BELARUSIAN NATIONAL FRONT LEADER FACES INTERNAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MINSK 000415 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/18/2017 TAGS: PHUM PGOV BO SUBJECT: BELARUSIAN NATIONAL FRONT LEADER FACES INTERNAL PROBLEMS Classified By: Charge Jonathan Moore for reason 1.4 (d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Belarusian National Front (BNF) activists in recent days have noted that BNF leader Vyachorka's support rating within his party is wavering. All agree that Vyachorka's inactivity contributes to the decrease in support, but those still backing the leader also blame the situation on party factions created by de facto coalition leader Milinkevich and his For Freedom campaign. BNF deputy head Mikhalevich thus far is the only BNF member openly confirming his intentions to challenge Vyachorka for the party leadership in December elections, and activists doubt Mikhalevich has the support to oust the incumbent. However, until Milinkevich's movement is better organized and defined and until Vyachorka moves his party forward, the BNF leader will not have a firm grasp on his party's leadership. End summary. Vyachorka and His BNF -------------- ¶2. (C) Belarusian National Front (BNF) activists in recent meetings with Pol/Econ Chief and Poloff have confirmed rumors that BNF leader Vintsuk Vyachorka's support within his party is wavering. Vyachorka was elected as leader of the BNF in 1999 following the party's split from what is now the Conservative Christian Party. Highly educated and fluent in several languages, including English, Vyachorka proved to be a master politician, whose "shrewd" tactics -- according to United Civic Party (UCP) deputy Lyudmila Gryaznova -- always secured the best deal for his party. ¶3. (C) Vyachorka used the BNF's membership (one of the largest among opposition parties) and party structure to support Aleksandr Milinkevich's bid to become the single opposition candidate at the 2005 October congress of democratic forces. During the 2006 presidential campaign, Vyachorka and his party proved to be Milinkevich's closest ally, using its well-established regional structures to boost Milinkevich's ratings. However, problems for Vyachorka began to mount after elections. Milinkevich Uses, Then Abuses BNF -------------- ¶4. (C) Following the presidential elections, coalition activity stalled for several months while party leaders debated the coalition's plan of action and leadership. Most importantly, party leaders did not agree with Milinkevich's �A;rise from single presidential candidate to de facto leader of the coalition. However, Vyachorka and his BNF continued to support Milinkevich and, while not necessarily defending Milinkevich's unexplainable behavior or decisions, overlooked or played down such moments. ¶5. (C) In early fall 2006, Milinkevich unexpectedly announced that he was creating a new movement called "For Freedom" that would be action-oriented and not hostage to the coalition's bureaucracy. Looking for support and members, Milinkevich tapped into the sources of his closest ally, the BNF. Without consulting Vyachorka, Milinkevich traveled to regional cities and BNF strong points to convince BNF members to join the For Freedom movement, which was still an undefined, unstructured concept that many activists -- including Vyachorka - viewed as Milinkevich's own political party. Fissures Occur Within BNF -------------- ¶6. (C) Milinkevich's maverick recruitment of BNF members quickly soured relations with Vyachorka and fractured the BNF into roughly three groups. The first group is comprised of those who remain loyal to Vyachorka and reject Milinkevich. However, this group is small, consisting of the older generation of BNF activists who first elected Vyachorka to his position. The second group, which is the majority of BNF members, equally supports both Vyachorka as the BNF leader and Milinkevich as the opposition leader. It is in this group that Vyachorka's support is unstable. The last group would take Milinkevich's position over that of Vyachorka and or even like to see the BNF leader replaced. ¶7. (C) Loyal BNF deputy head to Vyachorka and fierce Milinkevich opponent Yuriy Khadyko expressed to Pol/Econ Chief on May 16 his doubts that Vyachorka could keep the BNF MINSK 00000415 002 OF 002 fractions together, blaming Milinkevich's "insulting" behavior for the split. However, he predicted only a handful of BNF members, such as BNF deputy Alexei Kovolets and Brest regional BNF leader Yuriy Gubarevich, would abandon their BNF activities to join Milinkevich's movement. Khadyko maintained that once the congress reduces Milinkevich to the same level as Vyachorka and the other party leaders, support in the BNF will be defined and the threat against Vyachorka would dissipate. Inactivity Costs Vyachorka Support -------------- ¶8. (C) According to Khadyko and other BNF leaders, Vyachorka's inactivity was also to blame for his wavering support among the BNF moderates. One of BNF's four deputy heads and vocal Milinkevich supporter Ales Mikhalevich on May 11 told Poloff that Vyachorka enjoyed less support within the party because he had not provided any positive results from his eight years in the position. Brest BNF leader and soon to be member of Milinkevich's For Freedom movement Gubarevich on May 15 agreed, noting that during his tenure Vyachorka never had a strong, steadfast position on any issue and his inaction was leading the BNF to a dead end. According to Gubarevich, if a vote were held today, one quarter of BNF's members would categorically vote against Vyachorka's reelection. ¶9. (C) In separate meetings on May 16, BNF deputy heads Viktor Ivashkevich and Khadyko predicted to Pol/Econ Chief that Vyachorka could lose his position unless he became more active. Ivashkevich claimed Vyachorka had plans for his party after the congress, but he needed to implement them quickly in order to satisfy the demands of his constituents. If Vyachorka can accomplish this, he will no longer have to worry about the security of his position. Unseating Vyachorka One Deputy's Ambition -------------- ¶10. (C) The only BNF member openly discussing his plans to unseat Vyachorka is Mikhalevich. At the BNF's largest inner party congress, or Syom, in December 2006, Mikhalevich attempted and failed to usurp Vyachorka. Mikhalevich has not given up and has repeatedly announced to Poloffs and party associates that he plans to run against Vyachorka in the next inner party elections in December 2007. According to Gubarevich, Mikhalevich's support rating in the regions continues to grow, largely because of his young age (early 30s),ambition, and fresh ideas for the party. Khadyko and Ivashkevich also noted Mikhalevich's positive aspects, specifically his commitment to BNF unity, but maintained that he did not yet have the necessary support to topple Vyachorka. Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) All party leaders within the coalition can be blamed for inactivity and lack of resolve, but Vyachorka and the BNF are one of the most active groups within the opposition. Vyachorka is mainly responsible for getting other party leaders and Milinkevich to reach a compromise on convening a second congress and it seems that Vyachorka and his party are the ones keeping party leaders together on holding a second congress. According to UCP deputy Gryaznova, Vyachorka is the only party leader trying to keep the coalition united. ¶12. (C) However, Milinkevich damaged BNF unity and, combined with more time spent settling coalition disputes and less time promoting BNF activities, Vyachorka's support base is not strong. Although very attractive to some BNF members, Mikhalevich does not yet have the support needed to defeat Vyachorka. We will see what BNF accomplishes after the May 26-27 congress and where Vyachorka will stand when his plans are fulfilled or simply left on paper. Moore