NPA ELECTION EXTORTION: BICOL REGION 2007

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MANILA 001928 SIPDIS SIPDIS FOR EAP/MTS AND INR/EAP E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/12/2012 TAGS: PTER MOPS PGOV PHUM RP SUBJECT: NPA ELECTION EXTORTION: BICOL REGION 2007 Classified By: Pol/C Scott Bellard, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary. In Bicol, the Communist New People's Army (NPA) reportedly garnered unprecedented sums from its extortion activities in the run-up to the May 14 mid-term elections. Local politicians have criticized security forces for failing to protect them during the campaigning. The good news is that international sanctions have been noticeably successful in drying up sources of external funding and that the NPA is increasingly turning into no more than a ragged string of individual bandit/extortion gangs. The bad news is that the NPA still has the ability to terrorize so much of the rural countryside, to shake down even mainstream politicians, and successfully to rely on threats of violence -- or individuals acts of terrorism -- to get what it wants. End Summary. If You Don't Pay, You Don't Play -------------- ¶2. (C) According to Philippine National Police (PNP) regional director Police Superintendent Agnanayon Tira in Albay province of Bicol region in southern Luzon Island, the local NPA during the run-up to the May 14 mid-term elections had imposed a "permit to win" upon candidates, which required steeper extortion amounts than in 2004 even to enter the area. He noted that these "permits" had been only "experimental" during the 2004 elections but were nationwide in 2007. Ramping up from "campaign taxes" for the "right" to campaign in NPA-influenced areas in earlier elections, the NPA in 2007 increased the amount and added an outright ban on entry to those who refused to pay, he claimed. Another PNP source alleged that the victorious candidate in the Albay governor's race had transferred 37 million pesos (USD 800,000) into the NPA's coffers. According to a PNP field-grade officer, this particular candidate's contribution was just one of many. Outgoing Albay governor Fernando Gonzales, who lost the race, told emboff that he had been "denied entry" into the entire south of Albay Province, and attributed this to insufficient security guarantees to campaign there. He blamed his defeat directly on the NPA. ¶3. (C) According to Legaspi City chief of police Adel Castillo, the NPA's election "taxes" in 2007 were of "unprecedented size," and demonstrated the "growing strength" of the NPA. He commented that the willingness of candidates to cooperate with the NPA raised questions about exactly what the candidates expected from the NPA in return, as well as about what future promises might be part of the deal. Regional level PNP officers separately vowed to monitor possible continued relationships between victorious candidates and the NPA, albeit with "great caution." They expressed concern that pursuing criminal cases against individual politicians would lead to accusations of "Marcos-era heavy-handedness." ¶4. (C) Castillo added that the NPA needed to generate more revenue because its own expenses had increased due to greater financial obligations for its fighters and their families at a time when its outside sources of income, especially from Europe, had dwindled due to the NPA's terrorist designation. Referring to the self-exiled Philippine Communist leader, Castillo commented that "Jose Sison is behind the times. His own people in the Philippines have reached the best solution: major taxation to stay in business." It Only Takes a Few -------------- ¶5. (C) In the Bicol Region, NPA violence increased in the months prior to the elections, according to PNP sources. One PNP regional command intelligence officer said that there had been 18 murders attributed to the NPA in March alone. In December 2006, NPA forces had attacked a PNP substation in Camarines Sur province, resulting in two dead and two wounded police officers. Following this bold attack, the PNP had raised the minimum number of personnel assigned to each station to 20, regardless of community size. A rare but audacious urban assassination of a retired police officer in Legaspi City -- also attributed to the NPA -- helped further to increase the level of intimidation of the political class, they noted. ¶6. (C) Mayor Jesse Robredo of Naga City in Camarines Sur separately admitted that "all it takes are a small number of faceless armed men" to create an "atmosphere of intimidation." He said that he did not dare to leave the city limits after dark. According to Albay Governor MANILA 00001928 002 OF 002 Gonzales, the mere fact they were armed and outside the law gave the NPA cadres "great power beyond their numbers." Without their weapons, they were "nobodies," he added. Governor Gonzales accused both the PNP and the AFP of being "insufficiently active" during the election campaign and of not providing enough protection to him and other candidates. Mayor Robredo claimed that the AFP and PNP had assumed only "defensive postures," despite continued NPA harassment. ¶7. (C) PNP sources underscored that the actual number of armed NPA fighters in Bicol region was small, but noted that the latest intelligence estimates by the PNP and Armed Forces of the Philippines had revised upwards NPA personnel strength and areas of influence in Bicol. However, in the entire Bicol region, there were only an estimated 350 armed "cadres" as well as an additional 200 or so active but unarmed supporters. Of these, 60 armed NPA guerrillas operated in Camerines Sur province alone. AFP 9th Division commander Brigadier General Arsenio Arugay separately disputed the new intelligence estimates. He described the estimates as reflecting a "bureaucratic" tendency by AFP and PNP personnel to "exaggerate" the number of NPA-influenced localities. Comment -------------- ¶8. (C) Payoffs to the NPA are one of the dark but badly kept secrets of Philippine elections, despite earlier pledges by the government to crack down on anyone aiding and abetting the NPA and Communist Party of the Philippines in any way, including payment of "campaign fees." The good news is that international sanctions have been noticeably successful in drying up sources of external funding and that the NPA is increasingly turning into no more than a ragged string of individual bandit/extortion gangs. The bad news is that the NPA still has the ability to terrorize so much of the rural countryside, to shake down even mainstream politicians, and successfully to rely on threats of violence -- as well as individual acts of terrorism -- to get what it wants. Visit Embassy Manila's Classified SIPRNET website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eap/manila/index. cfm You can also access this site through the State Department's Classified SIPRNET website: http://www.state.sgov. KENNEY