Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07MAPUTO1278
2007-11-05 08:08:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Maputo
Cable title:  

PRESIDENCY MINISTER ON ZIMBABWE, PKO'S

Tags:  KPKO PGOV MASS MCAP MOPS MARR PREL MZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO7736
RR RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHTO #1278/01 3090808
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 050808Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY MAPUTO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8150
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0066
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0108
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MAPUTO 001278 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2017
TAGS: KPKO PGOV MASS MCAP MOPS MARR PREL MZ
SUBJECT: PRESIDENCY MINISTER ON ZIMBABWE, PKO'S

Classified By: Charge d'Affairs Todd C. Chapman, Reasons 1.4(b) & (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MAPUTO 001278 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2017 TAGS: KPKO PGOV MASS MCAP MOPS MARR PREL MZ SUBJECT: PRESIDENCY MINISTER ON ZIMBABWE, PKO'S Classified By: Charge d'Affairs Todd C. Chapman, Reasons 1.4(b) & (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: The Charge raised Mozambican PKO participation and the Zimbabwe crisis with Minister of the Presidency Antonio Sumbana on 10/31. Sumbana stated that the GRM wanted to participate in PKO's, and that he would speak to President Guebuza about notifying the UN's DPKO of Mozambique's interest. On Zimbabwe, he said that while the GRM had contact with ZANU-PF party members who wanted change, Mugabe still exerted almost complete control. Neighboring countries had to avoid isolating Zimbabwe, which would only exacerbate the domestic situation. End Summary. -------------- Peacekeeping Operations -------------- ¶2. (SBU) The Charge met on 10/31 with Antonio Sumbana, whose title was recently changed from Chief of Staff to Minister of the Presidency although the functions are the same. The Charge reiterated the USG's strong interest in seeing Mozambique participate in PKO's, emphasizing the opportunity for professionalization of the country's military. He indicated that while the USG and other donors could evaluate what type of logistical support could be mustered, the next step needed was a strong statement of political will by the GRM. When Sumbana queried how that statement should be best communicated, the Charge replied that the GRM's PermRep in New York should advise the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) of Mozambique's interest. This notification, he continued, would likely trigger an evaluation process resulting in a concrete list of areas for improvement before the military could deploy--the logical point where donors could provide targeted support. Sumbana responded that the GRM wanted to participate in PKOs, and that he would speak to President Guebuza about notifying DPKO of Mozambique's interest. -------------- Zimbabwe -------------- ¶3. (C) Moving to Zimbabwe, the Charge said that the situation was reaching a critical point, and the USG was seriously concerned about the status of democracy and human rights. He asked if GRM officials had maintained channels of communication (alluded to in a previous conversation one month ago) with a new generation of ZANU-PF party leaders who recognized that Mugabe was not serving the long-term interests of the nation
. Sumbana noted that he had served as the Mozambican Ambassador to Zimbabwe in the 1990s and knew the situation intimately. He said that the GRM does indeed talk with ZANU-PF party members, but indicated that almost all fear Mugabe's retribution. He noted that only a 'half-dozen or so' senior advisors are benefiting from the current situation. When asked about Mozambique's public stance, Sumbana replied that publicly isolating Zimbabwe would only worsen Mugabe's attitude, which could result in thousands of Zimbabweans killed. Therefore, the GRM supported SADC and President Mbeki's efforts, which he believed had recently been showing promising signs of success. -------------- Opposition Parties -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Finally, the Charge advised the Minister that he intended to meet with members of the central committee of the FRELIMO party, and to also begin reaching out to opposition parties including RENAMO, as part of a series of regular diplomatic calls. Sumbana thanked the Charge for this information, recognizing that the Charge was not required to advise the government of such visits. He asked the Charge to relay the message that FRELIMO wanted a moderate opposition that would be open to constructive dialogue--a patriotic duty to do what was best for the country as a whole. Sumbana lamented that RENAMO's leader Afonso Dhlakama refused to meet with President Guebueza, despite numerous invitations. (Note: Dhlakama claims publicly that he has never been invited to meet with Guebuza.) The Minister of the Presidency claimed that some in RENAMO were far more extreme than Dhlakama, who otherwise would be willing to participate in some national day celebrations. Therefore, he concluded, it was in FRELIMO's best interests to ensure Dhlakama remained at RENAMO's helm. MAPUTO 00001278 002 OF 002 -------------- Comment: PKO's Possible; Zimbabwe Challenging -------------- ¶5. (C) The Minister,s line of questioning on PKO's indicates that the GRM is still contemplating PKO participation, even if a bit unsure on how to proceed. The Charge and DATT will meet November 7 with British, French, Dutch, and Canadian counterparts to discuss what joint approaches and support might be possible to help chart a course for eventual Mozambican participation in PKO's. On Zimbabwe, Sumbana's acknowledgement that the GRM is in contact with ZANU-PF party members suggests that the GRM is broadening efforts--albeit gingerly and behind the scenes--to at least remain engaged and to prepare for an eventual post-Mugabe bilateral relationship. That said, the GRM is clearly averse to being too forward or public in its approach, for fear of any backlash from Mugabe or the appearance that it is out of step with SADC and Mbeki. Chapman

Share this cable

 facebook -  bluesky -