US-RUSSIA STRATEGIC SECURITY TALKS, APRIL 17

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 12 MOSCOW 001877 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR ISN A/S ROOD AND T (TIMBIE, KATSAPIS) E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/18/2017 TAGS: KNNP MARR PINS PREL PTER RS SUBJECT: US-RUSSIA STRATEGIC SECURITY TALKS, APRIL 17 REF: A. PRAGUE 398 ¶B. MOSCOW 1129 ¶C. MOSCOW 1002 ¶D. MOSCOW 1001 Classified By: DCM Daniel A. Russell. Reasons: 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Missile Defense (MD) dominated the all-day Strategic Security talks in Moscow April 17. The Russian side, led by Deputy Foreign Minister Kislyak, contended that the proposed placement of MD interceptors and a radar in Poland and the Czech Republic, respectively, occurred along Russia's "soft underbelly," thereby threatening Russian security and compeling a response from Moscow. Russian Defense Ministry officials presented a detailed PowerPoint presentation arguing that the locations in Poland and the Czech Republic were better suited for intercepting Russian ICBMs than against "hypothetical" Iranian ballistic missiles. The result would be destabilizing, they said. ISN Assistant Secretary Rood demurred on Russian concerns, emphasizing that SIPDIS the U.S. has no perception of Russia as a strategic threat and that the proposed MD facilities would offer no capable defense against Russia's offensive strategic nuclear forces. He underscored that the USG perceives the missile threat from Iran and North Korea as real and serious. Rood said the USG seeks to allay Russian concerns and is prepared to engage in cooperation with Russia across the full spectrum of missile defense activities. He passed Kislyak a non-paper on potential MD cooperation, which included data sharing, research and development, and testing. The agenda also included: -- GNEP: Kislyak complained that the proposed May 21 GNEP Ministerial with a public communique undercuts the bilateral presidential intiative to be unveiled in early June. He urged that the Ministerial be postponed or revised to be an experts level meeting with a lower profile. -- GICNT: Kislyak expressed concern that the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism has generated "quantity but not quality" in its new participants, and lamented that the current European participants had not lobbied EU states to join as promised. Rood promised the USG would work jointly with Russia on recruiting and discussed the proposed agenda and focus for the next meeting in June in Kazakhstan. -- Post-START: The Russian side said the US-Russia talks in Berlin had settled many technical issues and had established considerable common ground for eventual conclusion of a post-START arrangement. Kislyak said he hoped to hand over a Russian paper soon containing elements of a possible final agreement. He proposed another technical-level meeting in mid-June or July, as well as two or three additional meetings before the end of 2007. He said the goal is the preparation of a framework document that could serve as the basis for a final, post-START agreement. -- Iran: Kislyak indicated that Russia was not moving forward with delivery of fuel to Bushehr citing payment and other contractual issues. He stressed that Russia's agreement with Iran had been based on money in exchange for work and that Moscow had no intention of extending credit to Tehran. He said some Russian workers have withdrawn from the Bushehr project because, in the absence of payment, there was nothing for them to do. Tehran continued to demand the fuel deliveries, he said, but that "won't happen." END SUMMARY. -------------- PARTICIPANTS: -------------- United States: -------------- ISN Assistant Secretary John Rood Ambassador William Burns T Senior Advisor Jim Timbie ISN Senior Advisor Hugh Amundson T Senior Advisor Tim Katsapis General Patrick O'Reilly, Deputy Director MDA DASD Brian Green Paul Iarrobino, OSD EST and POL officers (notetakers) Russia: MOSCOW 00001877 002 OF 012 -------------- Sergey Kislyak, Deputy Foreign Minister General-Lieutenant Buzhinskiy, MOD Anatoliy Antonov, MFA (DVBR Director) Sergey Koshelev, MFA (DBVR Deputy Director) Vladimir Kuchinov, Rosatom Igor Neverov, MFA (North America Director) Ambassador Berdennikov, MFA Oleg Burmistrov, MFA Aleksandr Shilin, MFA (DVBR) Mikhail Kondratenkov, MFA (DVBR) Colonel Ilian, MOD General-Major Ponomarkeno, MOD Aleksey Ivannov, MFA MFA notetakers -------------- MISSILE DEFENSE -------------- ¶2. (C) Russian Deputy Foreign Minister (DFM) Kislyak said Russia's impression of the USG's Missile Defense (MD) plan was that it was "unfriendly" towards Russian security interests. He said Russian experts had looked at the scope and range of radars and interceptors planned for the third U.S. MD site and had concluded these were aimed more at Russian ICBM bases in Europe rather than Middle Eastern threats. He added that Russia has been talking to the Europeans about Russian views on MD. ¶3. (C) Kislyak asked how the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) and U.S. MD systems were connected. He said it was far better to cooperate on MD. He mentioned the difficulty in reaching consensus on MD language on the NRC Work Plan, due to the inability for all to agree "to take into account the security interests of all NRC members." Kislyak suggested that there are more MD questions than answers. ¶4. (C) A/S Rood emphasized that both Russia and the U.S. believe in the value of MD as demonstrated by the fact that both operate and maintain missile defense systems. Rood noted Russia had maintained its own MD system around Moscow even during the lean defense budgets of the 1990s. Both countries face a common threat from ballistic missile (BM) and WMD proliferation and MD is part of a comprehensive strategy to address this threat. MD is an insurance policy and a key component of contemporary deterrence. The U.S. wants more options than just retaliation Rood said, citing last year's missile launches by North Korea on July 4. Rood said the U.S. activated its MD system for the first time during this situation, thus providing an alternative to pre-emption or preparations for a military counterstrike to a missile attack. In this way missile defense promoted stability. ¶5. (C) Rood said U.S. MD assets in Central Europe can defend most NATO Allies and much of Europe with locations in the Czech Republic and Poland. Rood underlined that MD in Europe poses no threat to Russia and that the U.S. had no perception of Russia as a strategic threat. He also emphasized that U.S. MD in Europe offered no capable defense against Russia's offensive strategic nuclear forces. The MD system in Europe, he said, had little or no ability to intercept Russian ICBMs. If the U.S. had wanted such an ability, Rood added, the proposed system would have been designed very differently. ¶6. (C) Rood said the U.S. would keep Russia informed of its plans in Europe and that fielding of the MD system there was scheduled to be completed by the 2011 - 2013 timeframe. He underscored that MD cooperation would be beneficial to both the U.S. and Russia. Rood reiterated that both countries had been discussing MD during this Administation since 2001. He noted that we still needed a Defense Technical Cooperation Agreement (DTCA) and progress on the Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC). Rood emphasized that the USG is open to partnership with Russia on projects the full spectrum of MD activities including: data sharing, research and development, testing, improving capabilities of deployed forces to operate together in joint operations like peacekeeping, and better interoperability. He said the U.S. and Russia shared a common threat from Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and partnership was in both countries' long-term interest. MoD Powerpoint -------------- MOSCOW 00001877 003 OF 012 ¶7. (C) Colonel Ilian from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) gave a detailed 23-slide PowerPoint presentation on Russian reactions to the U.S. MD plan in Europe. In summary: -- The Russians disputed or disagreed with most U.S. assumptions and decisions regarding threats posed by North Korean or Iranian ICBM development. U.S. forecasts, such as the 1998 "Rumsfeld Commission" and 1999 "National Intelligence Estimate," had proven incorrect. At best, Iran and North Korea currently have missiles with a maximum range of 2500 kilometers, which presents no threat to the U.S. and essentially no threat to Europe. The Russians predict the range of Iranian BMs would increase to no more than 3500 kilometers by 2015. Even this range poses a threat only to the eastern portion of the European continent. -- The Russians said the MD sites in Poland and Czech Republic, if effective against Iranian BM threats, would also be effective against Russian ICBMs. The direction of flight of Iranian missiles practically coincides with Russian missiles based at Kozelsk and Tatishevo. -- Furthermore, the MD site in Europe does not provide for the defense of all European states, thus giving the U.S. incentive to continue to develop MD capabilities in Europe, causing further Russian concern. -- The Russians contend that to better protect Europe from Iran, the proposed MD sites should be located in Turkey, France and Italy. If located there, they would not threaten Russian ICBMs. -- Radar coverage from the Czech Republic would provide early detection and would lead to MD interception of Russian ICBMs, in addition to Iranian missiles. The Russians contend that radar-based elements of MD in Czech Republic could be rapidly reoriented from the south to the east. -- The U.S. would be better served to protect itself from Middle Eastern threats with a MD system based out of Grand Forks Air Force Base in North Dakota. -- The Russians believe that 10 interceptors is only the beginning of a MD in Europe and that the site could be enhanced by increasing the number of interceptor missiles, increasing interceptor missile velocity, and using separating warheads for BM destruction. -- The Russians also expressed concerns that MD interceptors in Europe could have anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities. -- Based on Russian calculations, U.S. interceptor missiles in Europe could "catch-up" and destroy Russian ICBMs. -- The Russians said debris caused by an interception posed a far greater risk of danger than the U.S. has briefed. A 100 gram fragment would be enough to pierce through a five-floor building from rooftop to ground floor. If the BM had chemical, biological, or radiological agents, the payload could be spread over a great area in the atmosphere. ¶8. (C) Colonel Ilian concluded that the MD site in Europe would be destabilizing and would influence the deterrent potential of Russia, although it "would not be disastrous." Russia would be forced, however, to take adequate measures to prevent its defensive capability reduction. Other states, such as China, might try to find countermeasures to this U.S. system. China's recent ASAT test may have been a response to U.S. MD plans. Ilian said the U.S. layered MD in Europe is intended to counter BMs equipped with penetration means not available in Iran and North Korea. Differing threat perception -------------- ¶9. (C) A/S Rood said the U.S. would carefully review the Russian presentation, but had some initial thoughts. The U.S., he said, had a different perception of threats than Russia and sees the ICBM threat as real from North Korea and believes we face a growing missile threat from Iran. North Korea's launches of the Tapo-Dong missile in 1998 and last year's July 4 launch of the Taepo Dong-2, even if not completely successful, clearly indicated that North Korea was already a threat. ¶10. (C) Regarding Iran, Rood said that relations between the U.S. and Iran are poor and that President Ahmadinejad's public remarks on wiping Israel "off the map" and achieving MOSCOW 00001877 004 OF 012 "a world without America," as well as regular demonstrations where "Death to America" is commonly heard, are all representative of a threatening view. He noted that when Iran paraded its Shahab-3 missile a few years ago, it carried a sign saying "USA can do nothing," clearly indicating that the absence of missile defenses at that time was clearly a factor in Iran's interest in ballistic missiles. The U.S., Rood said, perceived the BM threat from both North Korea and Iran as serious. ¶11. (C) OSD Deputy A/S Brian Green agreed with some Russian aspects of the brief but disputed others. He agreed that currently Iran only has a 2500 kilometer BM capability but pointed out that Iran is working to increase its BM range. The main element the Iranians have not mastered in their missile development is controlled staging. Once the Iranians successfully launch into space, he said, they will have mastered controlled staging. Iran was also working on its nuclear program in defiance of the international community, which makes it a threat not only to the U.S., but also to Russia. ¶12. (C) Missile Defense Agency (MDA) Deputy Director Brigadier General O'Reilly added that the detailed Russian presentation showed the need to consult in detail about the U.S. MD site. He characterized some of the Russian assumptions in the brief as inaccurate. He emphasized that the U.S. had a standing invitation for transparency at MD sites, the production facility, testing facilities, etc. He disputed that American interceptor missiles could catch Russian ICBMs, noting that several factors must be taken into account, such as: the time required to determine trajectory, establish a radar track, calculate a firing solution, etc. A closer examination of U.S. times for interception would change Russian conclusions. Specifically, the interceptors will only be capable of intercepting BMs that are in the ballistic phase of their trajectory; there will be no capability to intercept BMs that are still in the boost phase. He added that the proposed radar in the Czech Republic is a precision track and discrimination radar, not a wide area search radar. ¶13. (C) Rood said that although the "Rumsfeld Commission" findings mentioned in the Russian presentation were not official USG figures, the Commission members argued the conclusions had proven to be accurate as demonstrated by the 1998 Tapo-Dong-1 missile launch which the U.S. intelligence community judged had demonstrated North Korea's ability to deliver a small payload to ICBM range. The five-year estimate by that commission was simply a "worst-case" scenario. The U.S. "National Intelligence Estimate" used by the Russian presentation was also proven accurate by last year's launch of the Tapo-Dong-2, which has ICBM range. Although the launch was not a success, it showed North Korea has a program that could continue to make progress. Launching on July 4, U.S. Independence Day, was no coincidence. ¶14. (C) DFM Kislyak agreed that Russian and American threat assessments were different. He said North Korea was not in ICBM production, let alone Iran. To reach the U.S., he said, any missile from either of those two countries would need to travel at least 8000 kilometers. Iran's capabilities in liquid and/or solid fuel are limited, and Russia would know if Iran was preparing to expand research. He agreed that the Iranian President Ahmadinejad's remarks were unacceptable but asked, rhetorically, if such statements reflected the country's capabilities. Iran is certainly pursuing uranium enrichment, he said, but it is not clear that Iran is working to develop a nuclear weapons program. Russia's "Soft Underbelly" -------------- ¶15. (C) Kislyak emphasized that the planned MD site in Europe along with planned U.S. military training sites were along Russia's "soft underbelly" and, therefore, caused concern and threatened their security. Bases in the Czech Republic and Poland would seem to have capabilities not only against Iran, but against Russia. If the idea is to provide protection to Europe, then any MD site should be located in different parts of Europe that would not threaten Russia. He reiterated that the radar site in the Czech Republic could "see" Russian missiles as well as "hypothetical" Iranian missiles. There was a strategic component to U.S. MD systems in Europe, and this MD system did not exist "in a vacuum." Increased MD capability certainly affected Russia's MOSCOW 00001877 005 OF 012 interests, Kislyak said. From Russia's point of view, the only real targets for the MD system were those Russian ICBMs based in Kozelsk and Tatishevo. ¶16. (C) Kislyak said the MD plan was not an immediate disaster for Russia, but it would compel a Russian response. Russia took "no comfort" from new U.S. systems in Europe. Recalling U.S. concerns during the Cold War about Russian radars at Krasnoyarsk, he said Russia saw a similar threat from U.S. MD radar in the Czech Republic. Kislyak asked what would happen after 2012 or 2013 once the MD system was in place. Would more MD systems be deployed? He argued that MD is an evolving concept and its components are still in development. How would future MD systems affect Russia? He said Russia views this MD system as only a first step of the "evolution" of the U.S. Global MD system. ¶17. (C) Rood underscored that the threat was real from North Korea and Iran. He said North Korea was not 8,000 km from the U.S.; Alaska is closer to North Korea than it is to North Dakota. The U.S. would protect all of its territory, not just the continental U.S. Rood assessed North Korea's technical achievements as "very capable" and a serious threat. The North Koreans were competent technically and copied technology in the nuclear and missile field. Similarly, Iran should not be underestimated in either the political or technical field. The Iranians have taken a sophisticated approach and we are convinced that Iran is pursing a nuclear weapons program and ICBM development. ¶18. (C) Rood stated that 10 missile interceptors pose no threat to Russia's more than 800 ICBMs and SLBMs. He reemphasized that there was no design or direction against Russia's strategic forces. He also disputed the assertion that the MD system in Europe would have an ASAT component. He added that the Chinese had been working on ASAT capabilities for years before the U.S. had pursued fielding of MD in Europe. ¶19. (C) Green added that the U.S. does not see Russia, in the old framework of the Cold War, as an adversary. He said the U.S. wants renewed MD cooperation. He reiterated that the proposed missile defense system in Poland intercepts warheads in mid-course only. It has no capability against BMs in the boost or terminal phase. Green acknowledged that there would be some radar coverage into Russia, but very little and not powerful. Green noted that the U.S. could not "upgrade" any MD system in Europe easily, adding that the U.S. had an open budget process and that any changes be visible in the budget years in advance. Green disputed the Russian claims about debris. Any debris from the intercepted BM launched from Iran to the U.S. would continue on the BM's flight path, and would not land close to Europe or Russia, but closer to its intended target. ¶20. (C) BG O'Reilly noted that the U.S. must take into account a large swath of land to protect against BMs. Poland, he said, is in the optimal place for interception. The radar in the Czech Republic was a "discrimination" radar by wavelength. It works only after post-boost deployment. He said U.S. interceptors would not be able to catch Russian missiles. Radars would be turned on only during intercept and would not be used for surveillance. He added that U.S. interceptor production lines take a long time -- 30 months per unit -- and are therefore not well suited to rapid expansion of production. ¶21. (C) In response to Russian concerns that U.S. interceptors in Poland would be silo based, O'Reilly said that the U.S. was developing mobile interceptors in the Kinetic Energy Intercept program, not land-based fixed silos. Future U.S. developments on MD, such as Multiple Kill Vehicles (MKVs),would not be effective capable of intercepting multiple Russian missiles as these smaller kill vehicles would be used against a small area around one missile to deal with decoys and countermeasures. He reemphasized that flight times and placement locations, such as Poland and Czech Republic, would not be well placed to engage Russian ICBMs. ¶22. (C) Kislyak agreed that the two sides need to meet at the experts' level to discuss these issues in further detail. He shifted to political aspects. He said Russia had talked to the Europeans and they told him they had made no requests for MD coverage of their territory. Within NATO, he said, there are differing concepts of European MD. The European countries have no common understanding of any BM threat. He added that Russia looks at the total sum and consequences of MOSCOW 00001877 006 OF 012 deploying a MD system. Russia sees it as a U.S. National MD system that could affect Russian security. ¶23. (C) Kislyak concurred that the Cold War is over and that Russia does not see the U.S. as a rival. Still, he said, mutual deterrence has not disappeared. He questioned recent U.S. statements about the "uncertainties of Russia." Transparency is good, he noted, but it does not solve all problems. Missile defense, Kislyak underlined, increased the U.S. potential to decrease the deterrence potential of Russia. Mutual suspicions remain. Russian concerns remain and would not be withdrawn today. ¶24. (C) Rood readily agreed that the discussion should continue at the experts level and reiterated that the MD system is not anti-Russian and that the United States does not aim to counter Russia with such systems. He added that both Poland and the Czech Republic have expressed their support for this system and desire to host facilities. Bilateral MD Cooperation -------------- ¶25. (C) Rood characterized MD cooperation with Russia as a potential not fully realized. The U.S. wants to be open to all possibilities, he said, and is prepared to discuss the full spectrum of MD cooperation with Russia. Russian and American MD capabilities could be improved by cooperation. Rood passed a nonpaper to the Russian delegation on Missile Defense cooperation with Russia. ¶26. (C) Green said the U.S. and Russia had explored MD cooperation in the past but that projects such as the Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC) remain incomplete. He said the recent phone call between Presidents Bush and Putin provided a "high-level" push to renew cooperation. He emphasized the United States seeks a true partnership with Russia. He said another key projects that has not been completed, but is close, is the Defense Technical Cooperation Agreement (DTCA). ¶27. (C) BG O'Reilly pointed to two broad areas of further cooperation: Enhancement of current systems and development of smaller and more effective MD technology in the future. This could lead to separate, stand-alone systems by each country or integrated system. He added that both sides could jointly pursue: -- research and development for survivability and miniaturization of future interceptors and MKVs. -- hardened ground-based systems and better software, optical electronics. -- research on high-energy and solid-state laser systems. -- co-location of radar systems and/or shared radar data. -- better modeling and simulation, command and control, rule sets, etc. ¶28. (C) MOD Buzhinskiy noted that U.S. proposals went far beyond what had been discussed in Geneva. He said that Russia had no ongoing MD development or production programs and thus there could be no mutuality to such cooperation. He said they would give the U.S. answers once they had studied our proposal carefully. DFM Kislyak said the U.S. proposal differed from the past and went far beyond previous U.S. proposals. He described the U.S. nonpaper as a "very serious document" requiring study. He also noted that future cooperation would need to have a legal basis, and questioned whether U.S. or Russian law was current on the topic. Kislyak asked whether peacekeeping operations were the only joint MD operations envisioned in the U.S. nonpaper, saying if so this was limited cooperation previously discussed with NATO. ¶29. (C) Rood replied that peace-keeping operations are only one example of many potential scenarios for joint cooperation. He said NATO-Russia work in this area could be a starting point. He said the DTCA could be the legal foundation for MD and other areas of defense cooperation. Kislyak said that Russia would consider this proposal carefully and seriously, noting that cooperation was good as long as it was consistent with Russian national interests. He said Russia now better understands U.S. views and that he hopes the United States now better understands Russian concerns. -------------- GNEP -------------- MOSCOW 00001877 007 OF 012 ¶30. (C) After a brief luncheon recess, Kislyak turned the discussion to GNEP, noting that he and Rood had discussed the issue during the break, one-on-one. He said Russia has based its work on the Presidential instructions to DOE and Rosatom to combine their projects. Until now work was unfolding accordingly. A plan of work had been developed, a normal operational plan of work. Specialists were working on technical aspects. In parallel we were working on steps to strengthen nonproliferation by creating alternatives to make nuclear energy more attractive while reducing the risk of proliferation. Kislyak said that the NPT regime is now stressed. He cited North Korea, the Non-Aligned Movement, and tensions between the developed and underdeveloped world as posing specific threats. "We're in the same boat on this question," he noted. Kislyak warned, however, that there is danger of losing the nonproliferation regime. Therefore, joint work is particularly important. "In our view, there could be a strong political statement by the two Presidents regarding U.S.-Russia cooperation." ¶31. (C) Expressing his pique about the proposed GNEP Ministerial, Kislyak argued that it would be acceptable if the conference covered only technical issues, but not if it is "aimed at a large-scale political statement." According to Kislyak, the public communique of the conference would preempt the joint initiative of the two Presidents and undermine the ability to provide an attractive offer to states considering nuclear energy. Based on the GNEP Ministerial proposal, we believe that our U.S. partners are not eager to participate jointly in an attractive offer. Only assured fuel supply would remain as a possible area for cooperation, he said. Ruminating on GNEP's future, Kislyak maintained that "GNEP remains attractive to us." But if the conference goes forward without us and makes a public statement, GNEP will start its own life, not coordinated. "What's the point of a joint initiative if GNEP starts its own life?" We can either pursue the initiative of the two Presidents with a joint coordinated strategy, or put GNEP first and invite Russia to what the United States is already doing. ¶32. (C) Rosatom's Vladimir Kuchinov seconded Kislyak's comments, saying they were all correct. The two initiatives appear at the same time, with the same content: global development of nuclear energy; and strengthening the nonproliferation regime. Kuchinov said that at the St. Petersburg summit the two Presidents had decided to develop long-term cooperation in nuclear power, create safe and sustainable nuclear energy, strengthen non-proliferation, and address spent fuel handling. A plan of action has been developed, and subgroups have been created that are tasked with particular actions. Now with the proposal for a ministerial conference and adoption of a communique, there is a question whether what was done is still operational. Kuchinov said we should either continue as agreed by Presidents - with political cooperation and technical cooperation, or proceed on some other basis. Kislyak underscored that Russia is not opposed to GNEP. But the proposed Ministerial statement would consume three fourths of what has been drafted for our Presidents. In that case, then GNEP will live its own life, independent. The Russian fuel center would not die, but bilateral cooperation would suffer. ¶33. (C) In response, Rood emphasized that the Presidents' joint initiative to strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime and promote nuclear energy use is very important, citing the personal interest of President Bush. Rood agreed that the NPT is under tremendous stress and that current structures are insufficient to allay that stress. Rood observed that the Presidential initiative offers a new approach, one of a "big umbrella." Under that umbrella, he said, are multiple items, including the Russian International Fuel Enrichment Center at Angarsk, the six-country assured fuel supply initiative at the IAEA, GNEP, and others. Rood stated that there could even be subsidiary projects under GNEP and underscored the need to fulfill the Presidents' vision. GNEP would not replace the joint initiative or be an alternative. Rood said that there could be a number of cooperative projects under GNEP with Russia, which DOE views as very attractive. ¶34. (C) Timbie stated that the Presidential initiative grew out of recognition that the United States and Russia are pursuing the same goals. Indeed, U.S.-Russia cooperation adds some coherence to the various activities. Russia and the United States are working together, and looking to involve other suppliers, in developing the most attractive MOSCOW 00001877 008 OF 012 possible offer to countries like Egypt and Indonesia, drawing on all sources. This will help to provide an alternative path and to prevent the spread of sensitive technologies. "We thought we were on track," Timbie said. He reiterated that the GNEP Ministerial is not intended to compete with the Presidential initiative. "They're intended to enhance one another," Timbie said. ¶35. (C) Kislyak responded that Russia could also organize a Ministerial on the international fuel center. Instead, work was proceeding with Kazakhstan and others with no political events. The two Presidents have agreed to proceed together, and we should foster their initiative. A U.S. meeting could have addressed practical and technical questions, but a high-level statement is different. He argued that the Ministerial will mean "our joint efforts have no real basis," adding that his attitude was one of "disappointment." Kislyak proposed that the conference be postponed until after the June meeting of the two presidents. If the USG proceeds as planned, he said, "we will draw our own conclusions." Rood suggested that there had been an "inadvertent misunderstanding" and said he would consult with DOE. -------------- GLOBAL INITIATIVE TO COMBAT NUCLEAR TERRORISM -------------- ¶36. (C) Kislyak said the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism is an attractive initiative with political support, but that there are "some practical problems." Although Russia hopes for a "big splash" at the next GICNT meeting in Kazakhstan, the list of 24 members is notable for quantity but not quality. Kislyak said that the current size was good, but emphasized that quality was more important. He was pleased with addition of Israel, Ukraine, and Romania in the Global Initiative. Kislyak said he had been disappointed by the reaction of G8 countries in Europe and some European countries, which seemed to use the pretext of the European Commission's absence as a reason not to join. He expected the Europeans would have been more active in their regional outreach (Note: Since this meeting, France has approached the U.S. and Russia to coordinate its plans to approach 11 prospective partner nations in the Middle East and Asia). Kislyak maintained that we sought commitments and capabilities that states could provide not in the EC. Greece and Romania are now the only new EU states in GICNT. He suggested the Europeans may be trying to "sabotage" the initiative. Asian states also need to be recruited, Kislyak said, mentioning the upcoming Australian Global Initiative Regional Outreach conference, which will help raise visibility in that region, especially with Japan. Russia will send Ambassador-at-Large Grigori Berdinnikov to help raise awareness of the Global Initiative among ASEAN states. According to Kislyak, Latin American countries also need to join, but they are "drowning in lengthy considerations and national analyses." ¶37. (C) Noting that "more awareness work is needed," Kislyak proposed collective demarches and observed that the United Kingdom and France are particularly influential. On the Turkey/Cyprus issue, Kislyak stated that Cyprus should be welcomed into the Partnership, and noted that Cyprus is an EU member state. "Turkey won't slam the door in our face," he predicted, but added that it would be "good to approach Turkey calmly." Kislyak commented that our Plan of Work will be strengthened "when serious countries come" to planned Global Initiative activities. He also remarked that the U.S. should be able to urge Poland and the Czech Republic to join the Global Initiative in light of our work together on missile defense. ¶38. (C) During the last Non-Proliferation Director's Group meeting, Anatoliy Antonov recounted that the European states "were stringent in their views and also asked tough questions about the role of the EU in the Global Initiative." Antonov said the U.S. and Russia were not prepared to address these concerns and recommended that the U.S. and Russia in upcoming G8 NPDG and other relevant meetings urge their European and Japanese counterparts "to do more" in their regional outreach. Kislyak and Rood concurred with Antonov's recommendation. Antonov also noted Russia's satisfaction with the Global Initiative-related paragraph in the non-proliferation statement reviewed at the last NDPG meeting. ¶39. (C) Rood promised that the USG would continue to press for new partners. He noted that several European countries have expressed interest, including Spain, Portugal, and Denmark. According to Rood, the focus should be on MOSCOW 00001877 009 OF 012 recruiting those nations with global influence, nuclear capabilities, or where terrorism concerns are more prominent. The United States is reasonably optimistic that we will have 40-50 countries participating in the Astana meeting. He said the United States and Russia should jointly press Europeans. He suggested that the United States and Russia make a joint presentation at the Australia Global Initiative Regional Outreach conference, adding that the United States hopes to recruit Indonesia and Singapore. Berdinnikov welcomed the opportunity to make a joint presentation with the United States. ¶40. (C) Rood said that Russia and the United States should ask the Europeans to help manage the Turkey/Cyprus issue. We should try to avoid making it a big issue, Rood said, noting that both are members of other groups. Rood said he had spoken with India and Pakistan, and the latter seems "more promising." India had claimed the issue seems to be of low importance to Russia because Putin and Kislyak had not raised it during their January visit to New Delhi. Rood said he told the Indians that the reason this was not likely raised by Russia was that we were still finalizing our outreach strategy during Putin's visit to India. Kislyak was very appreciative of Rood's support. Rood urged Kislyak to confirm Russia's support to India. He proposed joint demarches/approaches. ¶41. (C) Kislyak replied that he supports the concept of joint approaches but that we need to clarify the logistics. He said Russian Ambassadors report that their American counterparts beat them to the punch on demarching host governments about issues of joint concern. Kislyak said he was "not optimistic" on India joining the GICNT and expressed concern about Pakistan's interpretation of the Terms of Reference and applicability of the Global Initiative to Pakistan's military facilities. ¶42. (C) Rood responded that the United States does not intend to recognize Pakistan as a nuclear state, but that Pakistan has domestic concerns to consider, including the perception of admitting weakness. Rood said the Pakistanis might repeat previous statements about their military nuclear program in the context of endorsing the initiative. Kislyak said "Pakistan is the strongest problem for all of us. Pakistan will be a huge problem, if there is a successful Taliban-led attempt (to assassinate) Musharraf." ¶43. (C) Rood noted the need to develop a strong agenda for the Astana meeting. He proposed a joint Chinese-Greek presentation on security for Olympic Games. Rood also mentioned the upcoming Miami conference and said Russia's chief Prosecutor, Interior Minister, and FSB Chief had been invited to participate. Kislyak was skeptical that the Chinese would be open about their plans for the Olympic Games. Rood noted the importance of planning scenarios and suggested that principals participate in a scenario-driven tabletop exercise in Astana. Rood handed Kislyak copies of U.S. and Russian Improvised Nuclear Device and Radioactive Dispersal Device scenarios presented in a recent Joint Nuclear Terrorism Workshop. Kislyak said he would review the presentations. He also said he would review the U.S. draft agenda for the meeting in Astana. ¶44. (C) Rood said the United States and Russia should promote awareness of the Global Initiative in the lead up to the G8 Summit and plan a joint communiqu between Presidents Bush and Putin for the one-year anniversary of the Global Initiative. Kislyak agreed, adding that Russia and the United States need to define "where we go from here." Kislyak was open to a range of options, including adding a Global Initiative statement in energy or non-proliferation documents or a standalone statement to be issued during the Presidential Summit. Kislyak and Rood also agreed to approach Kazakhstan soon to finalize our planning for the June meeting in Astana. -------------- Post-START -------------- ¶45. (C) Antonov said he came away from last month's talks in Berlin with A/S Paula DeSutter with a positive impression. He said the two sides had settled many technical issues and had established considerable common ground for eventual conclusion of a post-START arrangement. Russia and the US had agreed to exchange papers outlining their respective understanding of the issues. Antonov said Russia had completed its paper but was still waiting for the US' input. MOSCOW 00001877 010 OF 012 Kislyak said he hoped to hand over the Russia paper to Ambassador Burns within the next day or two, which summarized elements of a possible final agreement. He proposed another technical-level meeting in mid-June or July, as well as 2-3 additional meetings before the end of the year. The goal was to prepare a framework document by that time, which could ultimately serve as the basis for a final, post-START agreement. ¶46. (C) Kislyak noted that differences remained, primarily centered around threshold levels and the extent of the post-START regime's legal basis. Such points would be left for future discussion, but it was important to move forward now on the issues of common agreement and draft a framework document to facilitate these final talks. Among the issues still to be worked out was the form of the final agreement. Kislyak stressed that reaching final agreement would be an important achievement not only for our bilateral relations, but also in establishing a cooperative example for the rest of the world in keeping with the NPT's Article VI requirements. ¶47. (C) Kislyak suggested that the two countries include a statement in the June joint statement for the Bush-Putin summit on progress made toward a post-START arrangement. He emphasized that the two countries would have to reach agreement on the basic elements soon. Rood agreed with Kislyak's recommendation concerning the joint statement. He added that the US had also been pleased with the discussions in Berlin and was generally optimistic that we would be able to reach final agreement on a post-START arrangement. -------------- IRAN -------------- ¶48. (C) On Iran, A/S Rood asked about Russia's views on the current centrifuge work at Natanz, as well as Russia's views concerning Tehran's tender solicitation for two light water reactors (LWR). He noted that Iran seemed to be using the tenders to create international support for its nuclear program should countries like Russia participate. Rood also asked whether Russia had any insights concerning Iranian decision-making on next steps. ¶49. (C) DFM Kislyak agreed that the Iranians probably had ulterior motives for offering the tenders at this time, but he was personally skeptical that they would be able to fool anybody. He explained that Rosatom would not be able to participate in the offer because of legal restrictions, but other Russian firms would not be legally barred from participating. However, Kislyak said he was not aware of any discussions currently taking place here and was noncommittal about Russian participation. ¶50. (C) With respect to Iranian decision-making, Kislyak pointed out that Larjani and Ahmadinejad were bitter political rivals who had competed against each other in the previous elections. With this in mind, Kislyak cautioned against taking at face value any proposals offered by one or the other without confirming first that it represented Iran's common position. Since there were considerable internal political differences in Tehran, it was not unreasonable to assume that either Larjani or Ahmadinejad would seek to undermine the other to achieve personal advantage. Ahmadinejad was in a particularly weak position because his economic promises to Iranians had largely gone unfulfilled and might be compelled to hype the nuclear differences between Tehran and the rest of the world. ¶51. (C) With regard to the latest proposals that Laranjani had conveyed via the Swiss State Secretary, Kislyak said we had to determine how serious they were ("check, then double check") since they might be open to interpretation. He generally supported allowing Solana to meet with Larjani if the latter were able to confirm that he would be negotiating with a "full mandate" from Tehran. Likewise, Kislyak stressed that Solana would also have to approach the meeting with a proper mandate from the "Six." At best, Kislyak thought that Solana would only be able to explore possible opportunities for further negotiations with Iran on freezing centrifuge work in exchange for no additional UN action against Tehran. Nonetheless, this opening was a positive development that could lead to a resolution of the impasse with Iran. ¶52. (C) In response to Rood's queries regarding Russian fuel shipments to Bushehr, Kislyak reviewed the GOR's decision to MOSCOW 00001877 011 OF 012 stop the transfers because of non-payment by the Iranians. He stressed that Russia's agreement with Iran had been based on money in exchange for work and that Moscow had no intention of extending credit to Tehran. Some Russian workers withdrew from the Bushehr project because there was nothing for them to do in the absence of payment. Tehran continued to demand the fuel deliveries, but Kislyak stated flatly that it "won't happen" under current circumstances ¶53. (C) Kislyak replied to Rood's query about the recent travel to Moscow by a senior Islamic Revolutionary Guard official by emphasizing that the visit had not violated UNSCR ¶1747. Moscow had notified all relevant parties of the visit and had informed the visitor in advance that discussions here would be restricted and would not include the nuclear area. The official had been given a low key visit to work on border security issues and had not been given official banquet. Nonetheless, Kislyak acknowledged that Russian officials had been irritated by General Zolqadr's subsequent public remarks, which had obviously sought to undermine the UNSCR's travel ban. -------------- BURMA -------------- ¶54. (C) Rood expressed concerns about potential Russian nuclear cooperation with Burma and to urge Moscow to refrain from such cooperation. Kislyak said he was unaware of any nuclear cooperation between Russia and Burma, but would check again based on Rood's remarks. -------------- AUSTRALIA GROUP -------------- ¶55. (SBU) Antonov briefly told Rood about his efforts to meet with Ambassador Mahler to discuss Russia,s admission into the Australia Group. He said the two hoped to get together soon in Vienna. -------------- OUTER SPACE -------------- ¶56. (C) Kislyak noted that A/S De Sutter and Antonov had begun a dialogue on outer space issues at their meeting in Paris on January 25. The GOR presented its military doctrine on the use of outer space, and the two sides exchanged documents on their respective space policies. Kislyak expressed a strong interest in continuing the dialogue. He remarked humorously that the GOR assumed the USG had lost the earlier Russian proposals for cooperation in confidence building measures. He called for industrial cooperation as a general confidence building measure and asked for a follow-up meeting at the level of A/S De Sutter. ¶57. (C) Rood agreed to pursue further dialogue on space issues. At the January meeting, A/S De Sutter offered a proposed joint Presidential Statement on the free access to and use of outer space for peaceful purposes. Rood urged a response to the proposed Presidential Statement. ¶58. (C) Kislyak segued from space cooperation to concern over Google satellite maps available on the Internet. He clothed his comments as repeating reactions from various other governments which objected to the precise identification of their industrial and military assets. He noted that Google Map covered all areas of the world except the United States. In his view the exact coordinates created a handbook for terrorists to plan strikes. He claimed three dimensional representation raised a serious question that should be addressed by the United Nations. The GOR was planning an international meeting to discuss all aspects of outer space, security and terrorism. ¶59. (C) Rood acknowledged that Internet map availability was a new topic. He urged examination of the topic in future discussions. Kislyak responded that there were legal and practical concerns for both military and civil areas. ¶60. (C) DVBR Director Antonov raised the issue of Presidential instructions on the draft agreement regarding space technology exchanges. He recalled that the 2005 Russian draft had not been not acceptable to the USG, which proposed its own draft in 2006. The GOR objected that the latter agreement narrowed the scope of the subject matter by limiting its provisions to commercial exchanges. In March MOSCOW 00001877 012 OF 012 the GOR called for an experts' meeting to facilitate development of the basis for a comprehensive agreement. Rood offered to consider the proposal for an experts' meeting and urged the GOR to respond with written comments on the 2006 draft. -------------- CONVENTIONAL WARHEADS ON SLBMS -------------- ¶61. (C) Kislyak stressed that Russian concerns about the dangers of a false alert and possible miscalculation remained. The GOR had not come up with a mechanism that could adequately discriminate between a nuclear-tipped SLBM and one with a conventional warhead. The U.S. had not offered any information that allayed these concerns. Rood agreed that we needed to continue to discuss this issue, but stressed that the risk of a misinterpretation of a hostile launch was low. DASD Green explained that the number of SLBMs with conventional warheads would be limited and pointed out that CBMs could be put in place that would reduce the chances for error. The U.S. was waiting on a Russian response to our non-paper on the subject. Buzhinskiy highlighted the possibility for error given the limited time the Russians would have to respond once a launch was detected and certain "automatic" features of the Russian launch warning system. BURNS