SOUTH OSSETIA: RUSSIAN MFA "ALARMED"

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 002214

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/14/2017
TAGS: PREL MOPS MARR OSCE GG RS
SUBJECT: SOUTH OSSETIA: RUSSIAN MFA "ALARMED"


Classified By: PolMilCouns Alice G. Wells. Reason: 1.4 (b, d)


1. (C) Russian MFA Ambassador at Large for the South Ossetia
conflict Yuriy Popov on May 14 assessed the situation on the
ground as "alarming." Neither side is willing to blink
first, he said. The Russian PKF conducted a monitoring
mission after the violence late May 13, and concluded that
the South Ossetians had started it. AKMs and rifle-launched
grenades were used in the attack. One Georgian police
officer suffered "medium" wounds. Popov was under the
impression that the South Ossetians finally permitted OSCE
monitors to reach Avnevi, where the incidents began. We said
that the OSCE had informed our Embassy in Tbilisi otherwise.
Popov said he would call PKF chief Kulakhmetov again.


2. (C) In a subsequent conversation, the Ambassador raised
U.S. concerns with Security Council Secretary Igor Ivanov.
The Ambassador stressed that securing OSCE access to Avnevi
would help ease tensions. Ivanov, who recalled the role of
Avnevi in the 2004 hostilities, said he would try to help.


3. (C) Popov said the South Ossetian actions were a reaction
to Georgian "intrigues" with the Sanakoyev "alternative
government." The Ossetians have been threatening to respond
to the passport scanning and registration posts that the
Georgians have set up on the Trans-Caucasian Highway
("Transcam"). (Note: the Transcam is used by Ossetian
truckers smuggling banned Georgian agricultural products into
North Ossetia, Russia. The Ossetians believe the Georgians
will make loyalty to the Sanakoyev "alternative government" a
cost of doing this business. End Note.) The Russians tried
to dissuade the Ossetians, but the Ossetians were
"overwhelmed" by their nervousness. The Ossetian roadblocks
have hampered access to Georgian enclaves via the Transcam,
but have not affected access to the enclaves via other routes.


4. (C) We responded that there can be no equation between
Georgian political maneuvers and South Ossetian recourse to
violence. The appearance of Russian support for the Ossetian
violence could call into question the meaning of Russia's
push for an agreement not to resume hostilities. Popov
responded that "Any use of force in the region is absolutely
inadmissible. We will never encourage or support the use of
force by the Ossetian side. We will do our best to stop any
Ossetian use of force." Popov noted that the South Ossetians
may try to involve the Russian peacekeepers in fighting
Georgians, but such attempts will fail. The peacekeepers are
under strict orders not to be drawn in, and this has been
made clear to the South Ossetians. Popov said Security
Council Deputy Secretary Zubakov spoke to Kokoity on May 12.
Popov denied rumors that Kokoity is expected in Moscow.


5. (C) Popov departs for Tbilisi and Tskhinvali on May 15.
He hopes to ease tensions by getting the South Ossetians to
lift their blockade as part of a gentlemen's agreement with
the Georgians to ease their passport regime after a
face-saving interval. He urged the U.S. to impress upon the
Georgians the need to avoid violence. He asked the U.S., in
view of the "warlord traditions and mentality" of the
Ossetians, to urge Georgia to refrain from provoking the
Ossetians. Popov has the feeling that the Georgians would
like to "stir up the South Ossetians." That would be
"unfruitful."


6. (C) Comment: The Russians are clearly backpedaling from
the South Ossetians, at least in public. When we pointed to
Russian MFA and PKF statements critical of the Ossetians,
Popov said they were "not critical -- just objective." Based
on Popov's words, Russia's statements appear to be a warning
to Kokoity not to try to start something in the hope that
Russia might finish it.

BURNS