CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM ON PEACE TALKS RESUMPTION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MANILA 003050 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2017 TAGS: PREL PINS KISL RP SUBJECT: CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM ON PEACE TALKS RESUMPTION REF: A) MANILA 2852 B) MANILA 2838 Classified By: DCM Paul W. Jones for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: In a September 4 meeting with the DCM, the Philippines' chief negotiator with Muslim insurgents expressed cautious optimism that stalled peace talks could begin to make progress on key issues like territory and governance for a Muslim political entity in Mindanao. Peace Panel chairman Rodolfo Garcia suggested that the cabinet might soon agree on a territorial offer for the Muslim entity, and gave a general outline of key next steps in the process. Garcia observed that the recent informal executive session on August 27 with the insurgent Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in Kuala Lumpur was productive, citing an agreement to extend the mandate of the Malaysian-led international monitoring team and discussions on territory. The Malaysian government has pressed both sides to overcome the current stalemate in the talks held under its auspices, and the Malaysian and Philippine presidents committed to reviving the talks during an APEC meeting September 8. End summary. ¶2. (C) Garcia described the August 27 executive session of the government-insurgent talks in Kuala Lumpur as frank and informal. The key public accomplishment was extending for one year the mandate of the international monitoring team that oversees the current peace arrangement. The sides also agreed to expand the territory covered by the monitors, to include Basilan, Jolo, Palawan and Tawi-tawi, but Garcia added that the international monitoring team would not be stationing members on these islands since the MILF had only a "smattering" of forces there at best. In the event of an unforeseen crisis, as had occurred with the ambush and beheadings on Basilan on July 10, the international monitors would be able to investigate. ¶3. (C) Garcia said the real focus of the talks was a continued discussion of what territory to include in any future Muslim political entity in Mindanao, an issue that had been bogged down for a year. The two sides continued to engage in "probing" on the territory issue, and Garcia voiced concern that the issue could deadlock again if he attempted to open full-scale exploratory talks on the subject. The less formal executive sessions seemed more likely to "avoid explosions." On the government side, Garcia noted that a 
national security council meeting September 3 on the territory issue had yielded a productive discussion. The cabinet meeting had provided enough guidance to the negotiators "to get the talks going," but this was a living issue and there might be "some drags on the process." ¶4. (C) Negotiators were taking a step-by-step approach, Garcia said, first trying to figure out what territory would be included in the political entity, before taking up governance issues. "Before you build a house, you need to see the lot you are building on," Garcia observed. But one issue was clear: while the principle of self determination would apply in setting up the government structure, independence was not an option, Garcia stated. The goal was to allow local people to determine their future within a sovereign state. The goal was not a separate state. ¶5. (C) Once the area and governing structure were agreed, it would be vital to work with key local and national leaders in the Congress and Senate, Garcia said, not least because it would be necessary to amend the act that set up the autonomous region. A plebiscite would then be needed probably soon after a final peace accord was signed. While the historical record on such plebiscites was not encouraging (several Mindanao provinces voted against inclusion in the existing autonomous region),Garcia observed that the MILF had a better chance, as the territories in question were more contiguous. ¶6. (C) Malaysian intermediaries were impatient over the current impasse and got "ruffled" when the process did not go in expected directions, Garcia said. Still, they put on a good face and there had been no repeat of September 2006, when the Malaysians had lost some of their composure and made threats over the breakdown in the talks. Garcia himself observed that while contacts were good between himself and the Malaysians, and between the MILF and Kuala Lumpur, he wished the negotiating arrangement allowed him direct contacts with the Muslim insurgents. Informal links existed, but he noted that he could not call his MILF counterpart directly on the phone. ¶7. (C) Garcia stated firmly that he believed the MILF were not responsible for the July 10 beheadings of 10 Philippine MANILA 00003050 002 OF 002 Marines on Basilan, though an MILF command had initiated the ambush. In Garcia's experience, the MILF forces did not lie about their activities, but took responsibility for acts they committed. ¶8. (C) Meanwhile, President Arroyo and Malaysian President Badawi agreed to push for resumption of the peace talks during a September 8 meeting at APEC. Arroyo noted to the press that Badawi had pressed her to return to the talks, and she voiced optimism that the Malaysian-sponsored discussions would soon reconvene. ¶9. (C) Comment: Garcia gave a clear -- but very cautious -- signal that the government had made progress in its difficult internal deliberations over what territory to include in a future Muslim political entity on Mindanao. He was more equivocal on the question of political powersharing for the Muslim entity, explaining that "self determination" had not been fleshed out and could mean many things. The combination of Malaysian pressure and Arroyo's desire for a resolution to the insurgency before her tenure ends in 2010 could lead to further progress. But the negotiator would not be drawn out on timelines for progress, only on the issues of territory and governance still outstanding. KENNEY