COMPROMISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL COURT'S MOVE TO ST.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000217 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/RUS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR RS SUBJECT: COMPROMISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL COURT'S MOVE TO ST. PETERSBURG MOSCOW 00000217 001.2 OF 002 -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (SBU) After much unexpected wrangling, on January 19 the decision was taken to transfer the RF Constitutional Court (CC) to St. Petersburg, as initially proposed by President Putin. CC judges, publicly opposed to the move, succeeded in retaining the right to hold sessions in Moscow. In a rare disagreement with Russia's other legislative body, the Federation Council on December 27 rejected legislation passed by the Duma that would have required the CC to conduct sessions exclusively in St. Petersburg. The legislation went to a joint "conciliation" commission. The commission's compromise proposal allows the CC to hold sessions outside of St. Petersburg on an as-needed basis and to have a representative in Moscow. The transfer of the CC is intended to enhance St. Petersburg's political stature. End summary. -------------- The Amendments -------------- ¶2. (U) The amendment to move the RF Constitutional Court (CC) to St. Petersburg, introduced in early 2006 at President Putin's behest, while hardly a surprise, was reportedly not welcomed by CC judges. After months of negotiations, the bill passed its second reading only on December 15. That version would have moved the CC to St. Petersburg, but allowed it to hold sessions in Moscow. The typically seamless passage of bills through the Duma was interrupted when on December 20 an amended version of the bill was returned for a "second" second reading. The new draft limited the CC to holding sessions only in St. Petersburg and restricted its Moscow presence to support staff. The Duma approved the revised bill in back-to-back second and third readings, much to the very public displeasure of CC Chairman Valeriy Zorkin. ¶3. (U) Subsequently, Zorkin sent a letter to the Presidential Administration and the heads of the lower and upper houses, in which he objected to the manner of the amended bill's adoption. Federation Council Chairman Sergey Mironov, while backing the transfer of the CC, supported Zorkin's objections. On December 27, in less than nine minutes and under the careful direction of Mironov, the Federation Council rejected the amended bill and sent it to a joint Duma - Federation Council "conciliation" commission. While there was no public debate, the transcript of the Federation Council proceedings showed that Chair of the Federation Council's Constitutional Legislation Committee Yuriy Sharandin, charged with presenting the legislation for the vote, argued that the last-minute changes would reduce the prerogatives of the CC to fewer than those enjoyed by other state bodies such as the Federation Council and the Duma and constrain the CC's independence. ¶4. (U) Additionally, Sharandin obscurely alluded to the welfare of former CC judges. While Mironov dismissed the discussion for another time, the statement supports the popular belief that the CC judges' reluctance to move is based on personal factors, such as housing, access to medical care, children's education, as well as the concomitant difficulties of attracting qualified personnel to work for the CC in St. Petersburg. (NOTE: Studies show that Russians are averse to moving in search of employment.) -------------- Response to Federation Council's Rejection -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Tacitly conceding defeat, Duma Deputy Alexandr Moskalets, deputy of the committee responsible for introducing the original amendments, as well as the last-minute changes, predicted to us on January 9 that the joint commission would "peacefully decide" how many times the Court would be able to hold sessions outside St. Petersburg. Mikhail Paleyev, a lawyer for the Presidential Administration, agreed that a compromise detailing the number of "away" sessions the Court could hold was likely. ¶6. (SBU) Moskalets argued that allowing the Court to go on the road would be expensive, but that it was not just a financial question. In the Soviet era, courts had traveled and that, he held, had affected their independence. MOSCOW 00000217 002.2 OF 002 ¶7. (U) In a subsequent Kommersant article, however, Moskalets was less conciliatory. After outlining all the reasons why no compromise would be possible, he concluded that since the move was the Kremlin's initiative, it would be up to the Kremlin to decide what should be done. ¶8. (U) On January 19, the Duma voted to accept the commission's compromise proposal. This allows the CC to hold sessions outside of St. Petersburg on an as-needed basis. Putin reportedly extracted a promise from Zorkin that if the CC were allowed to hold sessions outside of St. Petersburg, the privilege would not be abused. The CC will also be allowed a representative in Moscow, as opposed to just a support staff presence. -------------- Putin As Chairman? -------------- ¶9. (SBU) There has been conjecture that Putin's push for the CC's move to St. Petersburg is not disinterested. Yelena Mazulina, the Russian Federation representative before the Constitutional Court and a former Duma deputy, speculated to us that Putin's grand plan was to unite the three high courts (the CC, the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Arbitrage Court) and then become the Chairman of this "super court." ¶10. (SBU) The Moscow Carnegie Center's Nikolay Petrov, on the contrary, told us January 12 that the move was not part of Putin's retirement package. Putin had long ago promised to make St. Petersburg into a real second city, and the CC move was designed to advance that process. Unlike other ministries or branches of government, the CC's attendant bureaucracy was relatively compact. Moving it would not cause great dislocations. Petrov added that one collateral benefit of the move for Putin was that the St. Petersburg CC would almost certainly be able to offer sinecures to a large number of "second tier" people whom Putin might want to help. It also would further burnish the President's reputation in his native city as he prepared to retire. ¶11. (SBU) In a January 18 conversation, LDPR Duma Deputy Yevgeniy Ivanov ascribed the move as, concomitantly, the product of a desire to insulate the CC from Moscow's political whirlwind. Some in the Duma, he said, had argued that the CC should even be moved to one of Russia's third-tier cities. Having the judges at some distance from Moscow would make it easier for them to make evenhanded decisions, Ivanov said. He dismissed the rumor that the CC's relocation had anything to do with Putin's post-presidential plans. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶12. (SBU) Leaving aside Putin's possible post-2008 plans, this latest public disagreement about legislation again demonstrates a willingness on the part of some to fight proposals generated at the top, especially when their personal well-being may be affected. Lofty notions of CC independence notwithstanding, much of the undercurrent seems to reflect practical concerns about housing and lifestyle. While Putin ultimately had his way, a clause that delays the CC's transfer until an unspecified date to be agreed upon with the President and the need to renovate the CC's St. Petersburg premises means that a change of venue remains at least a year away. BURNS