GOVERNMENT NEGOTIATOR: PEACE TALKS ON TRACK,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MANILA 000787 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/09/2017 TAGS: EAID MY PINS PREL RP SUBJECT: GOVERNMENT NEGOTIATOR: PEACE TALKS ON TRACK, SEEKS QUIET US HELP REF: MANILA 594 AND PREVIOUS Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Kristie Kenney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Government peace negotiator Secretary Afable told DCM and visiting EAP/MTS Director Marciel March 1 that territorial differences between the government and MILF had narrowed considerably, thanks to the visit and intervention of Malaysian negotiator Othman. Afable sought quiet U.S. Embassy intercession with his cabinet colleagues, local leaders and the MILF in a push to achieve a compromise on territory in the near future, which we agreed to provide (Ambassador already raised the issue with Executive Secretary Ermita). Afable also agreed to share confidential negotiating documents and maps to allow Embassy to direct assistance more effectively to bolster the peace process. DCM briefed on Embassy delegation's February 15 meeting with MILF Central Committee members in Mindanao. While keeping confidential the level of detail in our discussions with SIPDIS Afable, we will ratchet up our engagement in key localities and raise with a range of contacts the need to compromise on territory to achieve peace. Ambassador chaired an Embassy working group which agreed on the need for concerted USG efforts to support a peace agreement this year, which would help eliminate terrorists from Mindanao, and brainstormed a number of new initiatives which we will now seek to operationalize. End Summary ¶2. (C) After DCM briefed Government peace negotiator Secretary Silvestre (Yong) Afable on Embassy delegation SIPDIS meeting with MILF leadership February 15 (reftel),Afable briefed DCM and visiting EAP/MTS Office Director Marciel on the latest developments in the peace talks. Malaysian negotiator Othman had recently spent two days with the MILF in Mindanao followed by a day with Afable in Manila. Afable laid out three maps depicting: the government's territorial offer to add contiguous Muslim-majority villages to the current Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao to create a new political entity; the MILF's vision for control of the western half of Mindanao, based on the historical lands of the Sultanate of Sulu 100 years ago (much of which is now majority Christian or indigenous); and, proposed map presented by the Malaysians. The Malaysian compromise added ;just eight municipalities, albeit largely Christian municipalities, to the government's proposal, representing a massive scaling back from the original MILF position, Afable said. The Malaysians told Afable that if the Philippine government would formally table this Malaysian proposed map, the Malaysians would restart the peace talks. Afable said the Malaysians had really pressed the MILF to reduce territorial demands radically. He indicated that the Malaysian-proposed map would not become the final agreement but rather a negotiating point from which the MILF would demand additional concessions. Nevertheless, Afable believed the Malaysian proposal represented a potential break-through on territory, a key impasse in the peace talks. ¶3. (C) The challenge, Afable continued, was to convince local and national political leaders to accept territorial concessions of Christian areas, made more difficult by the imminent outset of the campaign season for the May 14 mid-term elections. The reputation of the current ARMM was so poor that local governments did not want to join a new, larger Muslim political entity. Afable said he had yet to brief his own government on the Malaysian proposal, and worried that President Arroyo would find it difficult to accept any territorial concessions during the election season. Asked by DCM if he could use some help with the national or local government officials, or the MILF, Afable said, "all of the above." DCM said we would seek opportunities to convey to all relevant players that it is time to make the difficult territorial compromises for peace, without indicating our knowledge of the Malaysian proposal. (Comment: Ambassador already delivered this message to Executive Secretary Ermita during a breakfast meeting on March 2). ¶4. (C) Aside from raising the need for territorial concessions with all players, DCM said the Embassy was prepared to expand our engagement to help prepare the MILF to play an appropriate political role after an agreement. We could offer the MILF assistance to develop into a viable political party and help develop concepts of policing. We could also expand our contacts with stakeholders, and U.S. Special Forces could coordinate more frequently with the Malaysian-led International Monitoring Team on MEDCAPS and other community outreach. Separately, DCM suggested that the MANILA 00000787 002.2 OF 002 Philippine government convene a meeting of embassies that interact with the MILF, such as the U.S., Japan, Malaysia, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, and others, to share information and coordinate messages. Afable welcomed all of these ideas. DCM asked to see the sensitive consensus points agreed by the Philippine government and the MILF to date, in order to be able to best channel U.S. assistance to the process. Afable agreed to provide them very discreetly. ¶6. (C) Comment: At an internal peace process working group chaired by the Ambassador, key Embassy agencies and sections concluded that we should take advantage of the quiet openings evident from our contacts with both the MILF and the government to press for a peace agreement this year, which we believe could significantly help rid Mindanao of terrorists. We will continue to support Malaysian leadership as the facilitator to the peace talks, but believe that coming to closure on a peace agreement will require more U.S. support behind the scenes. We will continue to develop and deploy our ideas on an interagency basis. KENNEY