REPLACING PM SIDORSKIY EASIER SAID THAN DONE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MINSK 000710 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/17/2017 TAGS: PGOV PINR BO SUBJECT: REPLACING PM SIDORSKIY EASIER SAID THAN DONE REF: A. MINSK 681 ¶B. MOSCOW 3777 ¶C. MINSK 696 ¶D. MINSK 687 ¶E. 06 MINSK 641 ¶F. 06 MINSK 514 ¶G. MINSK 620 Classified By: Ambassador Karen Stewart for reason 1.4 (d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Once again, Belarusian Prime Minister Sergey Sidorksiy has survived rumors of his imminent political demise. Dismissing Sidorskiy with economic indicators still holding up, and with further gas negotiations with Russia just around the corner, would seem ill-timed. Instead, Lukashenko may hold on to Sidorskiy in order to dump him once higher energy prices start to bite and further privatizations become a necessity. Unfortunately for Lukashenko, the bench of skilled and experienced potential successors looks thin. Lukashenko must further consider how a successor would alter power relationships between clans in his inner circle and whether keeping Sidorskiy in place too long allows the Prime Minister to accumulate too much recognition and a possible political base. End summary. Russians Spread Rumors of Dismissal? -------------- ¶2. (U) Proceeding the latest round of gas negotiations (refs A and B),Russian daily "Kommersant" reported high-level Belarusian sources confirmed an order for Belarusian Prime Minister Sergey Sidorskiy's dismissal had already been signed by Lukashenko. Shortly thereafter rumors spread suggesting that Lukashenko would name Minister of the Interior Vladimir Naumov as the new prime minister. ¶3. (C) Vadim Sekhovich, reporter for the on-line publication "Yezhednevnik," told Acting Pol/Econ Chief he suspected "Kommersant" purposely spread the rumors to try to pressure Sidorskiy into coming back to Minsk with a deal on gas. Sergey Zhbanov, economics correspondent for "Belgazeta", was even more emphatic, stating that "Kommersant" had allowed itself to be used by those close to Gazprom. Hard to Dismiss PM While Touting Belarus' Economic Miracle -------------- -------------- ¶4. (SBU) In fact, economic stability that has surpassed expectations bolsters the chances Sidorskiy will remain Prime Minister. Belarus continues to record solid economic growth for several reasons. The country escaped paying 83 percent of the gas price increase until late July and early August. Record income from potassium fertilizer exports -- caused by higher prices and leftover supply after last year's poor sales -- have made up losses on the export of refined oil products. The GOB frequently reports the seemingly impressive statistics as if somehow its management contributed to these exogenous factors. ¶5. (C) When asked whether Lukashenko might dismiss Sidorskiy, Tatyana Manenok, energy correspondent for the independent weekly "Belorusy i rynok," exclaimed "on what basis?" Irina Tochitskaya, Deputy Director for the Institute of Privatization and Management's Research Center agreed that Lukashenko could not easily dismiss Sidorskiy when the economy still seemed strong. Pollster Oleg Manayev told Ambassador and DCM the public did not accept Lukashenko's excuses for dumping the last prime minister, Gennadiy Novitskiy. ¶6. (C) Switching horses midstream in negotiations over natural gas prices for 2008 could also prove costly. Zhbanov noted Sidorskiy was the only figure with a track record of negotiating with Russia. He slammed others who had gone to Moscow to negotiate, stating they possessed outdated Soviet notions. Need to Save a Scapegoat for Later -------------- ¶7. (C) Even the most optimistic observers expect Belarus' GDP growth to slow next year. Manenok said Sidorskiy would go only once an economic slowdown brought the need for a "victim." Sidorskiy's replacement would have to signal some sort of new policy. Sekhovich also said Sidorskiy, who had shown timidity of late, was not the right person to push MINSK 00000710 002 OF 002 through significant privatizations (ref C). Few Good Men (and Almost No Women) -------------- ¶8. (C) In contrast to Putin, who grooms multiple possible successors to Prime Minister Fradkov, Lukashenko denies any one figure the attention and responsibility that might mark them for greater things. Economist Yaroslav Romanchuk speculated that National Bank Chairman Pyotr Prokopovich might fit the bill because of his subservience. However, both Chubrik and Tochitskaya doubted Prokopovich would have what it takes to run the government. Chubrik said Prokopovich listens to good advice from advisors, but this alone would not be enough to survive as prime minister. ¶9. (C) Sekhovich suggested several oblast executive committee chairpersons could fit the prime ministerial bill. He noted in particular Aleksandr Yakobson of Gomel oblast and Vladimir Savchenko (refs D and E) of Grodno oblast. United Civic Party Deputy Chair Vladimir Chervonenko told Acting Pol/Econ Chief that Savchenko had proven himself a good crisis manager through his service in a region known for relatively high levels of support for the opposition. Both Tochitskaya and Chubrik believed only Mikhail Pavlov of Minsk City had the necessary background. ¶10. (C) Candidates within the cabinet also fail to inspire widespread confidence. First Deputy Prime Minister Semashko stands head and shoulders above the other deputies in terms of media coverage. Zhbanov noted that Semashko's main talent seemed to lie in paraphrasing Lukashenko. A successful prime minister could of course never contradict the president, but should also go beyond simply parroting the party line, according to Zhbanov. Energy Minister Aleksandr Ozerets (ref F) received mention in independent media as a potential successor, but Political Counselor Mariya Levada of the Ukrainian Embassy said she failed to see how the minister had distinguished himself. ¶11. (SBU) Surprisingly, potential candidates from within the Presidential Administration have received the least attention of all, with only some speculation over Deputy Head Leonid Amfilov. "Narodnaya Volya" asked Deputy Head Natalya Petkevich whether she might become Chair of the Supreme Court, which she denied, but did not mention her as a possibility for any other post. Comment: Maintaining the Balance of Power? -------------- ¶12. (C) Identifying a replacement also entails predicting how the personnel change would impact clan politics. Despite the cabinet's general subservience to the Presidential Administration, replacing a prime minister who has served for nearly four years could upset the competing spheres of influence around Lukashenko. At one point Interior Minister Vladimir Naumov was rumored to be in line to succeed Sidorskiy. With the hard-line camp already seen as the winner in the dismissal of Sukharenko as BKGB Chair (ref G), the ascension of Naumov to the post of Prime Minister would have signaled a fundamental realignment in Lukashenko's inner circle. Instead Lukashenko seemed to throw some patronage in the direction of technocrat Sidorskiy by appointing some of his proteges to new state enterprise directorships. ¶13. (C) While there are reasons for keeping Sidorskiy, and problems replacing him, Lukashenko historically has feared leaving anyone in a prominent office for too long lest they accumulate power or even be seen to have gained some measure of independence. For now, Sidorskiy lacks any independent power base or plan of action. The longer Sidorskiy stays in place, the more willing Lukashenko may be to settle for a less than perfect replacement. ¶14. (C) Ultimately, given the fact that the Prime Minister would become acting head of state if Lukashenko left office, the position and its holder remain important for building a democratic future. Stewart