A/S FRIED'S MEETING WITH DFM KARASIN: ESTONIA,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 002334

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/18/2017
TAGS: PREL MARR ETRD UNSC OSCE AM AJ EN GG RS
SUBJECT: A/S FRIED'S MEETING WITH DFM KARASIN: ESTONIA,
GEORGIA


Classified By: DCM Daniel A. Russell, Reason: 1.4 (b, d)

Summary
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1. (C) EUR A/S Fried and Russian DFM Karasin's May 15
discussion focused on Estonia and Georgia. Fried assured
Karasin that the U.S. supports the independence and
sovereignty of Russia's neighbors and their freedom from a
Russian sphere of influence -- but also urges them to develop
good relations with Russia. Issues such as World War II
monuments are emotional on both sides; both Russia and its
neighbors must take these emotions into account. Karasin
viewed the situation in South Ossetia (Georgia) as alarming.
He said the Sanakoyev "alternative government" is creating
nervousness in South Ossetia that has led to ill-considered
actions. Fried replied that political steps cannot justify
violence. Fried believed that recent prisoner releases in
Abkhazia have set the stage for further progress. Karasin
said one Abkhaz prisoner remains unaccounted for. Karasin
said talks with the Georgians will continue; if Saakashvili
attends the June 9-10 CIS Summit he will get a meeting with
Putin (unless he makes that a condition of his attendance).
Karasin briefly raised the possibility of a statement by the
two presidents on Nagorno-Karabakh at the G-8 Summit and the
Russian candidate for OSCE Head of Mission in Armenia. End
Summary.

Russia and Its Neighbors
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2. (C) EUR A/S Daniel Fried met with Russian DFM Grigoriy
Karasin for one and a half hours May 15. Fried led off by
describing the Secretary's constructive approach to
Russian-U.S. relations. Karasin complained of U.S. actions
on missile defense and a statement by a U.S. official in
opposition to Putin's recently-concluded deal for Central
Asian oil. He complained that U.S. and EU statements on
Estonia would not lead to a "positive atmosphere," though he
admitted that Russia's actions were not "elegant."


3. (C) Fried replied that we view Russia as a partner on our
most vital issues, though the partnership is not living up to
its potential. We do have difficulties with Russia over its
relations with its neighbors and differences over certain
internal developments. We start off from the position that
the neighbors are truly independent and sovereign, and not
part of a Russian sphere of influence. At the same time,
they need to develop good relations with Russia and not
provoke it. Estonia's actions in removing the Soviet WWII
memorial were not wise, and we told the Estonians so. We
made the statements to which Karasin objected after Russian
mobs over-reacted. On gas pipelines, Fried reiterated that
we favor a diversity of routes to take Central Asian oil and
gas to market -- both through Russia and outside it.


4. (C) Karasin stressed the depth of Russian feeling about
World War II, and said that monuments are symbols for these
feelings, just as flags are for national sentiment. Fried
agreed, but reiterated that Estonians, Poles and Ukrainians
(Western, especially) also have deep feelings about World War
II, and they are very different feelings, though equally
based on real events. The Russians need to understand this.


5. (C) Karasin said the partnership of which Fried spoke must
be based on equality and mutual respect; these do not appear
in some American rhetoric. Fried replied that we see most of
the sharp language coming from the Russian side. The
Secretary and Defense Secretary Gates have both taken a

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positive tone, and Fried had tried to do likewise in his
recent speech in Berlin.

South Ossetia
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6. (C) Fried asked for Karasin's views on South Ossetia,
pressing the Russians to ensure that monitors reach the
village of Avnevi, where recent incidents started. Karasin
was unaware that monitors had not been there and said he
would look into it. Fried noted a recent Russian statement
critical of South Ossetian misdeeds, and we appreciate that
objectivity. He reminded Karasin that the U.S. consistently
warns Georgia against military adventurism under any
circumstances, and noted that Georgia "says the right things"
in reply and have been doing the right things.


7. (C) Karasin said the situation in South Ossetia is
alarming. The Ossetians are nervous about the Sanakoyev
government and are taking steps that are "not well thought
out." Karasin recounted the May 7 standoff between South
Ossetians and Russian and OSCE monitors, in which Ossetian

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forces fired in the air to prevent the monitors from
confiscating illegal anti-aircraft weapons. Subsequently,
Kokoity declared a blockade of Georgian enclaves and demanded
the liquidation of the Sanakoyev regime and an end to the
Georgian passport checks on the Trans-Caucasus Highway.
Russia urged restraint on both Kokoity and the Georgians.
Ambassador-at-Large Popov left for Georgia May 15 to calm the
situation.


8. (C) Fried responded that Karasin may be right
analytically that nervousness over the Sanakoyev government
led to the South Ossetian reaction. However, whatever
Georgia has done, and there was also something that could be
said in defense of Georgia's support for Sanakoyev, resorting
to violence is not justified. It was wrong when Georgia did
it; it is wrong when South Ossetia does it. Georgia is
acting more constructively than it was one or two years ago.
It is taking political steps, not military. Russia may not
like the political steps, but it is better that they are
political, not military. Fried said that the recent
incidents show that there must be a permanent JPKF post at
Didi Gupta to keep heavy weapons out of the hands of the
South Ossetians. Karasin praised the leadership of the JPKF
as serious, responsible and impartial.


9. (C) Karasin raised the recent Russian assistance
delegation to South Ossetia led by DPM Bukayev. Russia wants
to intensify the social rehabilitation of the area. Experts
in transport, health and construction were on the delegation,
as was Ambassador Popov. Russia will not channel its aid
through the OSCE, because it wants to avoid spending money on
unneeded projects. But Russia wants to be transparent. The
delegation invited Georgian officials to join it, so they
could see exactly what projects Russia had in mind.
Regrettably, the Georgians refused. Fried was glad to hear
the Russian desire for transparency. He hoped the Russians
will work with the Georgians, not just provide direct support
for Kokoity. Economic development must be in ways acceptable
to all sides.

Abkhazia
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10. (C) Fried said we were encouraged by UNSCR 1752 and by
the reciprocal releases of hostages. 1752 should provide the
basis for moving forward, and this could be discussed at a
"Geneva-style" meeting in New York with the participation of
Abkhaz "FM" Shamba. The U.S. is finalizing a package of
proposals. They will include ways to reduce tensions in
Gali, secure agreement on a package providing for IDP return
and commitments not to use force, ways to combat criminality,
and ways to address the human rights situation, including in
Gali. Accomplishing these steps will require the U.S. and
Russia to cooperate.


11. (C) With regard to the hostage releases, Karasin
explained that the Georgians had freed one hostage --
Chakaberia -- but not the other, Sigua. Karasin met with
Bagapsh after Chakaberia's release and asked him to release
at least one of the Georgian students the Abkhaz were
holding. Bagapsh had released all three on the basis of what
he understood to be Georgian commitments -- commitments
Georgia did not fulfill. Instead, Saakashvili was
publicizing his accomplishment in getting the Georgian
students freed. Sigua must be found. Measures must be taken
to restore confidence. Fried said he did not know what
promises Georgia may have made on Sigua, but they needed to
be fulfilled.


12. (C) Karasin concluded the discussion of the frozen
conflicts with two points. First, the sides need to meet.
The South Ossetians and Georgians need to talk in the context
of the Joint Coordination Council. The Abkhaz and Georgians
need to talk directly. Second, the "puffing up" of Sanakoyev
is not just political; it goes hand in hand with preparations
for action by "Georgia's military machine." There is danger
in the logic of military actions. Georgia needs to end its
preparations for conflict. Fried agreed that the danger of
conflict exists. Instead of waiting passively for the next
crisis, we should put the peace processes on a good course.
Direct talks between the Georgians and Abkhaz and Georgians
and South Ossetians are important. Fried agreed that
rhetoric must be toned down. The Georgian Ministry of
Internal Affairs needs to act responsibly. The Georgians
should adhere to the 1994 Moscow Agreement's provisions on
Kodori, and should be transparent to UNOMIG.

Russia-Georgia
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13. (C) Karasin said he had spoken at length with Georgian

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Parliament Speaker Nino Burjanadze, who led Georgia's
delegation to Yeltsin's funeral. He complained to her of
continued insulting rhetoric. Georgia's Minister of Internal
Affairs has become the most "disturbing" member of the
Georgian government. Georgians should not stubbornly stick
to an anti-Russian line; the two countries are neighbors,
after all.


14. (C) Contacts continue, Karasin said. Georgian DFM
Manjgaladze is coming soon. Preparations are under way for a
Putin-Saakashvili meeting on the margins of the June 9-10 CIS
Economic Summit in St. Petersburg. Karasin explained to
Burjanadze that Saakashvili should not condition his
willingness to attend the summit on getting a meeting with
Putin. Rather, Saakashvili should just signal his attendance
and, Karasin assured Burjanadze, he would get his meeting.


15. (C) Ultimately, Karasin said, everything depends on
Georgia's willingness to take visible steps to normalize
relations. Fried replied that normalization also means
reopening the border that Russia has closed; re-starting
direct air links that Russia has grounded; and ending the
Russian bans on imports of agricultural goods, wine and
mineral water. Fried was glad Saakashvili is coming; there
is much to discuss.

Nagorno-Karabakh
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16. (C) Karasin noted that there are many meetings on NK,
but they did not appear likely to lead to a breakthrough this
year. He asked Fried whether the mediators should think of a
joint effort -- such as an appeal by the Presidents on the
margins of the G-8 meeting. This could have its downside if
the sides failed to move. Fried said he would discuss the
issue with our negotiator, EUR DAS Matt Bryza. The G-8
Foreign Ministers are meeting before the summit; that might
also provide a venue for action on NK.

OSCE Mission in Armenia
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17. (C) Karasin asked for Fried's support for the Russian
candidate to be OSCE Head of Mission in Yerevan. The
incumbent, whose term is up, is a Russian and has done a good
job. A Russian, Sergey Kapinos, should replace him. Fried
agreed to look at the suggestion.


18. (U) Assistant Secretary Fried has cleared this message.

BURNS