NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR VIEWS WAY FORWARD IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MANILA 003392 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/10/2017 TAGS: PREL PINS KISL RP SUBJECT: NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR VIEWS WAY FORWARD IN MILF PEACE PROCESS REF: A. MANILA 3317 (GOVERNMENT AND MILF NARROW DIFFERENCES ON TERRITORY ¶B. MANILA 3194 (NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR ON PEACE PROCESS) ¶C. MANILA 2852 (GOVERNMENT AND MILF TO HOLD EXECUTIVE SESSION) Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Paul W. Jones for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: The Ambassador and DCM pressed National Security Advisor Gonzales to maintain momentum toward closing peace negotiations with Muslim insurgents over breakfast October 5. Gonzales described President Arroyo's impatience for reaching a deal, but said that recent strains within the governing coalition and in Congress called into question the government's strategy for quickly legislating territorial and governance provisions for a new Muslim political entity. The territory issue is very close to resolution, Gonzales said, but creating a governance structure to include all of Mindanao's communities, while also passing constitutional muster, was still a challenge. Gonzales said he was considering three models: broad self-determination, with a charter to be established by a transitional council; truly competitive and open elections in 2008 in an expanded Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, for which the insurgents could run candidates; and, "selecting" a competent candidate with insurgent credentials to run with Presidential backing in the Autonomous Region elections. The Ambassador and DCM encouraged the government to stay focused, since time is of the essence to implement an agreement during President Arroyo's tenure. In a separate meeting on October 4, former government negotiator Afable, who participated in negotiations in Kuala Lumpur in late September, told DCM that divisions in the governing coalition had raised the political price of concluding a peace deal, but that President Arroyo still wanted it. The Ambassador's Iftar dinner October 2 attracted a remarkable cross-section of Mindanao's oft-divided political leadership, including an insurgent representative, underscoring the potential for reconciliation and progress. End Summary. ¶2. (C) In a friendly and open discussion, the Ambassador and DCM noted the positive environment for concluding a peace agreement with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) insurgents. The people want peace; the insurgent leadership is politically weak; Philippine military leaders support peace; and the international community is more engaged and supportive than ever. The moment should not be lost, the Ambassador said, and forward momentum is critical to maintain the support of these and other stakeholders. ¶3. (C) Political challenges: Gonzales described President Arroyo's insistence on reaching a peace deal. The government had embarked on consultations with key members of Congress to educate them and build support for a negotiated deal. However, unrelated recriminations within the governing coalition had created unexpected challenges to the government's plan to introduce and quickly pass legislation containing territorial and governance provisions for a new Muslim political entity (ref B). Allegations of high-level corruption involving a Chinese loan to develop a National Broadband Network deal had recently led to the resignation of the head of the Commission on Elections and created fissures among pro-Administration members of both the House and Senate. The Ambassador steered Gonzales back to the peace process, noting that political challenges will always arise. ¶4. (C) Territory and Governance provisions: Gonzales said the territory issue was very close to resolution, but creating a governance structure to include all of Mindanao's communities that also passed constitutional muster was a significant challenge. Gonzales said the Cabinet was considering three possible models. The first model would grant broad self-determination for the new Muslim political entity, with a charter to be established by a transitional council. While this model is most attractive to the insurgents, Gonzales said it was the most difficult constitutionally. Under the second model, the MILF could run candidates against other Muslim factions in truly competitive and open elections already scheduled for 2008, in an expanded Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. Truly competitive elections would break with tradition, Gonzales noted, since the Presidential Palace would have to forego its historical practice of backing candidates financially and politically. The third model involved the "selection" of a competent candidate with insurgent credentials to run with Presidential backing in the Autonomous Region elections, in the hopes that such a candidate could attract MILF support. MANILA 00003392 002 OF 002 ¶5. (C) Gonzales complained that MILF leaders want political leadership of Muslim Mindanao handed to them without regard to their ability to win elections. DCM described discussions he has had with MILF leaders in which they supported a transitional council with set numbers of representatives appointed by the President, the MILF and other Muslim and Christian groups. The Ambassador noted that good constitutional lawyers could perhaps find ways to press the envelope in fleshing out President Arroyo's concept of self-determination. A new approach to governance was perhaps needed to pull-in the Muslim youth, so they do not support insurgent activity. The Ambassador and DCM encouraged the government to stay focused, noting that time was of the essence for an agreement to be implemented before the expiration of President Arroyo's tenure in 2010. Gonzales replied that the Cabinet's National Security Cluster would meet later that day to try to finalize the territory issue. He would continue to consider and consult on the governance issues. ¶6. (C) Former Negotiator: In a separate meeting on October 4, former government negotiator Afable (who participated in the late September executive session negotiations in Kuala Lumpur, ref C) underscored to the DCM that President Arroyo remained committed to negotiating a comprehensive and durable peace agreement. He worried, however, that recent political events were distracting her advisors and raising the political costs of concluding a deal. While the territory provisions could be agreed, Afable was concerned that some cabinet members may believe that governance provisions acceptable to the MILF would be too hard politically for the government to accept. ¶7. (C) Iftar Dinner: A remarkable cross-section of Mindanao's oft-divided political leadership attended an Iftar dinner at the Ambassador's residence October 2. Attendees included a representative from the leadership of the MILF, as well as leaders of the Moro National Liberation Front, Office of Muslim Affairs, Congress, Autonomous Region Regional Government, local government units, non-governmental organizations, civil society, and prominent Christian political figures such as Senate President Manny Villar. Their attendance pointedly underscored the potential for reconciliation and progress in the peace process. Visit Embassy Manila's Classified SIPRNET website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eap/manila/index. cfm You can also access this site through the State Department's Classified SIPRNET website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/ JONES