MISUARI DETERMINED TO GAIN FREEDOM AND POLITICAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MANILA 001011 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/29/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS RP SUBJECT: MISUARI DETERMINED TO GAIN FREEDOM AND POLITICAL OFFICE REF: A. MANILA 962 ¶B. MANILA 923 Classified By: Pol/C Scott Bellard for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Imprisoned Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) Chairman Nur Misuari reportedly has pledged cooperation with USG peace, security, and development efforts in Mindanao. Despite a long-standing and intermittently ongoing trial for sedition, Misuari is determined to win the May 14 gubernatorial election in Sulu province, as well as to head an MNLF delegation to the OIC in Saudi Arabia in July. As the only leader of the MNLF recognized by the OIC, Misuari remains an important actor in at least part of Mindanao, but his apparent hopes of either imminent freedom or a return to political power may be quixotic. End summary. -------------- Misuari Supports USG In Mindanao -------------- ¶2. (C) According to MNLF Chairman Nur Misuari's attorney -- former Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) Solicitor-General Ombra Jainal, Misuari now wanted to cooperate with the USG's peace, security, and development efforts in Mindanao. Jainal thanked the USG on behalf of Misuari for reducing human rights violations in Sulu province. While describing Misuari as a "reasonable man" who no longer had any appetite for war, Jainal noted "Misuari wants freedom" following five years imprisonment on charges of sedition, which he claimed were based on "hearsay." He said that he would file a motion for dismissal during an April 11 hearing at the Makati Regional Trial Court. -------------- Determined to Win Election -------------- ¶3. (C) Jainal said he had personally advised Misuari not to run against well financed politicians Abdulsakur Tan and incumbent Sulu Governor Benjamin Loong in the May 14 gubernatorial election. Nonetheless, Misuari viewed himself as the only candidate with the grassroots support to become Sulu Governor, and not only registered as a candidate but even had Interior Secretary Ronaldo Puno, in his capacity as Kampi Party president, swear him in as the party's official candidate on March 26. Jainal admitted that, without support from Malacanang, Misuari would be unlikely to win the election. Jainal commented that Misuari planned to address endemic corruption, drug trafficking, and the presence of Abu Sayyaf members in Sulu, while trying to attract more international development assistance for poverty stricken areas. -------------- Sabah Sensitivities -------------- ¶4. (C) Jainal claimed that Malaysia had become increasingly apprehensive over Misuari's resurgent political stature as well as his potential to influence the large Filipino population residing in Sarah, to which the Philippines has not officially renounced its claim. Jainal commented that "neutralization of the Sabah issue" had been a primary motive behind Malaysia's hosting of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) peace talks in Kuala Lumpur. He noted that the mostly ethnic Maguindanaon MILF leadership in central Mindanao did not support the recovery of Sabah, unlike some 20 competing Sultans of Sulu and North Borneo and the ethnic Tausug-dominated MNLF leadership within the Sulu Archipelago. -------------- The OIC connection -------------- ¶5. (C) Jainal insisted that the MNLF would never accept an MILF peace pact that supplanted its own 1996 final peace agreement with the Philippine government, and underscored that the inclusion of territory from the six-province ARMM under a new MILF political entity would require Congressional approval and a plebiscite. Jainal claimed that Misuari has resisted pressure by the Philippine government to support its own observer status in the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) and to certify provisions of the 1996 Final Peace Agreement as fully implemented. He explained that the Philippine government apparently wanted first to settle its differences with the MNLF and OIC over implementation of the MANILA 00001011 002 OF 002 1996 agreement, and then to have Misuari negotiate with the MILF leadership over next steps. ¶6. (C) Jainal noted that Misuari's participation in the July 2007 GRP-MNLF-OIC Tripartite Conference in Jeddah remained uncertain. One issue that threatened to preclude Misuari's travel to Jeddah was the armed police escort that would likely have to accompany him, unless the Philippine court dismisses his case first. Jainal cited a March 9 incident at the Embassy of Saudi Arabia in Manila during OIC Special Envoy Sayed El-Masry's visit, when Misuari could not enter to perform noon prayers because his police escorts declined to hand over their firearms to the embassy's security personnel without prior permission from the court. -------------- Internal Divisions Remain -------------- ¶7. (C) During the OIC March visit, Misuari agreed to unify the MNLF in preparation for the Tripartite Conference, Jainal said. However, despite a recent agreement by members of the Council of 15 and Alvarez Isnaji factions of the MNLF to reunite with Misuari's fold, Jainal admitted that the organization remains internally divided. ¶8. (C) Jainal commented that the MILF leadership also faced internal divisions among at least four factions under Al-Haj Murad Ebrahim, Samir Hashim, Aleem Mimbantas, and Abdul Rakman Macapaar. Hashim, who considers himself the legitimate successor to his late brother, MILF Chairman Salamat Hashim, never accepted Murad in this position of power, according to Jainal. Members of Salamat Hashim's former guard force recently broke away from the MILF and joined the more secular MNLF, which includes Christians, said Jainal. -------------- Comment: -------------- ¶9. (C) Malacanang and the Makati Regional Trial Court hold at least some of the keys to Misuari's immediate future. While likely to retain some influence in Mindanao, especially in Sulu, he may well fail in his quests both for freedom and for a return to political power within the ARMM, at least in the near future. His gubernatorial campaign strikes many observers here as, at best, quixotic, and, at worst, as a desperate act by a political has-been. Visit Embassy Manila's Classified SIPRNET website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eap/manila/index. cfm You can also access this site through the State Department's Classified SIPRNET website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/ KENNEY