UKRAINE: GOR WAITING FOR COMPROMISE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 001809 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/19/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV UP RS SUBJECT: UKRAINE: GOR WAITING FOR COMPROMISE REF: A. MOSCOW 1478 ¶B. MOSCOW 1552 Classified By: Pol/Min Alice G. Wells. Reasons: 1,4(B/D). -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Since the early-April start of the Ukrainian government crisis, the GOR has consistently maintained that it is an internal Ukrainian affair and not amenable to Russia's overt involvement. The Ukrainian FM Yatsenyuk's April 16 visit was portrayed as "business as usual," during which the two countries agreed on a roadmap for bilateral relations over the next two years. Except for sharp criticism leveled against Yulia Tymoshenko's recent articles about containing Russia, the GOR continued its wait-and-see policy. Both official and expert circles hope for compromise or a return to the status quo as the most positive outcome to the current impasse. End summary. -------------- Waiting for Compromise -------------- ¶2. (C) Victor Sorokin, Director of the MFA Second CIS Department (Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova),told us that Russia was not pleased with the continuing political crisis in Ukraine but confirmed that the bilateral relationship had not so far been affected. He added that neither Yushchenko nor Yanukovich had requested Russia's assistance. Sorokin emphasized what we have heard repeatedly: that the current crisis stems from the 2004 divide, which had not been properly mended. He thought that any attempt to patch up the problem hurriedly -- such as "illegitimate" early elections -- would only lead to problems re-surfacing later. The recent visit by a group of Russian Duma members to Kyiv "was a private visit" by the group. Sorokin welcomed the start of the Constitutional Court's hearings and the willingness of both parties to honor the Court's decision. -------------- Meeting and Greeting the New FM -------------- ¶3. (C) Sorokin said that FM Yatsenyuk did not seem to be tied to any particular faction in Ukraine. Sorokin saw Yatsenyuk as a pragmatist, who had the ability to listen. In "business as usual" discussions, Lavrov and Yatsenyuk reviewed the full range of bilateral issues and agreed to meet again in June in Moscow. Myroslava Shcherbatyuk, Political Counselor at the Ukrainian Embassy, told us that the significance of the otherwise routine visit was that initial contact between Yatsenyuk and his counterpart had been established. According to her, the visit was a positive and "necessary step" forward. Both Sorokin and Shcherbatyuk said that a roadmap for the next two years is ready for the two presidents to sign, and Sorokin hinted at the possibility of a June summit. -------------- "Whomever" Wrote Tymosheko's Articles . . . -------------- ¶4. (C) Sorokin said he did not believe for a second that Tymoshenko had authored the Foreign Affairs and International Herald Tribune articles regarding Ukraine and Russia. On April 17, the MFA website carried a long rebuttal to Tymoshenko's Foreign Affairs article, accusing the author of attempting to re-draw dividing lines in Europe and resurrecting the Cold War. Sorokin claimed that the MFA's charges were directed at the "force" behind these articles, "which is trying to marginalize Russia and re-create the unipolar world." He argued that as an experienced politician, Tymoshenko should understand the need for balance. The Yushchenko-Yanukovich equilibrium was better when Tymoshenko was not added to the equation. -------------- Experts: Moscow Will Lay Low -------------- ¶5. (C) Moscow's Ukraine experts have argued that Russia was right to be concerned about political turmoil in a neighboring state, but have advocated it take a far less emotional approach than it did in 2004. Dmitriy Furman, a scholar at the Academy of Science's Center for Europe, repeated claims that the GOR was calmer this time around because of lessons learned in 2004 about the costs of overt involvement and by its disappointment with Yanukovich. According to Furman, the 2004 event was painful because MOSCOW 00001809 002 OF 002 Russia understood it could no longer control Ukraine. Yanukovich's readiness for Euro-Atlantic integration (if not NATO membership) deeply disenchanted many Russian officials. He believed that the Orange Revolution was a great historical event, which Russia had good reason to fear because of its potential to become an example for other ex-Soviet countries. ¶6. (C) Furman maintained that Ukraine's political trajectory was likely to be quite different from Russia's. If Russia had a strong center with weaker regions, Ukraine historically tends to foster strong regions with a weaker center. The two countries are like siblings raised in different homes; they seemingly have much in common but in reality their political cultures were very different. Furman thought Ukraine's Cossack roots meant it would prefer a "free-spirited" democracy, which "naturally breeds chaos." To Furman, Ukraine will be always be more democratic than Russia but it may also have more confusion and disorder. Unlike the Russians, he posited, Ukrainians will find ways to co-exist without annihilating opposing forces. ¶7. (C) Even at the semi-governmental CIS Institute, whose Director, Konstantin Zatulin, is a United Russia Duma member, experts agreed that Russia should stand aside. Kiril Frolov, a Ukraine expert at the Institute, claimed that both Yushchenko and Tymoshenko were nationalists, not democrats, and that the Orange Revolution was nothing but an attempt to break Ukraine away from Russia. "Moral solidarity" with Yanukovich, however, was Russia's only option, Frolov thought, given the failures in 2004. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶8. (C) Wait-and-see adequately characterizes Russia's approach to this latest crisis. The business-like meetings between Lavrov and Yatsenyuk underline that while Moscow is concerned about political turmoil in its southern neighbor, there are not many openings for its active involvement. In the meantime, Russia wants to make sure that the elaborate consultative machinery that governs bilateral ties continues to grind on. Any major decisions, of course, will need to be postponed until the dust settles in Kyiv. BURNS