RUSSIA-GEORGIA, TRANSNISTRIA: TOUGH TALK FROM DFM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 001316

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2017
TAGS: PREL PBTS MARR MOPS OSCE MD BO UP KZ GG RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA-GEORGIA, TRANSNISTRIA: TOUGH TALK FROM DFM
KARASIN


Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reason: 1.4 (b, d)

Summary
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1. (C) DFM Grigoriy Karasin showed little flexibility when
Ambassador pressed him on relations with Georgia March 26.
Karasin warned that a Georgian application to the European
Court of Human Rights over last autumn's deportations would
lead to a sharp Russian reaction. He said no process of
normalization is under way between Russia and Georgia, and
offered no carrot for Georgian restraint on the ECHR --
though he remarked that if Georgia sent a delegation to
Moscow to discuss deportations it could also discuss other
issues. Karasin said Russia would act "positively" on the
Abkhaz and Ossetians, but avoided declaring that Russia is
urging the Abkhaz against use of force.


2. (C) Karasin raised the case of OSCE Moldova Head of
Mission O'Neill, urging that the U.S. give thought to
recalling him. Ambassador said that would not happen.
Karasin gave a readout on Kazakh President Nazarbayev's visit
to Moscow. Ambassador urged expansion of the CPC pipeline.
On Ukraine, Karasin said the timing of a Yushchenko visit had
never been formally agreed; the visit will take place in
April. Karasin had just returned from Minsk, and urged
increased U.S. contact with Belarus. End Summary.

Georgia
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3. (C) Ambassador led off his March 26 meeting with DFM
Karasin by emphasizing mounting U.S. concerns about
Russian-Georgian tensions over Abkhazia, and recent unhelpful
Russian actions and rhetoric. He added that Georgia is
increasingly worried that Abkhaz authorities might be
planning an attack. That comes after the very unwelcome
incident in Kodori; we are reserving comment until the Joint
Fact-Finding Group reports, but the incident was extremely
disquieting. The U.S. has urged Georgia not to use force.
The U.S. is urging the Georgians to exhaust all possibilities
with Russia before going to the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR). In order for the U.S. to be helpful, however,
we need to understand where Russia is going: assurances that
Russia is urging the Abkhaz side not to use force, and some
hopes of results on normalizing relations and rolling back
the measures Russia took last fall. The return of Russia's
ambassador to Tbilisi was a positive step, but Georgia is
concerned that other steps are not forthcoming.


4. (C) Karasin responded that "each day brings new signals"
that those who want normal relations with Russia are a
minority in Georgia's government. Russia sent its Ambassador
to Tbilisi for Russia's benefit; it is not the first step in
a process. The Georgian suit before the ECHR will lead to
more emotion and more tension. Public opinion in Russia will
react immediately. On the conflicts, Russia will continue to
play an honest role facilitating negotiations and contacts.
But the "puppet governments" Georgia has installed in Kodori
and South Ossetia will have a negative effect on those
contacts. They demonstrated that, for example, the last
UNSCR on Abkhazia had the correct tone. In that regard,
Karasin failed to understand why the U.S. would not issue a
visa to Abkhaz "FM" Shamba. He believed it was because some
thought a Shamba visit to New York might lessen the chances
of resolving the conflict in a particular way.


5. (C) Karasin said that our joint work to persuade Georgia
against using force had shown some results. Georgian
representatives spoke less of war, so "the year did not pass
in vain." Nonetheless, there is a new pistol in the Georgian
hands: the "puppet" governments, which might provoke
military action.


6. (C) The Ambassador repeated his previous point: we stress
the non-use of force with the Georgians; we expect Russia to
make the same point with the Abkhaz. On the alternative
governments, the mere presence of Georgian officials is no
excuse for ratcheting up tensions or use of force.
Ambassador noted that the Shamba visit was supposed to build
confidence; but in the wake of the incident in Kodori, it
would just produce more tension. We are prepared in
principle to allow a visit, but it is a question of timing;
the sooner this is resolved after the next UNSCR, the better.


7. (C) The Ambassador returned as well to the normalization
process. The actions taken by Russia last fall were very
unfortunate, and against that background it is difficult to
get the Georgians to listen when there is so little else to
point to. The Georgians claim they have tried to engage
Russian officials on deportations as well as other issues,

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but got nowhere. The U.S. needs something to work with to
try to influence Georgia to show restraint.


8. (C) Karasin answered that people who want to solve
problems don't take them to the streets and bring passers-by
into the issues. The Georgians and Russians can always work
on issues together; this, however, was a return to
"anti-Russian megaphone propaganda." The Georgian suit would
result in a severe deterioration in bilateral relations,
which is why Karasin had called Under Secretary Burns about
it. It would also kill prospects for Russian ratification of
Protocol 14 of the European Court, as Russia has informed its
European partners. Ambassador again tried to elicit
commitment to a positive step. Karasin responded that the
Georgians had already received answers on the deportations,
in the form of a letter from FM Lavrov. The "stupid" Russian
officials who had committed excesses had lost their jobs.


9. (C) Ambassador asked again whether other issues might be
discussed with regard to Russia's actions of last fall.
Karasin said that Russia is looking at all ways to improve
relations. But the ECHR suit would block any resolution.
Ambassador asked what steps might be possible if we slow the
Georgian train down on ECHR. Karasin said, "We can think
about it." He said that if a Georgian delegation comes to
Moscow to talk about deportations, it can discuss a wider
range of issues as well.


10. (C) Ambassador returned once more to the Georgian fear
that the Abkhaz might attack, and said he assumed Russia is
telling the Abkhaz not to. Karasin said he would be meeting
Abkhaz leader Bagapsh later the same day, and "we will
continue to influence the Abkhaz in a positive way." With
regard to the planned Abkhaz military exercise, the Abkhaz
had a right to feel insecure. That is why Russia urged
Georgia and the Abkhaz to sign an agreement on the non-use of
force. The positive outcome of the recent Joint Coordinating
Commission on South Ossetia, just held in Istanbul, shows
that the mechanisms can work to reduce tensions, if we let
them.


11. (C) The Ambassador tried once more -- and again just
before leaving Karasin -- to get a commitment that Russia was
dissuading Abkhazia from using force. Karasin said that
would be a topic of discussion with Bagapsh, and Russia would
continue to try to influence the Abkhaz positively.
Russians, he said, are not the "tricky intrigue-lovers"
Georgians such as Parliament Speaker Burjanadze depict; "We
want stability. We want the sides to see each other more
often to resolve problems. It is not good if they believe
there is an uncle who will come in and resolve their problems
for them."

Lou O'Neill
--------------


12. (C) Karasin made a demarche on Amcit OSCE Moldova Head of
Mission O'Neill. First, he said, he wanted the U.S. to know
the MFA did all it could to soften the incident. O'Neill was
not detained. Second, Karasin asked whether O'Neill could
continue his functions as HOM, given the possible criminal
case against him.


13. (C) Ambassador answered that the particular nature of the
violations were a Russian matter. We were not sure that all
previous such violations always resulted in criminal
prosecution. O'Neill continues to enjoy the full support of
the USG to continue in his position. Ambassador hoped that
the Russian government would not take steps to make O'Neill's
job harder. We believe it was unusual and very unhelpful
that the seizure was so widely publicized.


14. (C) Karasin said he accepted the logic of the U.S.
position, but could not imagine how O'Neill could continue.
"He has to come to capitals to discuss the issues."
Ambassador said that is why, without wishing to discuss the
violations themselves, he could assure Karasin that Russian
steps to prevent O'Neill from carrying out his job would
produce a negative reaction in Washington and would create a
source of friction between us. Ambassador asked if there was
anything further he could do with regard to the case; Karasin
urged him to stay in contact with DFM Kislyak.

Kazakhstan
--------------


15. (C) Karasin mentioned that he will be going to Kazakhstan
with PM Fradkov. The main issues on the agenda will be
energy, the Caspian, and some bilateral issues that are close
to solution, such as cooperation on refugee issues and use of
the Baykonur space facility. Most of the meeting Nazarbayev

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held recently with Putin was one-on-one, but both sides were
happy with the results. Ambassador said that the building of
a new Bosphorus bypass -- foreseen by the recent signing of
the Burgos-Alexandropolis pipeline -- gives impetus for
expanding CPC, and he urged the GOR to move in that direction.

Ukraine
--------------


16. (C) Ambassador asked about the cancellation of Ukrainian
President Yushchenko's planned visit to Moscow. Karasin
replied that the dates of the visit had not been agreed with
any precision. It was listed in a blueprint for
Ukrainian-Russian meetings during 2007-2008, nothing more.
The meeting will probably take place some time in April and
focus on economic, energy, cultural and political-military
issues, including the Black Sea Fleet and border demarcation.
The confirmation of a new foreign minister gave "clarity" to
Ukraine's foreign relations. Yatsenyuk is well-known to
Russia from his participation in the High Level Group on a
United Economic Zone; he is a "reasonable guy," neither
Russophile nor Russophobe. Yushchenko had managed to retain
Vladimir Ohryzko, so all sides gained.

Belarus
--------------


17. (C) Karasin said he had just been in Minsk with PM
Fradkov. The atmosphere was good, as if nothing had happened
on gas prices at the end of last year. Karasin asked whether
the U.S. was changing its policy towards Lukashenka;
Ambassador replied it was not. Karasin urged the U.S. to
maintain contacts and avoid calling Lukashenka the "last
tyrant in Europe." The Belarusans are tough, and they just
shrug off sanctions and blockades.

Comment
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18. (C) It is increasingly clear that the MFA has little
control over relations with Georgia. Karasin's hard line on
Georgia appears to be based on his perception that his
superiors want to hear him talk tough with the Americans. He
did hint that a Georgian delegation might make some progress
on both deportation and other issues; but he clearly wanted
the U.S. message to Georgia to be that Russia is readying
sticks, not carrots.


19. (C) It is hard to say how much of this is tactical -- to
get the Georgians to back away from ECHR, for example -- and
how much may be part of a broader push against the Georgians
in Kodori and elsewhere. At this point, we would urge:

-- Strong reinforcement of our concerns in Assistant
Secretary Fried's possible telephone conversation with

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Karasin at the end of this week;

-- Enlisting key Europeans to press the GOR on this issue;
and

-- exploring with the Georgians the possibility of proposing
a visit to Moscow to discuss deportations and other issues.
This may amount to nothing in the end, but at a minimum it
would call the GOR's bluff and strengthen Georgia's hand with
the Europeans if they are rebuffed.

BURNS