KOSOVO: HARDLINE RUSSIAN DFM TITOV URGES PHASED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 001143

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/15/2017
TAGS: PREL RS
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: HARDLINE RUSSIAN DFM TITOV URGES PHASED
APPROACH

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns: 1.4 (b, d).


1. (C) Summary: In a March 15 meeting, Deputy Foreign
Minister Titov reiterated to the Ambassador that the Russian
bottomline remained unchanged: the Ahtisaari plan was
unacceptable absent Serbian endorsement, and Serbs remained
united in their opposition to the proposal. Titov expressed
anger that GOR acquiescence to the forwarding of Ahtisaari's
report to the Secretary General was being spun as acceptance
of a UN Security Council review of the proposal, which would
produce only negative consequences. Titov took issue with
Holbrooke's critique of Russia, blamed the international
community for falsely raising Kosovar expectations for
independence, underscored Albanian aggression and the
existence of militant training camps, and questioned
Belgrade's interest in an EU successor to UNMIK. Titov
reiterated that Russia was not interested in a "swap" on
Kosovo. Russia believes a "phased approach" is gaining
ground at the UNSC, and supports the resumption of
negotiations post-Ahtisaari. The GOR will use the SC's March
19 discussion of UNMIK to criticize Security Council
deliberations over status, but has no clear vision on how to
approach the next Contact Group meeting. End Summary

Serbs United Against Ahtisaari; GOR Counsels Engagement
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2. (C) In an hour-plus meeting on March 15 with the
Ambassador, Deputy Foreign Minister Titov said that during
his early March visit to Belgrade, he detected no evolution
in the views of the Serbian leaders, who remain united in
their opposition to the Ahtisaari plan. Titov said it was a
mistake for "some international partners" to differentiate
President Tadic from PM Kostunica. While Tadic was a more
flexible individual in general, the domestic political
situation in Serbia did not permit flexibility on Kosovo. FM
Draskovic's intellectual musings on a "one country, two
systems" approach were not serious, and Titov speculated that
he soon would be leaving government. Titov said that Tadic
was overly optimistic about the timeline for a formation of a
new government, and predicted that Kostunica would succeed in
holding onto his position.


3. (C) The GOR continued to advise the Serbian leaders to
approach the Ahtisaari plan constructively, by achieving a
common understanding on the issues of national minorities and
security arrangements for cultural and religious sites. GOR
Special Envoy for Kosovo Botsan-Kharchenko clarified that
Serbia's intransigence at the final negotiating session was a
function of its refusal to demonstrate flexibility on the
technical annexes as long as the discussions were in the
framework of Kosovo's independence.

Russian Stance on UNSC Consideration of Ahtisaari
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4. (C) Titov said that the Serbs did not ask him whether
the GOR would veto the Ahtisaari plan, and the Russian
formulation remained the same: Russian support for the
Ahtisaari plan was premised on Belgrade's endorsement of the
proposal. Russian support was not for Serbs, per se, but for
the principle of territorial integrity contained in UNSC

1244. The Ambassador interjected that the U.S. and its other
Contact Group partners had a very different interpretation of
the resolution. Titov warned that if the plan, unrevised,
was sent to the Security Council for a vote, then "this would
be totally unacceptable to us." Titov underscored Russia's
consistent message to its partners, noting First Deputy Prime
Minister Sergey Ivanov's recent bilateral consultations with
the French Defense and Foreign Ministers, as well as Foreign
Minister Lavrov's public and private statements.


5. (C) Expressing frustration over comments attributed to
the State Department, Titov took issue with the
characterization that Russia had not opposed the Ahtisaari
proposal being brought to the Security Council. Russia
consistently objected to Security Council involvement, given
the lack of consensus, and believed any discussion would be
negative. Russia had not opposed Ahtisaari's decision to
send his plan to the Secretary General, because it was his
right to report to his superior. This was an important
distinction that was being misconstrued in Washington.


6. (C) Titov also took issue with Ambassador Holbrooke's
Washington Post op-ed, assigning blame to Russia for the
consequences that might follow rejection of the Ahtisaari
package. As a Security Council member, Russia had
responsibilities and would uphold them; responsibility did
not mean guilt. Russia was not afraid of the consequences;
to the contrary, it had warned Contact Group members for
years that an approach that vilified Serbia and did not

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achieve the acceptance of all the parties would fail. The
GOR had warned its Western partners that promises of
Euro-Atlantic integration would not be sufficient to overcome
Serbian objections to Kosovo's independence and Russia had
been proved correct. Serbian politicians lived in the
present, and could not placate domestic opinion with
promissory notes redeemable in twenty years. Serbia needed a
face-saving solution (e.g. the posting of Serbian personnel
on Kosovo's external borders) that prolonged negotiations
could achieve; time would help wean Serbia from the
centrality of Kosovo. Titov noted that Russia had to factor
in domestic consequences as well; in an election year, he
averred, the Duma would seize on Kosovo's independence and
demand similar treatment for Abkhazia.


7. (C) The Ambassador stressed that "guilt" or "fear"
should not frame the discussion; the issue was complicated,
with much at stake. While we believed that Kosovo was
unique, we understood that it had consequences. The U.S.
agreed that the best decision was a consensual one, but saw
no prospect for a negotiated solution between the Serbs and
Kosovars. Yes, this was a difficult pill for Serbs to
swallow, but Serbia needed to understand that Kosovo was
irrevocably lost. The Ambassador underscored that the U.S.
and EU were not prepared to maintain a troop presence in
Kosovo indefinitely: the status quo was unsustainable. The
Ambassador pressed the GOR to identify additional steps that
the U.S. and EU could take to persuade Belgrade to move
forward. Titov demurred: visits by the EU Troika exacerbated,
and didn't improve, the situation in Serbia.


8. (C) Titov complained that the international community
had changed the rules of the game, from standards first, to
standards later. Now the GOR understood that Kosovo was not
expected to adhere to European-level standards. Kosovo was a
failed state by Western definition, dominated by organized
crime, drug trafficking, and trafficking in persons. The
Kosovars were aggressive and would not be satisfied until a
Greater Kosovo emerged, at the expense of its neighbors.
Titov noted credible reports of extremist training camps in
Kosovo, which were not controlled by KFOR or UNMIK: that was
unacceptable. In terms of demographics, the Kosovars would
breed their neighbors into submission. International
community promises of independence meant that the Kosovars
never sought a compromise with Serbia; the West was to blame
for Albanian threats of violence.


9. (C) The Ambassador responded that Serbian behavior was
responsible for the changing perceptions of the international
community from the time of UNSCR 1244's passage to now. The
Kosovars were making substantial progress on standards and
were developing the attributes of statehood. The extended
period of international supervision would ensure that
standards were maintained. Titov questioned the staying
power of any follow-on European force. Noting the success of
PM Ceku's December 2006 visit, the Ambassador urged the GOR
to deepen contacts with the Kosovars. Titov conceded that
Ceku was reasonable, questioned his staying power in
Pristina, and noted the visit caused some controversy among
Russian Duma members.

Flagging UNMIK Successor
--------------


10. (C) Titov said that there was no Serbian consensus on a
follow-on international presence to UNMIK, although it was
clear that an international presence was required. The GOR
read was that Serbia preferred a UN presence to the European
Union and expressed concern that EU planning for a Kosovo
deployment could be premature. Titov expressed concern that
many EU countries did not appear informed about Belgrade's
view on the international presence.

Russia: No Swaps
--------------


11. (C) Titov underscored that Russia was not interested in
Kosovo as a template to be used in other frozen conflicts.
While some accused the GOR of looking for a "swap" in another
region or a horse-trade on another issue, this was not the
case. Lavrov had been clear: Russia had a principled
difference with the U.S. over Kosovo. The Ambassador said he
understood the GOR position, but urged Russia to seize on
Kosovo's differences as a way to justify its unique
resolution. The Ahtisaari plan's provision for extended
supervision was such a hook. The danger was that inaction
would generate far worse outcomes, including violence against
Serbs. The GOR considered this Albanian "blackmail," but it
was a political reality. Ahtisaari's plan was the least bad
outcome for Serbia that could be implemented. The Ambassador
stressed again that the status quo was unsustainable. Titov

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disagreed, arguing that Cyprus indicated otherwise. The
international community tried to have it both ways, saying
the situation was unsustainable, while KFOR reported that
everything was under control.

Phased Approach Required
--------------


12. (C) Based on consultations with European colleagues,
Titov claimed that more were leaning towards a "phased
approach" to solving Kosovo. This evolution reflected
Security Council realities: China was "close to Russia's
understanding" on Kosovo and several other Council members
were "nervous." Rather than fail in the Security Council,
the better approach would be a "provisional decision" that
took note of Ahtisaari's efforts, but introduced a new round
of discussions, under a new Special Representative. (Titov,
noting earlier consultations with the Swedish Ambassador,
jokingly alluded to FM Bildt's continued interest in Kosovo.)
Repeating on several occasions and in familiar terms the
Russian critique of Ahtisaari's negotiating style and bias,
Titov quipped that "it is not the end of history when
Ahtisaari leaves." Since Ahtisaari always viewed his
negotiating objective as "impossible," he had succeeded in
living up to his expectations of failure.


13. (C) Pressed by the Ambassador to clarify the GOR
strategy, Titov and Botsan-Kharchenko said there was no clear
vision for the upcoming Contact Group meeting.
Botsan-Kharchenko said the GOR would use the March 19 UNSC
session on UNMIK to express concern over the prospect of
Security Council deliberations on the Ahtisaari plan, but
thought that the UK-hosted Contact Group would be a general
exchange of views. The GOR would like to see a discussion of
how to restart the negotiating process. Titov warned against
any expectation of a joint statement. While Titov
characterized the meeting as an opportunity to take the
temperature, the Ambassador urged Russia to come prepared for
a serious conversation.

Comment
--------------


14. (C) We detect no give in the GOR position and Titov
showed little negotiating flexibility. The GOR is clearly
displeased that its acquiescence to the forwarding of
Ahtisaari's report to the SYG has been interpreted as a
softening of their bottom line: no Ahtisaari plan without
Serbian endorsement.
BURNS