FOREIGN AFFAIRS CONCURS WITH U.S. ON SEVERAL ISSUES;

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MASERU 000064 SIPDIS SIPDIS FOR AF/S E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/8/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM PTER MARR KNNP EFIN LT SUBJECT: FOREIGN AFFAIRS CONCURS WITH U.S. ON SEVERAL ISSUES; CAMPAIGN HEATS UP REF: (A) MASERU 60 (B) STATE 14457 (C) STATE 14071 (D) STATE 10275 (E) MASERU 27 MASERU 00000064 001.2 OF 002 CLASSIFIED BY: June Carter Perry, Ambassador, EXEC , STATE. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (S) On February 7 ( and over the course of the past 3 weeks) Ambassador raised key U.S. policy issues with Foreign Minister Moleleki. We also discussed the issues facing the February 17 general elections. On the new U.S. Africa Military Command, Moleleki was in complete agreement with the U.S. action and the President's announcement. He expressed appreciation for the U.S. role in trying to achieve calm in areas of conflict throughout the continent. Concerning the sanctions on Iran, Moleleki asserted the Government of Lesotho (GOL) was in full support of that position and, in fact, feared that any increase in Iran's nuclear capability posed a threat not only to the West, but to Africa as well; and he was fully supportive of our freezing of assets of the Dockrat Family which serves as a front for al-Qaida. ¶2. (S) In terms of the February 17 campaign, the Foreign Minister was certain that the ruling Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) party would win. He was vociferous in his attacks on the opposition All Basotho Convention (ABC) Leader Thomas Thabane and accused him of using criminals within his party during rallies. He alleged a shooting on the weekend of February 3-4 was instigated and carried out by the ABC against sympathizers of the LCD. As he has previously, the Foreign Minister stated the Libyans are providing funding to the ABC Party. In a curious and complex twist, Moleleki argued that the ABC would be receiving funds from South Africa, except for the fact that the Republic of South Africa was also aware of the North African/Islamist influence within the ABC party. Moleleki's outburst comes as no surprise to us. As we have been reporting over a year, he has intense feelings about Thabane and his perceived role in the Foreign Minister's attempted assasination of 2006. His statement that the GOL stands firmly with the U.S. on counter-terrorism issues is consistent with Lesotho's policies and stances to date. End Summary -------------- African Command �A; -------------- ¶3. (C) We reviewed the talking points on the African Command and the establishment thereof by President Bush with Moleleki, emphasizing that "Africa matters" to the U.S., and that we want to assist in a concrete military force for the achievement of stability across the continent. Such stability would also help to develop a stronger economy and the decision demonstrates the U.S.'s long-term commitment to strengthening its ties to the continent. Moleleki responded that he was delighted to learn of AFRICOM and pointed to the on-going problems in Somalia and Sudan as indicative that Africa does indeed need such a dedicated area of operation. He stated that Lesotho would be supportive as needed and/or as requested by the U.S. if there is any way the country could assist in the command. -------------- UNSC 1737: Iran -------------- ¶3. (S) Concerning the effective implementation of the resolution to prevent Iran's continued nuclear development, we emphasized the threat that Iran presents to the international community and therefore we are taking the appropriate steps to implement the resolution, including seizing the assets of the individuals and/or organizations designated. We urged the GOL to take steps to implement their obligations as well. Moleleki stated the GOL again was in complete agreement with the U.S. position and feared that Iran's nuclear program presented a threat certainly to the international community, but given the conflict in the Middle East and East Africa, Iran also posed a threat to the continent. Concerning the Dockrat issues (freezing of assets) (Ref D),Moleleki offered that the GOL was very concerned about the rise of Islam within its borders. He indicated that the GOL had observed an increase in the numbers of converts to Islam over the past few years. When asked why that would be the situation here, his response was that Islam, and Libya in particular, was viewed as a source of financial enrichment; some Basotho felt that by aligning themselves with Islam, they could eventually benefit from the resources the religion and its followers offered. The GOL considered Islam a religion rife with fanaticism and was eager to keep such elements out of the country. (Comment: Per Ref D Dockrat, the MASERU 00000064 002.2 OF 002 Minister of Finance advised Ambassador on February 1 that the Central Bank would immediately act on freezing these assets in Lesotho. Post has already been contacted by the Acting Governor of the Central Bank. We have been assured that the GOL will follow up on the request. End Comment) -------------- Pending Elections -------------- ¶4. (C) Before the Ambassador could raise the subject of Lesotho's general elections, Moleleki seized the opportunity to point out that, in his view, the ABC Leader Thomas Thabane continued to receive financial support from the People's Republic of Libya. (We note here that Libya intends to send observers to the February 17 elections in Lesotho.) The Foreign Minister also accused the ABC of recruiting raucous youths who insult members of the ruling party by seeking them out in rural areas where rallies are being held and insulting them by stripping naked and shouting vicious chants. More than that, he alleged the ABC had killed an LCD supporter over the weekend of February 3-4. Post has not been able to substantiate this completely, although we have learned from our own team that a reporter of a radio station leaning towards the ruling party had attempted to cover the funeral of an ABC member over the weekend and had been shot. The UN Resident Representative's security team also reported that the ABC had assaulted an adherent of the LCD at the same time. Post continues to seek fuller information about this incident. ¶5. (C) We encouraged the Foreign Minister and his party to engage in dialogue/debates with other parties and to be certain that all parties had access to media because of the importance of stability across the country. Moleleki in his florid style said "these people do not understand talk about peace. The Prime Minister can go on the radio and talk about the future of the country as NGOs and the international community have continued to encourage peace and free and fair elections." However, "these people," he said, referring to Thabane's party, "do not understand the word peace, they only understand fear." I asked Moleleki what he meant by that, and he answered that we "have to be prepared." He said there would not be violence at the polling places, but when the results were announced, he anticipated that the opposition parties would then become incensed at the results since, he contended, the LCD would win. We reinforced the point that we have made to all government officials, that it was important for Lesotho, as it continued on the road to the institutionalization of democracy, to ensure that elections proceeded in a tranquil manner and that authorized methods of discourse occur only by dialogue. The Foreign Minister did not disagree. He felt that the GOL could rely strongly on the army (Lesotho Defense Force),but had little confidence in many elements of the police force whom many in the GOL viewed as supporting Thabane. (See Ref E) -------------- Comment -------------- ¶5. (C) While Moleleki is very dramatic in his presentations to us and charismatic in his oratory to public audiences, we cannot dismiss his evaluation of the animosity that exists between the LCD and the ABC. The international community as a whole, as well as on a bilateral level, continues to hold or support the use of dialogue and debates during this pre-electoral period. At the same time, we are separately and together making appropriate security arrangements for individual citizens as well as our larger community. ¶6. (S) In terms of the African Command and the threats posed by Iran and al-Qaida, we believe Lesotho is on the same page as we are, and one expects appropriate follow through from the GOL. Moleleki was very complimentary again about the U.S. role in tracking down terrorists and particularly in terms of trying to keep the lid on matters in Somalia. He did express the fear that operative Islamic militant groups would seek further shelter in Southern Africa. Because South Africa also faces this problem, he believes South Africa has not supported Thabane as it might have in the past given their fear that Islamist elements are providing support to the ABC party. Based on our February 7 conversation with the South African High Commissioner, we believe there may be some basis for Moleleki's analysis since the Republic of South Africa representative here told us that South Africa remains extremely concerned about Islamic factions trying to use Lesotho as an access point into South Africa. End Comment. PERRY