "wait until it is a
crisis." In fact, TNK-BP is sufficiently confident in the
ultimate outcome -) that it will be able to produce and
market additional gas -- that it is budgeting $300 million on
Kovykta development annually despite having no resolution to
its impasse with Gazprom over development of the field.
.

5. (C) TNK-BP, angry over the indecision over development of
Kovykta, vowed to attack Gazprom head-on since Gazprom simply
"cannot control it all." With gas sector reform slowly
strengthening in Russia, gas prices gradually rising, an
electricity crisis looming, and the hastily-passed export
monopoly law even coming under increasing fire, 2007-8 marks
a moment of opportunity to break through the Gazprom barrier.
Gazprom is at the "zenith of its power" at the moment, but
Gazprom really has no strategy other than increasing its
market capitalization while its motivations are almost
entirely driven by politics and vested interests rather than
business fundamentals. This is temporarily Gazprom's
strength but also its longer-term weakness. As long as
Gazprom is happy only with "domination and bulldozing,"
domestic supply problems will grow and will threaten exports,

MOSCOW 00002393 002 OF 007


and powerful authorities will increasingly recognize that
Gazprom is retarding rather than promoting growth in places
like East Siberia. At that point, the vested interests in
Gazprom could be upended while business fundamentals come to
trump politics. If not, Gazprom will simply grow weaker, or
at least more dysfunctional.

ExxonMobil
--------------


6. (C) Erik Houlleberghs, Peter Lundh, and Ed Verona provided
an overview of energy demand in the Russian Far East and
Asian markets and a brief summary of the Sakhalin 1 project,
but most of their presentation was a thesis on how to move
forward with Gazprom in Russia's east. There is no doubt
about Asian demand, and projects such as Sakhalin-1 are
proving that Russian supply is sufficient to meet it.
ExxonMobil (EM) sees Russia's gasification strategy in the
east quite differently than does TNK-BP, however. The
Russian government has undertaken a series of complementary
policies and legislative initiatives to develop the gas arena
in the east. These include the federal gas export monopoly
law (passed); a program (under final approval) establishing
an integrated production, transportation and supply system in
the east; a program (draft) on natural gas production; and a
separate program (draft) on a gas transportation system,
including for export. This would all go towards establishing
a Unified Gas Supply System (UGSS) in the east that roughly
replicates what Russia has in the west.


7. (C) The problem with Russia's plan is that it is
impossible to carry out. From 2009 to 2017 the plan calls
for bringing on-stream no less than eleven huge new sources
of gas to meet its commitments. These fields are spread
across virgin territory the size of the continental U.S., and
the projects will require enormous investments on a shocking
scale. EM by contrast sees few of these projects coming
on-stream until at least 2015 or 2020, with the exception of
the Kovykta gas project and obviously Sakhalin-1 and -2.
Sakhalin-1, in which ExxonMobil and Rosneft are partners, has
made good progress. Unlike most of the agreements Russia and
China have signed on energy, the Heads of Agreement that
Sakhalin-1 signed with China,s CNPC includes a detailed
price formula. China has finally realized it must pay world
prices for gas, at least from Sakhalin-1, and is moving away
from its obsession with using coal as a basis for setting
import prices in favor of LNG as the price-setter. Since gas
is essentially a peak-shaving fuel for China, it can afford
to pay relatively high prices for it. Sakhalin-1's proposed
gas pipeline to China can serve as the basis for Russia's
eastern UGSS. To ExxonMobil,s chagrin, however, Sakhalin-1
export rights are still uncertain.


8. (C) All this leaves Russia with a giant need for foreign
partnerships in the east, but this will be difficult given
the inherent conflicts of interest Gazprom brings to the
table. Nevertheless, on the oil and gas fronts at least,
international companies will be able to establish such
partnerships with Gazprom and other Russian majors. For
example, despite some internal vested interests that would
ordinarily compel Gazprom to want to divert Sakhalin-1 gas
into Sakhalin-2's LNG facility, Gazprom might be satisfied
with its Sakhalin-2 role and honor Sakhalin-1's PSA rights to
export the LNG as it sees fit. It helps that EM's
calculations show fairly definitively that piping
Sakhalin-1's gas to China is more profitable to all
stakeholders than sending it anywhere as LNG. On the other
hand, Gazprom is loath to allow other companies to export gas.


9. (C) In a separate conversation with Beijing Econoff,
Verona stated that it is critical for China to finalize an
agreement for Sakhalin-1 gas as soon as possible. By doing
so, it may be able to preempt Gazprom's involvement in the
project. Verona said that China's unwillingness to cross
Gazprom is clearly influencing its measured steps to date in
negotiating for the gas.


10. (C) The survivors of Russia's 2008 political transition
will have an impact on whether such partnerships succeed.

MOSCOW 00002393 003 OF 007


Whatever happens, Russia's remaining dependency on Europe
will continue to reduce Russia's freedom to act, while
Central Asia will turn its attention to the east even more,
fostering opportunities for cooperation and competition with
Russia. Kazakhstan, for example, may find it easier to ship
gas east than west in the face of Russian opposition to
trans-Caspian routes. Kazakhstan has grand plans to develop
a petrochemical industry and simply does not have enough gas
to satisfy every direction on the compass, and China --
unlike Europe -- is just over the border. Given EM's view
that a trans-Caspian gas pipeline is &unrealistic,8 EM
wondered if USG rhetoric about it was meant to cause Russia
anxiety and questioned why the West complains when Russia
takes the same tack by talking of a gas OPEC.

Shell
--------------


11. (C) Alf D'Souza and Bibigul Baitluoeva characterized the
Putin energy era as one of ensuring stability, safeguarding
unity and control, restoring state capitalism, reacting to
the perceived inequities of the Yeltsin era, and seizing the
commanding heights of the economy. They labeled
ConocoPhillips' strategic deal with Lukoil as a model of how
much the international oil companies (IOCs) can get these
days -- about 20-25 percent of equity and "not much control."
As for Sakhalin Island, D'Souza compared the region to the
North Sea at the early stages of its exploration and
development. At that time the North Sea was thought to
contain around 4-5 billion barrels of recoverable oil, about
the same as is already proved in the known Sakhalin fields.


12. (C) Shell's Sakhalin-2 project is now 80 percent complete
and, thanks in part to project financing that the Japanese
partners insisted upon, it represents a level of transparency
not seen elsewhere in Russia. This despite some Russian
fears that the field's operators were giving themselves
kickbacks. Shell confessed it had shot itself in the foot by
not keeping all parties informed -) those conducting
negotiations with Gazprom to swap shares of Sakhalin 2 for
Shell's access to a West Siberian gas field and those
preparing to announce Sakhalin-2 cost overruns at the same
time. Nonetheless this made the Russians that signed the
alliance look dumb, the authorities suspicious, and led to
the campaign to replace the foreigners' majority control with
Gazprom's. "When you are under attack in Russia, you are
alone," D'Souza added.


13. (C) D'Souza went to great lengths to defend Sakhalin-2's
performance, pointing out that most of the authorities'
claims of regulatory violations by Sakhalin-2 were unfounded.
For example, it was unrelated pipelines from the Soviet era
that were leaking and not Sakhalin-2's; dead fish that had
upset Russian and some western television audiences were the
result of natural spawning; and in the end the consortium had
to pay only $1 million in fines compared with the audacious
estimates by some authorities of $50 billion or more.
D'Souza also defended the recent deal with Gazprom (to sell
the latter 51% of Sakhalin-2),which "was not expropriation."
Instead it is a fair deal that avoided arbitration. Shell
will remain technical service provider for upstream and LNG
and the western partners will retain a proportionate role in
governance. He admitted the deal has taken a while to
complete because it is highly legalistic but noted that such
steps are essential since "forgiveness is not a Russian
trait". All partners have now received their funds for the
sale (totaling $7.45 billion).


14. (C) D,Souza also pointed out Sakhalin 2 required 100,000
different licenses and permits and boasted that the project
had consumed 18 million man hours without any deaths or
accidents. He criticized the environmental groups that had
stirred up trouble on Sakhalin for making "a deal with the
devil" because the attention they had drawn had resulted in
Gazprom taking majority control of the project. D,Souza
believes Gazprom will produce a much poorer environmental
record than Shell has thus far. He noted, however, that the
environmental groups had played a useful role by keeping
Shell honest.

MOSCOW 00002393 004 OF 007



Rosneft
--------------


15. (C) Rosneft's Vice President for Finance, Peter O'Brien,
boasted that Rosneft has enjoyed five years of oil production
growth at more than 8 percent, although he did not specify in
how many of those years growth was through acquisition
(Yuganskneftegaz, Anglo-Siberian, Severnaya Neft) rather than
organic growth. Rosneft is hiring experts from throughout
the sector to remain the industry leader in growth, overtake
Lukoil in production, and become competitive internationally
with a market capitalization capable of supporting further
acquisitions. Looking forward, Rosneft will continue to grow
thanks in large part to its strategy in Eastern Siberia and
the Far East (Sakhalin and Kamchatka). Rosneft is partnering
with nearly every international major in one project or
another, and with most Asian oil and gas companies as well.
Rosneft characterizes its partnership with ExxonMobil in
Sakhalin-1 as highly successful. The company hopes to get
into the retail sector of several Asian countries ultimately
and has also begun thinking about upstream activity in
Vietnam.


16. (C) While eastern production accounts for only 5 percent
of Rosneft's output now, by 2015 it will grow to 20 percent
even accounting for a higher production level company-wide.
With Rosneft's Vankor field, the company plans to be the
major user of the East Siberian-Pacific Ocean (ESPO)
pipeline, shipping 500,000 b/d or more by 2020. Rosneft and
Transneft will have a "tariff discussion" to come to
agreement on a fee structure that works for both parties.
That discussion will focus on Transneft's cost of capital
prior to taking out loans or on Transneft simply acquiescing
to the need to pay off its loans more slowly, because to date
the pipeline seems too expensive. O'Brien said that even the
Prime Minister has taken an interest in why ESPO is so
expensive. Other East Siberian exploration will be spurred
by the combination of ESPO and the recently enacted tax
differentiation for east Siberian fields.


17. (C) O'Brien characterized the tax relief (for the first
25 million tons of a new East Siberian field) as a huge
development incentive, equating to over a billion dollars for
each field at current prices. Rosneft sends 180,000 b/d of
crude to China by rail currently and notes that China's
desire to get into Russia's upstream is an important lever to
ensure that higher exports will secure world-level prices in
the future. The "price at the end of the pipe" is a major
concern so such leverage should help.


18. (C) Separately, USG officers visited Rosneft's Science
and Technology Center in Moscow. Here Rosneft monitors and
directs production, water-flooding programs, and other
factors and calculates the most commercially favorable
production profile for its fields. While the tour is largely
a packaged presentation that Rosneft's public relations firm
has prepared for dignitaries, it nonetheless demonstrated a
competent, technically serious, and very young company that
wants to advertise its sudden emergence into the ranks of the
supermajors. In side conversations, Rosneft admits that at
least 70 percent of its personnel came with the acquisition
of Yuganskneftegaz's center and that most of the technology
and reservoir management techniques were developed by Yukos'
team of western reservoir engineers who delivered the
production miracle to Yukos earlier this decade.

Vladimir Milov
--------------


19. (C) Vladimir Milov, president of the Institute for Energy
Policy and former Deputy Energy Minister, offered his opinion
on a wide range of topics, including the growing
Chinese/Russian rivalry in Central Asia and energy relations
between the two countries. He said that the Chinese have
always wanted to buy an equity stake in a big Russian company
and thought they had extracted a promise from the Russians to
allow them to buy into Yuganskneftegaz when it was taken from
Yukos. Rosneft ended up with this asset and the Chinese have

MOSCOW 00002393 005 OF 007


not forgotten this "broken promise."


20. (C) On Central Asia, Russia is clearly worried about
Turkmenistan sending gas to China because Gazprom needs to
lock up these volumes for itself. The current agreement
between Russia and Turkmenistan is only good through 2009.
Moscow has spent the last 15 years squeezing resources out of
its Central Asian partners. As a result, Moscow's
competitive advantage over Beijing in the region is being
threatened. Because of its need for gas, Gazprom will
undoubtedly muscle into TNK-BP,s giant Kovykta gas project
in East Siberia. The volumes can go to meet some of the gas
volumes Putin committed to China during a trip to Beijing
last year. The Sakhalin-1 project looks to be safe from
Gazprom's predatory tendencies for the time being, he
thought. It is likely that ExxonMobil (the operator of the
project) and Gazprom will work out a way to export the gas.


International Energy Agency (IEA)
--------------


21. (C) Yo Osumi, head of Asia-Pacific, Latin America, and
Sub-Saharan Africa at the IEA, gave a detailed presentation
on Asian energy demand going forward. While China, India and
other Asian giants are clearly going to continue leading the
globe in energy demand growth, there are more alternatives at
their disposal than some realize. China's growth has been
and can continue to be fueled by coal overall, but China will
clearly welcome Russian oil. Muted Chinese demand for gas to
date has left the country so far ambivalent about piped gas
vs. LNG. Japan's interest in ESPO must stem definitively
from a policy desire for diversification since Japanese oil
demand is set to decline in coming decades. South Korea and,
to a lesser extent, Japan could face strong needs to seek out
Russian LNG (or in the case of South Korea, piped gas) in the
future as gas demand grows and LNG contracts come up for
renewal in the face of some Asian supply problems (primarily
in Indonesia).


22. (C) India has had good luck with domestic gas discoveries
recently but will continue to be a magnet for LNG and
pipeline gas imports looking forward, although much depends
on domestic energy price reform. IEA's recent criticism of
Russia for not investing enough in gas development in the
face of a growing call on Russian gas hit Chinese
policymakers "square in the eye" and forced them to examine
Russian gas from a new perspective. Meanwhile, the Chinese
have always had a major footprint in Central Asia and IEA
believes Chinese imports of major volumes of Central Asian
gas is a likely scenario.


23. (C) In closing, Osumi stressed that diversification is
everyone's energy policy goal, but that the key to success in
this part of the world will be negotiations over pricing, the
fate of coal use in China, and developments in the "LNG vs.
piped gas" arena. "Avoidance of captivity," whether for a
consumer or producer, will also be determined by internal and
external politics and, sadly, the seemingly permanent
corruption in the region.

Carnegie Center
--------------


24. (C) The Carnegie Moscow Center pulled together an array
of experts to discuss emerging Russian-Asian energy linkages.
Their emphasis was on the nature of the decision to
construct the ESPO pipeline, different perceptions of China's
role in the energy equation, and the importance of Central
Asian gas.

-- Konstantin Simonov, General Director of the National
Energy Security Fund, emphasized that the ESPO pipeline is a
political, not a commercial, project. Whether it terminates
in China or on the Pacific coast will be a reflection of
friends Russia chooses at the time. Russian society is "very
flexible" about China and not as fearful of it as many think.
With so few resources identified to fill ESPO in the east,
the pipeline really should be called WESPO since it will

MOSCOW 00002393 006 OF 007


require oil from West Siberia. This is a policy of
"diversion, not diversification," he said.

-- Tatiana Mitrova of the Center for International Energy
Markets Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences argued
that China and Russia do not understand each other yet on
energy trade. Russia sees the flows through ESPO, and
possibly the promised gas volumes, to China as a maximum but
China views them as a "starting point." This conflict will
grow and will exacerbate pricing negotiations. Agreements to
date are nothing but declarations, whereas actual business
deal-making will be exceptionally difficult. Timing is
another huge issue as China and other markets opt for
alternative sources of fuel. Russia's obsession with adding
value to the economy by exporting products rather than raw
materials is another stumbling block since Russia's would-be
fuel customers do not want Russia to add value before the
products cross the border. The G8 approach to energy
security, focusing as it did on diversification for both
consumers and producers, makes Russia's turn to the east a
fundamentally strategic rather than commercial issue.

-- Vasiliy Mikheev of the Institute of World Economy and
International Relations argued that Russia's recent
statements about its strategic foreign policy direction have
been misconstrued by the West. The West has mistakenly
focused on Putin's message in Munich, for example,
interpreting it to mean that Putin was only criticizing those
who would limit Russia's competitiveness. In fact Putin
raised ten points of cooperation with the West as well. It
is through this sort of prism that Russia views who is
helping and who is hurting Russia, and energy security is
part of that prism. On the issue of Russia-China relations,
Mikheev argued that China is both a cooperator and a
competitor with Russia. It would be a psychic shock for
Russia to see China on Russian soil developing oil or gas, as
Russia is not prepared to accept China as an equal the way it
does the U.S., the EU, or Japan. China on the other hand is
not satisfied with the level of mutual trust with Russia.
Central Asia, meanwhile, will play Russian and Chinese
competition off one another.

-- Vladimir Milov pointed out that much of the hype about
eastern Russian hydrocarbon riches is overblown. Proved
reserves are tiny compared with western Russia, high taxes on
production that work in western Russia where sunk costs make
such a government take possible will not work in the east,
and the only projects in the east showing "signs of life" are
the two PSA projects run by westerners. Milov argued for
focusing less on energy as an economic linchpin for eastern
Russian development in favor of more focus on overall
transportation links with the Asia-Pacific world. While some
fear this might split Russia in two, Milov believes it would
instead ground eastern development in economic and geographic
reality as opposed to the centrally-planned energy projects
that are little more than a political way to glue the country
together. Regarding Central Asia, Milov believes that all
the states want transit independence and customer diversity
after years of "broken promises" from Russia on transit and a
blatantly self-interested Russian position on the Energy
Charter Treaty. Russia is taking a short-sighted view of
Central Asia but still has a firm grip on those states.
Russia will have to change its strategy in the face of
Chinese inroads to Central Asia, however.


25. (C) Asked in closing what advice they would give the USG
on taking a policy position towards emerging Russia-Asia
energy trade and geopolitics, participants offered the
following advice:

-- China is really the key, not Russia. The U.S. must decide
what China represents in energy matters --friend or foe?
Then, the U.S. should develop a strategy of cooperation with
China and only then incorporate Russia into the equations.

-- Take a firm position, reflected recently by the NSC to
some audiences, that demonstrates that the USG is
strategically interested in Russia having a presence in the
Pacific Rim. U.S. advice to all on how to achieve that

MOSCOW 00002393 007 OF 007


integration will be much appreciated.

-- Be gentle in handling developments in the energy
geopolitics of the region and avoid over-reacting. Do not
regard ESPO as merely a commercial or a political exercise --
it is both. Russia will continue maneuvering on ESPO until
it finds enough reserves to fill it and will continue to play
China, Japan, South Korea and the U.S. off against one
another as it seeks the most comfortable partnership at the
moment. Recognize that Central Asian gas is being pulled in
four directions and that there is not enough to fill all or
even most of them. The USG should take a position on Central
Asian gas to China.


26. (U) This cable was cleared by all conference participants.
BURNS