TRANSNISTRIA: RUSSIAN MFA NEGOTIATOR ON INCIDENTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 001257 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2017 TAGS: PREL PBTS MARR MD RS SUBJECT: TRANSNISTRIA: RUSSIAN MFA NEGOTIATOR ON INCIDENTS INVOLVING AMERICANS Classified By: PolMilCouns Alice G. Wells. Reason: 1.4 (b, d) ¶1. (C) On March 23 we raised with Russian MFA Ambassador-at-large Nesterushkin the March 16 refusal of Transnistrian authorities to allow diplomats from Amembassy Chisinau into the separatist region. We handed Nesterushkin a copy of Ambassador Finley's March 21 intervention at the OSCE Permanent Council. ¶2. (C) Nesterushkin said he would repeat what he had told EUR DAS Kramer in Vienna: express U.S. indignation directly to the Transnistrian authorities. We replied that we would certainly make our views known. But Nesterushkin had told us the U.S. should "listen" to the Transnistrians; it was clear from this incident that the Transnistrians are not interested in talking with us. Nesterushkin said the diplomats had not planned to meet with the Tiraspol authorities, but rather were engaged in "diplomatic tourism" to "find out which roads are closed." We replied that Tiraspol cannot dictate how we listen to them; either they want the U.S. to have information on Transnistria or they don't. We said we were approaching Russia because its peacekeepers were charged with guaranteeing freedom of movement. Nesterushkin said there were too few peacekeepers to guarantee that; were we suggesting an increase in their numbers? No, we answered; their presence just means Russia is involved. Nesterushkin repeated that we should take the matter up with Tiraspol. ¶3. (C) We raised concerns that the March 16 Russian Customs confiscation of posters from OSCE Moldova Head of Mission O'Neill, and the subsequent widespread publicity of the affair, were part of a campaign to undermine him. Nesterushkin suggested that this was a paranoid response. U.S. customs had once confiscated 500 grams of caviar from him, and he did not think it was part of a campaign. We assured Nesterushkin that the O'Neill affair was being interpreted in Washington as we described, given the publicity by both the MFA and Russian media; and that it was clear O'Neill's actions as HOM did not suit Russia. We suggested that Russia should let the matter disappear and get back to working with O'Neill on the issue at hand: resolving the Transnistria conflict. Nesterushkin agreed, and said he admired the U.S. defense of its diplomats in international organizations. BURNS