COALITION LEADERS UNITED ON MESSAGE, ELECTIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MINSK 000901

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2017
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR BO
SUBJECT: COALITION LEADERS UNITED ON MESSAGE, ELECTIONS

REF: A. MINSK 875


B. MINSK 846

C. MINSK 853

Classified By: Ambassador Karen Stewart for reason 1.4 (d).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) The four leaders of the opposition coalition asked
Ambassador to signal to the GOB that the international
community would watch closely the planned November 4 Social
March. They expressed relief that the recent visit by a
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe official
apparently did not portend GOB-EU dialogue without
conditions. The leaders recognized the need to boost their
popularity ratings through 2008 parliamentary elections in
order to increase pressure on the regime to enter into
negotiations. End summary.


2. (U) United Democratic Forces (UDF) Co-Chairs Anatoliy
Lebedko, Anatoliy Levkovich, Vintsuk Vyachorka and Belarusian
Party of Communists Deputy Yelena Skrigan (filling in for
Sergey Kalyakin) joined Ambassador, DCM and Deputy Pol/Econ
Chief for dinner on October 22 to welcome new Pol/Econ Chief
to Minsk.

Will Dissatisfaction Turn into Activism?
--------------


3. (C) Discussing the October 14 European March (ref A) and
the Social March planned for November 4, Skrigan said surveys
(ref B) showed a majority of Belarusians supported the
demonstrations. She added that social issues generated a
greater public response than the abstract concept of European
values, but admitted that this may not translate into active
participation. Vyachorka warned that those most affected by
decreased social spending were unaccustomed to actively
promoting their interests. Skrigan said Lukashenko had
called for a meeting on the eve of the Social March that may
result in the rollback of some planned social benefits cuts.
While this might drive down participation, it would allow
organizers to claim they had successfully pressured the GOB,
according to Skrigan.

Pushing the Regime into Meaningful Discussions
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4. (C) All thanked Ambassador for the USG statement before
the European March calling for restraint from Minsk. Similar
announcements from the EU and the United States before the
Social March would help protect demonstrators, Lebedko said.
A series of successful events were necessary to raise the
UDF's standing enough to draw the regime into negotiations.
Currently, according to Lebedko no one in the regime would
admit to wanting talks with the opposition.


5. (C) On the heels of the visit of the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe's (PACE) Special Rapporteur
for Belarus Andrea Rigoni, Lebedko worried that the EU would
repeat the old mistake of confusing meaningless conversation
between the regime and the opposition with serious
constructive dialogue. Vyachorka expressed satisfaction that
PACE was not considering readmission of Belarus to special
guest status at this time. According to Vyachorka and
others, the conditions for any dialogue must be clear -
release of all political prisoners and parliamentary
elections held according to OSCE standards. Any such
dialogue would require a specific agenda and tight deadlines
for agreement, argued Lebedko.

Active Election Monitoring Necessary
--------------


6. (C) The Social March would help the opposition begin to
reach out to the public on bread-and-butter issues well
before next year's parliamentary elections, according to
Lebedko, Skrigan and Vyachorka. The interlocutors agreed
that the opposition should focus resources on a limited
number of districts with the strongest candidates. Vyachorka
brought up the idea of also campaigning on electoral reform,
with a particular focus on the need to include independent
members on local electoral commissions.


7. (C) The interlocutors argued for an active monitoring
presence for the election, including both political party and
independent monitors. Lebedko averred that efforts by former
OSCE Minsk Head of Office Hans Georg Wieck to organize
monitors from the Belarus Helsinki Commission and the human

MINSK 00000901 002 OF 002


rights NGO Vyasna could take too literally the need for
neutrality. Complete separation between the organizations
and parties could prove difficult because of overlapping
membership, Lebedko said. Vyachorka added that candidates
would value monitors' activeness over their impartiality.

Difficulty Attracting Appealing Candidates?
--------------


8. (C) Levkovich said that the recruitment of so-called VIPs
from outside the UDF (ref C) yielded only three potential
candidates. Other well-known figures had decided not to run,
but had pledged to support the UDF list. Lebedko explained
that with each successive election activists grew less and
less interested in running for office, and party discipline
became more important as a tool for finding candidates.
Vyachorka stated that those ready to act already belonged to
the parties. He offered that many of the potential
candidates from his Belarusian National Front (BNF) were 25
or younger, and their main qualification was having run in
2007 local elections.

Comment: Acting to Broaden the Coalition
--------------


9. (C) The UDF members clicked particularly well.
Suggestions earlier in the year that the Communists would not
cooperate actively on the European March and/or that BNF
would not work on the Social March now appear off the mark.
Significantly, none of the guests made even the mildest
critique of former Presidential candidate Aleksandr
Milinkevich, who had to send his regrets. While the
opposition has its work cut out, cooperation within the UDF
appears unusually high for a period between elections.


10. (C) Efforts to downplay the turnout for the Social March
suggest the event will not meet organizers' initial
expectations. Nonetheless, UDF cooperation on an event
designed to draw new and non-traditional backers to the
opposition is significant in and of itself. The approach may
in the end not bear much fruit in terms of increased support,
but the opposition leaders are correct that it beats inaction
or waiting until the eve of elections to criticize austerity
measures.


11. (C) The leaders seem to understand they must mount some
strong campaigns for the parliamentary elections. The regime
will not allow independent members on local election
commissions in any district with a respectable opposition
candidate. This fact will serve as a succinct reminder to
the international community that Lukashenko will not permit
even minimally improved electoral practices for the sake of
better relations with the West.
STEWART