SOUTH OSSETIA: RUSSIAN MFA "ALARMED"

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 002214 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/14/2017 TAGS: PREL MOPS MARR OSCE GG RS SUBJECT: SOUTH OSSETIA: RUSSIAN MFA "ALARMED" Classified By: PolMilCouns Alice G. Wells. Reason: 1.4 (b, d) ¶1. (C) Russian MFA Ambassador at Large for the South Ossetia conflict Yuriy Popov on May 14 assessed the situation on the ground as "alarming." Neither side is willing to blink first, he said. The Russian PKF conducted a monitoring mission after the violence late May 13, and concluded that the South Ossetians had started it. AKMs and rifle-launched grenades were used in the attack. One Georgian police officer suffered "medium" wounds. Popov was under the impression that the South Ossetians finally permitted OSCE monitors to reach Avnevi, where the incidents began. We said that the OSCE had informed our Embassy in Tbilisi otherwise. Popov said he would call PKF chief Kulakhmetov again. ¶2. (C) In a subsequent conversation, the Ambassador raised U.S. concerns with Security Council Secretary Igor Ivanov. The Ambassador stressed that securing OSCE access to Avnevi would help ease tensions. Ivanov, who recalled the role of Avnevi in the 2004 hostilities, said he would try to help. ¶3. (C) Popov said the South Ossetian actions were a reaction to Georgian "intrigues" with the Sanakoyev "alternative government." The Ossetians have been threatening to respond to the passport scanning and registration posts that the Georgians have set up on the Trans-Caucasian Highway ("Transcam"). (Note: the Transcam is used by Ossetian truckers smuggling banned Georgian agricultural products into North Ossetia, Russia. The Ossetians believe the Georgians will make loyalty to the Sanakoyev "alternative government" a cost of doing this business. End Note.) The Russians tried to dissuade the Ossetians, but the Ossetians were "overwhelmed" by their nervousness. The Ossetian roadblocks have hampered access to Georgian enclaves via the Transcam, but have not affected access to the enclaves via other routes. ¶4. (C) We responded that there can be no equation between Georgian political maneuvers and South Ossetian recourse to violence. The appearance of Russian support for the Ossetian violence could call into question the meaning of Russia's push for an agreement not to resume hostilities. Popov responded that "Any use of force in the region is absolutely inadmissible. We will never encourage or support the use of force by the Ossetian side. We will do our best to stop any Ossetian use of force." Popov noted that the South Ossetians may try to involve the Russian peacekeepers in fighting Georgians, but such attempts will fail. The peacekeepers are under strict orders not to be drawn in, and this has been made clear to the South Ossetians. Popov said Security Council Deputy Secretary Zubakov spoke to Kokoity on May 12. Popov denied rumors that Kokoity is expected in Moscow. ¶5. (C) Popov departs for Tbilisi and Tskhinvali on May 15. He hopes to ease tensions by getting the South Ossetians to lift their blockade as part of a gentlemen's agreement with the Georgians to ease their passport regime after a face-saving interval. He urged the U.S. to impress upon the Georgians the need to avoid violence. He asked the U.S., in view of the "warlord traditions and mentality" of the Ossetians, to urge Georgia to refrain from provoking the Ossetians. Popov has the feeling that the Georgians would like to "stir up the South Ossetians." That would be "unfruitful." ¶6. (C) Comment: The Russians are clearly backpedaling from the South Ossetians, at least in public. When we pointed to Russian MFA and PKF statements critical of the Ossetians, Popov said they were "not critical -- just objective." Based on Popov's words, Russia's statements appear to be a warning to Kokoity not to try to start something in the hope that Russia might finish it. BURNS