KOSOVO: HARDLINE RUSSIAN DFM TITOV URGES PHASED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 001143 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/15/2017 TAGS: PREL RS SUBJECT: KOSOVO: HARDLINE RUSSIAN DFM TITOV URGES PHASED APPROACH Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns: 1.4 (b, d). ¶1. (C) Summary: In a March 15 meeting, Deputy Foreign Minister Titov reiterated to the Ambassador that the Russian bottomline remained unchanged: the Ahtisaari plan was unacceptable absent Serbian endorsement, and Serbs remained united in their opposition to the proposal. Titov expressed anger that GOR acquiescence to the forwarding of Ahtisaari's report to the Secretary General was being spun as acceptance of a UN Security Council review of the proposal, which would produce only negative consequences. Titov took issue with Holbrooke's critique of Russia, blamed the international community for falsely raising Kosovar expectations for independence, underscored Albanian aggression and the existence of militant training camps, and questioned Belgrade's interest in an EU successor to UNMIK. Titov reiterated that Russia was not interested in a "swap" on Kosovo. Russia believes a "phased approach" is gaining ground at the UNSC, and supports the resumption of negotiations post-Ahtisaari. The GOR will use the SC's March 19 discussion of UNMIK to criticize Security Council deliberations over status, but has no clear vision on how to approach the next Contact Group meeting. End Summary Serbs United Against Ahtisaari; GOR Counsels Engagement -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) In an hour-plus meeting on March 15 with the Ambassador, Deputy Foreign Minister Titov said that during his early March visit to Belgrade, he detected no evolution in the views of the Serbian leaders, who remain united in their opposition to the Ahtisaari plan. Titov said it was a mistake for "some international partners" to differentiate President Tadic from PM Kostunica. While Tadic was a more flexible individual in general, the domestic political situation in Serbia did not permit flexibility on Kosovo. FM Draskovic's intellectual musings on a "one country, two systems" approach were not serious, and Titov speculated that he soon would be leaving government. Titov said that Tadic was overly optimistic about the timeline for a formation of a new government, and predicted that Kostunica would succeed in holding onto his position. ¶3. (C) The GOR continued to advise the Serbian leaders to approach the Ahtisaari plan constructively, by achieving a common understanding on the issues of national minorities and security arrangements for cultural and religious sites. GOR Special Envoy for Kosovo Botsan-Kharchenko clarified that Serbia's intransigence at the final negotiating session was a function of its refusal to demonstrate flexibility on the technical annexes as long as the discussions were in the framework of Kosovo's independence. Russian Stance on UNSC Consideration of Ahtisaari -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) Titov said that the Serbs did not ask him whether the GOR would veto the Ahtisaari plan, and the Russian formulation remained the same: Russian support for the Ahtisaari plan was premised on Belgrade's endorsement of the proposal. Russian support was not for Serbs, per se, but for the principle of territorial integrity contained in UNSC ¶1244. The Ambassador interjected that the U.S. and its other Contact Group partners had a very different interpretation of the resolution. Titov warned that if the plan, unrevised, was sent to the Security Council for a vote, then "this would be totally unacceptable to us." Titov underscored Russia's consistent message to its partners, noting First Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Ivanov's recent bilateral consultations with the French Defense and Foreign Ministers, as well as Foreign Minister Lavrov's public and private statements. ¶5. (C) Expressing frustration over comments attributed to the State Department, Titov took issue with the characterization that Russia had not opposed the Ahtisaari proposal being brought to the Security Council. Russia consistently objected to Security Council involvement, given the lack of consensus, and believed any discussion would be negative. Russia had not opposed Ahtisaari's decision to send his plan to the Secretary General, because it was his right to report to his superior. This was an important distinction that was being misconstrued in Washington. ¶6. (C) Titov also took issue with Ambassador Holbrooke's Washington Post op-ed, assigning blame to Russia for the consequences that might follow rejection of the Ahtisaari package. As a Security Council member, Russia had responsibilities and would uphold them; responsibility did not mean guilt. Russia was not afraid of the consequences; to the contrary, it had warned Contact Group members for years that an approach that vilified Serbia and did not MOSCOW 00001143 002 OF 003 achieve the acceptance of all the parties would fail. The GOR had warned its Western partners that promises of Euro-Atlantic integration would not be sufficient to overcome Serbian objections to Kosovo's independence and Russia had been proved correct. Serbian politicians lived in the present, and could not placate domestic opinion with promissory notes redeemable in twenty years. Serbia needed a face-saving solution (e.g. the posting of Serbian personnel on Kosovo's external borders) that prolonged negotiations could achieve; time would help wean Serbia from the centrality of Kosovo. Titov noted that Russia had to factor in domestic consequences as well; in an election year, he averred, the Duma would seize on Kosovo's independence and demand similar treatment for Abkhazia. ¶7. (C) The Ambassador stressed that "guilt" or "fear" should not frame the discussion; the issue was complicated, with much at stake. While we believed that Kosovo was unique, we understood that it had consequences. The U.S. agreed that the best decision was a consensual one, but saw no prospect for a negotiated solution between the Serbs and Kosovars. Yes, this was a difficult pill for Serbs to swallow, but Serbia needed to understand that Kosovo was irrevocably lost. The Ambassador underscored that the U.S. and EU were not prepared to maintain a troop presence in Kosovo indefinitely: the status quo was unsustainable. The Ambassador pressed the GOR to identify additional steps that the U.S. and EU could take to persuade Belgrade to move forward. Titov demurred: visits by the EU Troika exacerbated, and didn't improve, the situation in Serbia. ¶8. (C) Titov complained that the international community had changed the rules of the game, from standards first, to standards later. Now the GOR understood that Kosovo was not expected to adhere to European-level standards. Kosovo was a failed state by Western definition, dominated by organized crime, drug trafficking, and trafficking in persons. The Kosovars were aggressive and would not be satisfied until a Greater Kosovo emerged, at the expense of its neighbors. Titov noted credible reports of extremist training camps in Kosovo, which were not controlled by KFOR or UNMIK: that was unacceptable. In terms of demographics, the Kosovars would breed their neighbors into submission. International community promises of independence meant that the Kosovars never sought a compromise with Serbia; the West was to blame for Albanian threats of violence. ¶9. (C) The Ambassador responded that Serbian behavior was responsible for the changing perceptions of the international community from the time of UNSCR 1244's passage to now. The Kosovars were making substantial progress on standards and were developing the attributes of statehood. The extended period of international supervision would ensure that standards were maintained. Titov questioned the staying power of any follow-on European force. Noting the success of PM Ceku's December 2006 visit, the Ambassador urged the GOR to deepen contacts with the Kosovars. Titov conceded that Ceku was reasonable, questioned his staying power in Pristina, and noted the visit caused some controversy among Russian Duma members. Flagging UNMIK Successor -------------- ¶10. (C) Titov said that there was no Serbian consensus on a follow-on international presence to UNMIK, although it was clear that an international presence was required. The GOR read was that Serbia preferred a UN presence to the European Union and expressed concern that EU planning for a Kosovo deployment could be premature. Titov expressed concern that many EU countries did not appear informed about Belgrade's view on the international presence. Russia: No Swaps -------------- ¶11. (C) Titov underscored that Russia was not interested in Kosovo as a template to be used in other frozen conflicts. While some accused the GOR of looking for a "swap" in another region or a horse-trade on another issue, this was not the case. Lavrov had been clear: Russia had a principled difference with the U.S. over Kosovo. The Ambassador said he understood the GOR position, but urged Russia to seize on Kosovo's differences as a way to justify its unique resolution. The Ahtisaari plan's provision for extended supervision was such a hook. The danger was that inaction would generate far worse outcomes, including violence against Serbs. The GOR considered this Albanian "blackmail," but it was a political reality. Ahtisaari's plan was the least bad outcome for Serbia that could be implemented. The Ambassador stressed again that the status quo was unsustainable. Titov MOSCOW 00001143 003 OF 003 disagreed, arguing that Cyprus indicated otherwise. The international community tried to have it both ways, saying the situation was unsustainable, while KFOR reported that everything was under control. Phased Approach Required -------------- ¶12. (C) Based on consultations with European colleagues, Titov claimed that more were leaning towards a "phased approach" to solving Kosovo. This evolution reflected Security Council realities: China was "close to Russia's understanding" on Kosovo and several other Council members were "nervous." Rather than fail in the Security Council, the better approach would be a "provisional decision" that took note of Ahtisaari's efforts, but introduced a new round of discussions, under a new Special Representative. (Titov, noting earlier consultations with the Swedish Ambassador, jokingly alluded to FM Bildt's continued interest in Kosovo.) Repeating on several occasions and in familiar terms the Russian critique of Ahtisaari's negotiating style and bias, Titov quipped that "it is not the end of history when Ahtisaari leaves." Since Ahtisaari always viewed his negotiating objective as "impossible," he had succeeded in living up to his expectations of failure. ¶13. (C) Pressed by the Ambassador to clarify the GOR strategy, Titov and Botsan-Kharchenko said there was no clear vision for the upcoming Contact Group meeting. Botsan-Kharchenko said the GOR would use the March 19 UNSC session on UNMIK to express concern over the prospect of Security Council deliberations on the Ahtisaari plan, but thought that the UK-hosted Contact Group would be a general exchange of views. The GOR would like to see a discussion of how to restart the negotiating process. Titov warned against any expectation of a joint statement. While Titov characterized the meeting as an opportunity to take the temperature, the Ambassador urged Russia to come prepared for a serious conversation. Comment -------------- ¶14. (C) We detect no give in the GOR position and Titov showed little negotiating flexibility. The GOR is clearly displeased that its acquiescence to the forwarding of Ahtisaari's report to the SYG has been interpreted as a softening of their bottom line: no Ahtisaari plan without Serbian endorsement. BURNS