URUGUAY ON THE PEACEKEEPING CHALLENGE AHEAD

C O N F I D E N T I A L MONTEVIDEO 000345 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT ALSO FOR WHA/BSC,IO/PHO AND PM/PPA SOUTHCOM FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/20/2017 TAGS: PREL KPKO MOPS MARR UY SUBJECT: URUGUAY ON THE PEACEKEEPING CHALLENGE AHEAD REF: A. STATE 027147 ¶B. 06 STATE 134133 Classified By: Ambassador Frank E. Baxter for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) ¶1. (C) Summary: This telegram provides local context on the challenge of finding enough troops, military observers and police to staff new UN peacekeeping missions in Africa (ref A). Uruguay is likely to maintain its unmatched per capita contributions to PKO, and it appears well disposed to join some of the missions in Africa, probably Darfur/Chad. However, GOU officials have expressed some frustration with the way PKO has been managed. They hope for improvements so that future opportunities are not lost. One problem seems to be a lack of effective communication between the UN's Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO) and the military command here. For whatever reason, Uruguayan senior officers often find out late or never about upcoming PKO missions and related issues. Officials also complain that the UN is months in arrears on PKO payments for salaries and equipment. This places a heavy burden on the cash-strapped armed forces here. Finally, the GOU would welcome any DOS/GPOI funds that can be used to refurbish its PKO training area. End Summary. PKO and Foreign Policy -------------- ¶2. (C) Uruguay's foreign relations have historically reflected the efforts of a small nation to advocate self-determination, non-intervention, respect for human rights and the rule of law, the pacific settlement of disputes, and economic cooperation. Uruguay's enthusiastic participation in international peacekeeping operations can partly be attributed to the country's dedication and faith in international organizations. Prestige, on-the-job training and economic benefits for the poorly-funded military services are other important considerations. Except for a few far-left radicals, there is no domestic opposition to PKO here. We note that Spanish Foreign Minister Moratinos recently congratulated Uruguayan troops for their actions in Kinshasa. We also note that UY's MOD Azucena Berrutti -- a long-time Socialist and human rights activist -- recently told the Ambassador that, "Bringing peace is a most noble mission for our military." Problems -------------- ¶3. (C) However, if Uruguay's civilian leadership appears �A;content with the political benefits of international PKO, it also tends to delegate most of the logistical and decision-making responsibilities for PKO to the UY military, mainly the Army. The apparent apathy -- whether by Uruguay's diplomatic mission in New York, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) here or UNDP's mission in Uruguay -- this trait translates into poor coordination and miscommunication between the end user (DPKO) and the service provider (the UY military high command). ¶4. (C) For example, last August the Embassy demarched the MFA on the urgent need to send troops to Lebanon in support of UNIFIL (ref B). As far as we can tell we were the only country to do so and even the UN mission here did not demarche the MFA. (We note that the Foreign Minister is very anti-American and that sometimes US demarches can actually be counter-productive. End note.) Senior army officers privately told us that they were inclined to provide troops to UNIFIL because it represented the "big leagues" of PKO. They also reported that President Vazquez was on board, but that a "special invitation" from DPKO to Uruguay was needed to provide political cover for such a risky mission. Whatever the reason, the invitation never materialized and consequently Uruguay never signed up for UNIFIL. Some UY officers blame Uruguay's liaison to DPKO (Col. Devercelli) for failing to follow through on the request for an invitation. We do not know the full story, but it's disappointing that something as innocuous as a missing invitation could have prevented Uruguay from signing up for such an important mission. ¶5. (SBU) In another area, some Uruguayan officers claim that the UN is $14 million in arrears on PKO reimbursements for equipment (9 months in the case of MINUSTAH in Haiti and 11 months in the case of MONUC in DROC). They also assert that salaries for peace keepers are behind to the tune of $7 million. If true, this represents $21 million in arrears to a military that can ill afford it. We note that the GOU recently scaled back its troop deployments from nine months to only six. Officials explained that the move was made to reduce disciplinary problems among returning vets and to lessen family stress associated with prolonged deployments. Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative -------------- ¶6. (SBU) The Uruguayan military is also eager for more participation in GPOI. The UY military badly needs to refurbish its joint services PKO training area so that it can expand training opportunities for peace keepers here and abroad. Though a small country, Uruguay's instructors have gathered considerable expertise in the field over the course of many PKO missions, and they are willing to share it. The Embassy supports Uruguay's efforts to privide more and better PKO trainers. Comment: -------------- ¶7. (C) While the left-leaning GOU is often suspicious of US security cooperation, it has no qualms about participating in blue helmet operations. Embassy considers Uruguay's continued, robust PKO participation to be in line with US national interests and have incorporated it as major goal in our Mission Strategic Plan (MSP). I frequently congratulate GOU officials for Uruguay's participation in PKO. Perhaps it is time to help them with something more concrete. We would welcome any efforts by the Department to encourage the GOU's commitment to PKO, including assistance to resolve communications problems, clear up arrears and/or support Uruguay's greater participation in GPOI. End Comment. Baxter