RUSSIA-GEORGIA, TRANSNISTRIA: TOUGH TALK FROM DFM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 001316 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2017 TAGS: PREL PBTS MARR MOPS OSCE MD BO UP KZ GG RS SUBJECT: RUSSIA-GEORGIA, TRANSNISTRIA: TOUGH TALK FROM DFM KARASIN Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reason: 1.4 (b, d) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) DFM Grigoriy Karasin showed little flexibility when Ambassador pressed him on relations with Georgia March 26. Karasin warned that a Georgian application to the European Court of Human Rights over last autumn's deportations would lead to a sharp Russian reaction. He said no process of normalization is under way between Russia and Georgia, and offered no carrot for Georgian restraint on the ECHR -- though he remarked that if Georgia sent a delegation to Moscow to discuss deportations it could also discuss other issues. Karasin said Russia would act "positively" on the Abkhaz and Ossetians, but avoided declaring that Russia is urging the Abkhaz against use of force. ¶2. (C) Karasin raised the case of OSCE Moldova Head of Mission O'Neill, urging that the U.S. give thought to recalling him. Ambassador said that would not happen. Karasin gave a readout on Kazakh President Nazarbayev's visit to Moscow. Ambassador urged expansion of the CPC pipeline. On Ukraine, Karasin said the timing of a Yushchenko visit had never been formally agreed; the visit will take place in April. Karasin had just returned from Minsk, and urged increased U.S. contact with Belarus. End Summary. Georgia -------------- ¶3. (C) Ambassador led off his March 26 meeting with DFM Karasin by emphasizing mounting U.S. concerns about Russian-Georgian tensions over Abkhazia, and recent unhelpful Russian actions and rhetoric. He added that Georgia is increasingly worried that Abkhaz authorities might be planning an attack. That comes after the very unwelcome incident in Kodori; we are reserving comment until the Joint Fact-Finding Group reports, but the incident was extremely disquieting. The U.S. has urged Georgia not to use force. The U.S. is urging the Georgians to exhaust all possibilities with Russia before going to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). In order for the U.S. to be helpful, however, we need to understand where Russia is going: assurances that Russia is urging the Abkhaz side not to use force, and some hopes of results on normalizing relations and rolling back the measures Russia took last fall. The return of Russia's ambassador to Tbilisi was a positive step, but Georgia is concerned that other steps are not forthcoming. ¶4. (C) Karasin responded that "each day brings new signals" that those who want normal relations with Russia are a minority in Georgia's government. Russia sent its Ambassador to Tbilisi for Russia's benefit; it is not the first step in a process. The Georgian suit before the ECHR will lead to more emotion and more tension. Public opinion in Russia will react immediately. On the conflicts, Russia will continue to play an honest role facilitating negotiations and contacts. But the "puppet governments" Georgia has installed in Kodori and South Ossetia will have a negative effect on those contacts. They demonstrated that, for example, the last UNSCR on Abkhazia had the correct tone. In that regard, Karasin failed to understand why the U.S. would not issue a visa to Abkhaz "FM" Shamba. He believed it was because some thought a Shamba visit to New York might lessen the chances of resolving the conflict in a particular way. ¶5. (C) Karasin said that our joint work to persuade Georgia against using force had shown some results. Georgian representatives spoke less of war, so "the year did not pass in vain." Nonetheless, there is a new pistol in the Georgian hands: the "puppet" governments, which might provoke military action. ¶6. (C) The Ambassador repeated his previous point: we stress the non-use of force with the Georgians; we expect Russia to make the same point with the Abkhaz. On the alternative governments, the mere presence of Georgian officials is no excuse for ratcheting up tensions or use of force. Ambassador noted that the Shamba visit was supposed to build confidence; but in the wake of the incident in Kodori, it would just produce more tension. We are prepared in principle to allow a visit, but it is a question of timing; the sooner this is resolved after the next UNSCR, the better. ¶7. (C) The Ambassador returned as well to the normalization process. The actions taken by Russia last fall were very unfortunate, and against that background it is difficult to get the Georgians to listen when there is so little else to point to. The Georgians claim they have tried to engage Russian officials on deportations as well as other issues, MOSCOW 00001316 002 OF 003 but got nowhere. The U.S. needs something to work with to try to influence Georgia to show restraint. ¶8. (C) Karasin answered that people who want to solve problems don't take them to the streets and bring passers-by into the issues. The Georgians and Russians can always work on issues together; this, however, was a return to "anti-Russian megaphone propaganda." The Georgian suit would result in a severe deterioration in bilateral relations, which is why Karasin had called Under Secretary Burns about it. It would also kill prospects for Russian ratification of Protocol 14 of the European Court, as Russia has informed its European partners. Ambassador again tried to elicit commitment to a positive step. Karasin responded that the Georgians had already received answers on the deportations, in the form of a letter from FM Lavrov. The "stupid" Russian officials who had committed excesses had lost their jobs. ¶9. (C) Ambassador asked again whether other issues might be discussed with regard to Russia's actions of last fall. Karasin said that Russia is looking at all ways to improve relations. But the ECHR suit would block any resolution. Ambassador asked what steps might be possible if we slow the Georgian train down on ECHR. Karasin said, "We can think about it." He said that if a Georgian delegation comes to Moscow to talk about deportations, it can discuss a wider range of issues as well. ¶10. (C) Ambassador returned once more to the Georgian fear that the Abkhaz might attack, and said he assumed Russia is telling the Abkhaz not to. Karasin said he would be meeting Abkhaz leader Bagapsh later the same day, and "we will continue to influence the Abkhaz in a positive way." With regard to the planned Abkhaz military exercise, the Abkhaz had a right to feel insecure. That is why Russia urged Georgia and the Abkhaz to sign an agreement on the non-use of force. The positive outcome of the recent Joint Coordinating Commission on South Ossetia, just held in Istanbul, shows that the mechanisms can work to reduce tensions, if we let them. ¶11. (C) The Ambassador tried once more -- and again just before leaving Karasin -- to get a commitment that Russia was dissuading Abkhazia from using force. Karasin said that would be a topic of discussion with Bagapsh, and Russia would continue to try to influence the Abkhaz positively. Russians, he said, are not the "tricky intrigue-lovers" Georgians such as Parliament Speaker Burjanadze depict; "We want stability. We want the sides to see each other more often to resolve problems. It is not good if they believe there is an uncle who will come in and resolve their problems for them." Lou O'Neill -------------- ¶12. (C) Karasin made a demarche on Amcit OSCE Moldova Head of Mission O'Neill. First, he said, he wanted the U.S. to know the MFA did all it could to soften the incident. O'Neill was not detained. Second, Karasin asked whether O'Neill could continue his functions as HOM, given the possible criminal case against him. ¶13. (C) Ambassador answered that the particular nature of the violations were a Russian matter. We were not sure that all previous such violations always resulted in criminal prosecution. O'Neill continues to enjoy the full support of the USG to continue in his position. Ambassador hoped that the Russian government would not take steps to make O'Neill's job harder. We believe it was unusual and very unhelpful that the seizure was so widely publicized. ¶14. (C) Karasin said he accepted the logic of the U.S. position, but could not imagine how O'Neill could continue. "He has to come to capitals to discuss the issues." Ambassador said that is why, without wishing to discuss the violations themselves, he could assure Karasin that Russian steps to prevent O'Neill from carrying out his job would produce a negative reaction in Washington and would create a source of friction between us. Ambassador asked if there was anything further he could do with regard to the case; Karasin urged him to stay in contact with DFM Kislyak. Kazakhstan -------------- ¶15. (C) Karasin mentioned that he will be going to Kazakhstan with PM Fradkov. The main issues on the agenda will be energy, the Caspian, and some bilateral issues that are close to solution, such as cooperation on refugee issues and use of the Baykonur space facility. Most of the meeting Nazarbayev MOSCOW 00001316 003 OF 003 held recently with Putin was one-on-one, but both sides were happy with the results. Ambassador said that the building of a new Bosphorus bypass -- foreseen by the recent signing of the Burgos-Alexandropolis pipeline -- gives impetus for expanding CPC, and he urged the GOR to move in that direction. Ukraine -------------- ¶16. (C) Ambassador asked about the cancellation of Ukrainian President Yushchenko's planned visit to Moscow. Karasin replied that the dates of the visit had not been agreed with any precision. It was listed in a blueprint for Ukrainian-Russian meetings during 2007-2008, nothing more. The meeting will probably take place some time in April and focus on economic, energy, cultural and political-military issues, including the Black Sea Fleet and border demarcation. The confirmation of a new foreign minister gave "clarity" to Ukraine's foreign relations. Yatsenyuk is well-known to Russia from his participation in the High Level Group on a United Economic Zone; he is a "reasonable guy," neither Russophile nor Russophobe. Yushchenko had managed to retain Vladimir Ohryzko, so all sides gained. Belarus -------------- ¶17. (C) Karasin said he had just been in Minsk with PM Fradkov. The atmosphere was good, as if nothing had happened on gas prices at the end of last year. Karasin asked whether the U.S. was changing its policy towards Lukashenka; Ambassador replied it was not. Karasin urged the U.S. to maintain contacts and avoid calling Lukashenka the "last tyrant in Europe." The Belarusans are tough, and they just shrug off sanctions and blockades. Comment -------------- ¶18. (C) It is increasingly clear that the MFA has little control over relations with Georgia. Karasin's hard line on Georgia appears to be based on his perception that his superiors want to hear him talk tough with the Americans. He did hint that a Georgian delegation might make some progress on both deportation and other issues; but he clearly wanted the U.S. message to Georgia to be that Russia is readying sticks, not carrots. ¶19. (C) It is hard to say how much of this is tactical -- to get the Georgians to back away from ECHR, for example -- and how much may be part of a broader push against the Georgians in Kodori and elsewhere. At this point, we would urge: -- Strong reinforcement of our concerns in Assistant Secretary Fried's possible telephone conversation with SIPDIS Karasin at the end of this week; -- Enlisting key Europeans to press the GOR on this issue; and -- exploring with the Georgians the possibility of proposing a visit to Moscow to discuss deportations and other issues. This may amount to nothing in the end, but at a minimum it would call the GOR's bluff and strengthen Georgia's hand with the Europeans if they are rebuffed. BURNS